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ABSTRACT
The alleged privacy paradox states that individuals report high values for personal
privacy, while at the same time they report behavior that contradicts a high privacy value.
This is a misconception. Reported privacy behaviors are explained by asymmetric
subjective beliefs. Beliefs may or may not be uncertain, and non-neutral attitudes towards
uncertainty are not necessary to explain behavior. This research was conducted in three
related parts.
Part one presents an experiment in individual decision making under uncertainty.
Ellsberg’s canonical two-color choice problem was used to estimate attitudes towards
uncertainty. Subjects believed bets on the color ball drawn from Ellsberg’s ambiguous
urn were equally likely to pay. Estimated attitudes towards uncertainty were insignificant.
Subjective expected utility explained subjects’ choices better than uncertainty aversion
and the uncertain priors model. A second treatment tested Vernon Smith’s conjecture that
preferences in Ellsberg’s problem would be unchanged when the ambiguous lottery is
replaced by a compound objective lottery. The use of an objective compound lottery to
induce uncertainty did not affect subjects’ choices.
The second part of this dissertation extended the concept of uncertainty to
commodities where quality and accuracy of a quality report were potentially ambiguous.
The uncertain priors model is naturally extended to allow for potentially different
attitudes towards these two sources of uncertainty, quality and accuracy. As they relate to
privacy, quality and accuracy of a quality report are seen as metaphors for online security
and consumer trust in e-commerce, respectively. The results of parametric structural tests
were mixed. Subjects made choices consistent with neutral attitudes towards uncertainty
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in both the quality and accuracy domains. However, allowing for uncertainty aversion in
the quality domain and not the accuracy domain outperformed the alternative which only
allowed for uncertainty aversion in the accuracy domain.
Finally, part three integrated a public-goods game and punishment opportunities
with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit privacy values, replicating
previously reported privacy behaviors. The procedures developed elicited punishment
(consequence) beliefs and information confidentiality beliefs in the context of individual
privacy decisions. Three contributions are made to the literature. First, by using cash
rewards as a mechanism to map actions to consequences, the study eliminated
hypothetical bias as a confounding behavioral factor which is pervasive in the privacy
literature. Econometric results support the ―privacy paradox‖ at levels greater than 10
percent. Second, the roles of asymmetric beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were
identified using parametric structural likelihood methods. Subjects were, in general,
uncertainty neutral and believed ―bad‖ events were more likely to occur when their
private information was not confidential. A third contribution is a partial test to determine
which uncertain process, loss of privacy or the resolution of consequences, is of primary
importance to individual decision-makers. Choices were consistent with uncertainty
neutral preferences in both the privacy and consequences domains.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As a field, experimental and behavioral economics is familiar with the value of
individual anonymity in laboratory interactions.

Non-anonymous, face-to-face,

interactions motivate altruistic, reciprocal, and other interpersonal comparisons which
have been shown to change behavior in significant ways. This idea was first recognized
in Siegel and Fouraker (1960). In a small experiment, Alvin E. Roth (1995, p. 297-98)
demonstrates a significant decline in disagreement outcomes when bargaining is face-toface, as opposed to anonymous. The evidence further shows support for Siegel and
Fouraker’s (196) anonymity (uncontrolled social utility) hypothesis. Disagreement rates
are significantly higher in anonymous bargaining (Roth 1995, p. 298). However, face-toface disagreement rates are not significantly different when communication is
constrained. A related literature, beginning with Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith
(1994), demonstrates a significantly higher incidence of self-regarding behavior under
experimenter-subjects anonymity conditions.
What is less understood, however, is how individuals value their own personal
privacy, anonymity, and the consequences of privacy loss. What factors influence
individual decisions to voluntarily give-up or protect personal privacy? Using the
laboratory to simulate real-world exchanges of personal privacy, this thesis seeks to
obtain a deeper understanding of how individuals value privacy (confidentiality) in
bilateral bargaining situations, and how these valuations may be conditioned on existing
states of privacy.
If values of privacy have been understood for centuries (Westin 1967, 2003), why
then do individual privacy decisions appear to exhibit what some have called paradoxical
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behaviors? Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a) reports survey responses for 119 subjects,
between 19 and 55 years of age. A majority of responses (89.2%) indicate that subjects
are highly concerned about privacy.1,2 However, 87.5% of those same respondents have
signed up for loyalty shopping cards, potentially placing themselves in privacy-sensitive
situations. For example, the marketing firm HMI Communications, hired by Microsoft to
handle a promotional ―give-away‖ of Visual Studio.net, inadvertently allowed personal
information such as address, email, and telephone number for thousands of applicants to
be made public (Orlowski 2002). Did these individuals consider the likelihood of their
identifiable information becoming public, did they consider the likelihood of fraud,
conditional on such a release, and how do the benefits of receiving a free copy of Visual
Studio.net compare to the potential loss due to an increased risk of fraud? Similar
questions can be asked of subscriber to AOL internet service (Barbaro and Zellner 2006).
When AOL released 20 million web searches made from the AOL search engine,
numerous individuals self-identified themselves through their web searches.
The claim of paradoxical behavior rests on a misconception. Privacy behavior is
easily explained as a tradeoff between expected benefits and expected costs. Conditional
subjective beliefs account for the behavior reported in Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a).
This thesis studies the roles of risk and uncertainty in privacy decision making. To
accomplish this goal, laboratory experiments were conducted in three parts. Part one
tested the canonical choice problem described by Ellsberg (1961, p. 650) and the role of
uncertainty aversion in violations of Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory.
Part two extended the concept of uncertainty aversion to commodities with more than one
1

The term ―high concern‖ is a self-reported qualitative ranking of how concerned survey respondents are
about their privacy.
2
Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) observe similar self-reported behaviors.
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source of uncertainty. The experimental design of Heath and Tversky (1991) was adapted
to partially identify if subjects differentiate between uncertainties from different sources.
And, finally, part three expands on the methods developed in parts one and two to study
privacy decision-making and the role of uncertainty aversion.
1.1 Experiments in Personal Privacy
Individuals report high values for personal privacy, while at the same time
reporting behaviors that would seem to contradict having high privacy values. These
reports are self-reports from hypothetical surveys in which there are no real consequences
from dishonest reporting. This statement of the alleged privacy paradox describes the
canonical ―loyalty card‖ example discussed in Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a) and
others. Syverson (2003) and Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis (2007) argue these reports are not
indicative of paradoxical behavior. The dichotomy in self reports is attributable to either
subject heterogeneity (Spiekermann, Grossklags, and Berendt 2002), or recognition that
the alleged paradox assumes that stated attitudes map directly into consistent behavior
(Syverson 2003; Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis 2007).
More cachet explanations have included: bounded rationality, incomplete
information, psychological distortions, attitudes towards risk/uncertainty3, and strategic
interactions such as trust (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004 and 2005a). Evidence put
forward in support of these claims is arguably tainted by confounding factors. These
factors are: hypothetical biases, experimenter trust, framing effects, and deceit.
Hypothetical bias in privacy studies is supported by Acquisti and Grossklags
(2007), and is also a potential confound in Acquisti and Grossklags (2005b) and

3

It should be noted that neither risk nor uncertainty aversion are necessary conditions to explain allegedly
paradoxical privacy behavior.
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Huberman, Adar, and Fine (2005). Huberman et al (2005) elicit real and hypothetical
values for pieces of private information. For their real treatment, average willingness-toaccept for loss in weight privacy was $74.06, and 57.56 for age privacy loss.4 Reported
values rose dramatically for hypothetical salary and other unverifiable characteristics. In
Acquisti and Grossklags (2005b)5 values for 13 data categories such as name, SSN,
favorite online alias, home address, phone number, email address, sexual fantasies, etc.
were elicited using an open-ended hypothetical instrument. Wathieu and Friedman (2007,
sec. 1) would use these results as providing ―useful dollar values‖ for privacy valuations.
However, Harrison and Rutström (1999) tell us there are probably significant upward
biases on these reports. Even if one corrected for hypothetical bias, as illustrated in List
and Shogren (2002), instruments used in privacy experiments do not provide mechanisms
mapping actions into controlled consequences.6
The Duhem-Quine problem7 can be found in Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007),
where deceitful practices and experimenter trust effects are confounding factors. In
Norberg et al. (2007) an attempt was made to control for both uncertainty and trust
through framing of a hypothetical survey instrument designed to simulate a marketer’s
request for personal information. Their results offer little, if any, support for paradoxical
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Huberman, Adar, and Fine (2005) conducted both a theoretically incentive compatible sealed bid real
reverse Vickrey auction, and a hypothetical reverse Vickrey auction. Real auctions consisted of selling
verifiable personal information, such as weight and age for 127 individuals. Rutström (1998) and Harstad
(2000) provide evidence that behavior in Vickrey auctions does not reliably induce truthful responses,
despite the theoretical incentive compatibility of the procedure. These bids need to be interpreted with
caution. Hypothetical auctions were carried out for ―unverifiable‖ information, such as credit rating,
income, and savings. The average demand prices for age and weight were $57.56 and $74.06, respectively.
5
Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a) and (2005b) use the same subject pool.
6
Furthermore, results presented in Acquists and Grossklags (2005b) does not test effects of uncertain
(ambiguous) consequences on individual privacy decisions. The experimental design varied the framing of
benefits as either a payment or discount on a purchase, not with uncertainty.
7
The Duhem-Quine thesis states that without proving the background assumptions it is impossible to prove
or disprove a theory. Absence of order effects is an untested background assumption in Acquists and
Grossklags (2005b).
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privacy behavior. Violation of the ceteris paribus condition, as well as deceitful
experimental practices, explained below, confounds their experiment.
The initial experimental treatment in Norberg et al. (2007) was conducted under a
hypothetical scenario, asking subjects to behave as if they were responding to an
information request by a bank. Subjects were instructed that they were taking part in a
focus group to aid in the design of a bank’s survey instrument. The second treatment
removed the as if condition but a level of trust (i.e., a bank representative8) was added.
Treatment two of the ―experiment‖ used dishonest practices. There was in fact no bank,
and the bank representative was a fraud designed to cajole subjects into freely revealing
personal information.
Deceitful practices question the validity of subject responses, even under the most
pristine experimental conditions. Do the subjects in Norberg et al. (2007) have previous
experiences with deceitful practices? If so, are they responding truthfully, or are they
trying to exhibit behavior that they think the researchers want to see? Or, are they languid
with respect to the experimental task, simply reporting systematic responses in an attempt
to extract resources (e.g., money or grades) from the experimenter? Hertwig and Ortmann
(2001, p. 396-399) offer a detailed survey of potential detriments to deceiving and using
subjects whom have previously been deceived by such experimental designs.
Trust affects were also likely confounds in the online shopping experiment
reported in Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt (2002), Berendt, Günther, and
Spiekerman (2005). In this particular experiment, subjects were given the opportunity to
purchase real commodities (a camera or jacket) with their own money during an online
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Phase two of the ―experiment‖ presented in Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) used dishonest practices.
There was no bank representative (ibid., 111, 115).
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shopping experience. However, at the outset of the experiment, subjects were instructed
―the experiment’s goal was to test interaction with a new product search engine.‖
(Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt 2002 p. 40). These instructions, cue subjects to
interact with the search engine as an expected behavior during the experiment.
Furthermore, provision of rights according to EU privacy directive 95/46/EC and
(unspoken) institutional review board policies likely diminish subject apprehensions to
providing the experimenter with personal information.
The literature recognizes that stated intentions often contradict (stated) behavior,
even for privacy decisions. Subjective beliefs, consistent with Savage’s (1954) subjective
expected utility, are capable of explaining reported privacy behaviors. As a result, the
concept of uncertainty and attitudes towards uncertainty are unnecessary explanations.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a series of numerical
examples to demonstrate the role beliefs play in explaining privacy behaviors. The
concept of uncertainty is introduced with Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, and rationalized
with the uncertain-priors model of Neilson (1993, 2009) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005). Three experiments are proposed to test six hypotheses developed
throughout the chapter. Each experiment and findings are presented in chapters 3, 4, and
5 respectively.
Chapter 3 experimentally identifies attitudes towards uncertainty in the classic
Ellsberg (1961) framework. A structural econometric model is developed to calibrate
estimated attitudes for risk aversion and subjective beliefs. In Chapter 4, the experimental
design of heath and Tversky (1991) and linear scoring rule is used to elicit individual
preferences for objective, uncertain, and compound uncertain lottery pairs. Structural

6

econometric modeling suggests that subjects may cognitively differentiate multiple
uncertain processes. Chapter 5 implements an experimental design replicating privacy
behaviors previously documented in the literature. The experimental instruments are
designed to mitigate previously identified experimental confounds and biases from
hypothetical choice situations, experimenter trust effects, time inconsistent preferences,
uncontrolled preferences, and deceitful practices. In addition to replicating privacy
behaviors in a controlled environment, the data suggest that subjects respond differently
to uncertain of confidentiality loss and uncertain consequences. The results of chapters 4
and 5 also support a hypothesis that trust confounded subject choices in Spiekerman et al.
(2007), Berendt et al. (2002), and affected consumer decisions in AOL and HMI. Finally,
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The alleged privacy paradox says decision-makers report high values for personal
privacy, while at the same time these same decision-makers report behaviors that would
seem to contradict having high privacy values. Three behavioral explanations
hypothesized to rationalize reported behavior are: Savage’s subjective expected utility
(Syverson 2003), aversion to uncertainty (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004), and time
inconsistent preferences (Acquisti 2004). In the sequel, I test Syverson’s (2003)
hypothesis that the pattern of observed privacy behaviors is consistent with Savage’s
(1954) subjective expected utility (SEU) model. Uncertainty aversion is a more general
model, where the decision-maker holds multiple uncertain prior beliefs for the risks
associated with privacy behavior. Because of its close relation to subjective beliefs, the
time inconsistencies explanation is not studied here.
2.1 Subjective Expected Utility
Savage (1954) shows that if the decision-maker behaves according to a set of
axioms he will behave as if maximizing a preference functional give by

V z   pj  v z j  ,

(1)

jJ

where z j are consequences of act Z , dependent on which state j  J occurs, p j is a
probability measure (subjectively) known to the decision-maker, and v   is the state
independent utility function. To show how SEU preferences explain privacy behavior,
consider the canonical ―loyalty card‖ example discussed by Acquisti and Grossklags
(2005a). A majority of survey respondents (89.2%) reported having a high concern for
privacy. However, those same respondents admit to routinely placing themselves in
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privacy-sensitive situations. For example, 87.5% of respondents with a high concern for
privacy have signed up for loyalty cards using real identifying information.
A high privacy concern is taken to be synonymous with a high dollar value of
private information. Thus, the paradoxical privacy behavior is represented by the decision
to not make a direct-sale of information to someone who would potentially do harm,
while at the same time make an indirect-sale of the same personal information to
someone who will not do direct harm but may reveal the information to the same person
who would potentially do harm. Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a), among others, would
claim this behavior represents a dichotomy between stated privacy concerns and stated
behavior.
Consider this numerical example of the ―loyalty card‖ problem. Assume the
decision-maker has an initial wealth level given by w (e.g., w  $100 ) and, in exchange
for identifying information, he is offered some positive amount of money y (e.g.,
y  $20 ). If the decision-maker is successfully defrauded, he will lose some portion of

his wealth. For simplicity, assume he loses 1   percent, retaining either  w or

  w  y  following a successful fraud attempt. Specifically, let   0.5 ,  w  $50 and

  w  y   $60 . Finally, let J   cg,cb,ng, nb  be the events (good (g) conditional of
confidential (c), bad (d) conditional on confidentiality, etc.) considered by the decisionmaker.
For the direct sale the decision-maker compares the lottery between good and bad
events conditional on confidentiality, against the alternative lottery for good and bad
events conditional on non-confidentiality and payment for his identifying information.
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Assume these beliefs are given by

 pc , pn    0.50,0.50 .

p

g|c

, pb|c , pg|n , pb|n    0.65,0.35,0.35,0.65 with

When his identifying information is confidential, the decision-

maker believes there is a lower risk of being defrauded.
Defining v  x   x , SEU preferences imply that if the decision-maker makes the
direct sale he expects utility

V  z|direct sale   0.35  120  0.65  60  8.869 ,
and if he does not make the direct sale he expects utility

V  z|no direct sale   0.65  100  0.35  50  8.975 .
The decision-maker decides not to make the direct sale. However, when confronted with
the same offer of $20 for an indirect sale, the decision-maker agrees to the transaction
because he believes there is a 50 percent chance his personal information remains
confidential. For the indirect sale, the decision-maker expects utilities

V  z|indirect sale   0.5  0.35  120  0.65  60 
0.5  0.65  120  0.35  60   9.350 , and
V  z|no indirect sale   0.65  100  0.35  50  8.975  V  z|no direct sale  .
As this example demonstrates, exotic non-SEU preference functions are
unnecessary to explain privacy behaviors. However, for ambiguous events, decisionmakers appear to exhibit aversion to uncertain mean preserving spreads (Camerer and
Weber 1992). Halevy (2007) reports on an experiment where approximately 30% are
characterized by ambiguity aversion. The uncertain priors (UP) model (Neilson 1993,
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2009; and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005) is used to behaviorally allow for
attitudes towards uncertain privacy events.
The canonical concept of uncertainty aversion is introduced with Ellsberg’s
(1961, p. 650) two-color problem. The same UP model also explains Ellsberg’s threecolor problem (see Appendix B).
2.2 Uncertainty Aversion: Ellsberg’s Paradox
Consider the following Ellsberg (1961, p. 650) example. There are two urns, and
each is filled with red and black balls. Urn 1 contains 100 balls, split evenly between red
and black. Balls drawn from urn 1 are labeled ―R‖ for red and ―B‖ for black. Urn 2 also
contains 100 balls. However, the mix of balls is unknown. Balls drawn from urn 2 are
labeled ―r‖ for red and ―b‖ for black.

Outcomes
Rr
Rb
Br
Bb

Table 1. Ellsberg’s Two Urn Problem
L1
L2
L3
$100
$0
$100
$100
$100
$0
$0
$0
$100
$0
$100
$0

L4
$0
$0
$100
$100

Table 1 shows four lotteries ( L1 , L2 , L3 , and L4 ), with prizes $0 or $100 defined
over the unique outcomes from drawing one ball from urn 1, and then a second ball from
urn 2. Ellsberg (1961) hypothesized that subjects would exhibit preference relations given
by L1 ~ L4 , L2 ~ L3 , L1

L2 , and L4

L3 . These hypotheses are the result of a thought

experiment by Ellsberg, in the sense defined by Harrison and List (2004). He did pose
these choices hypothetically to several prominent economists, including Savage. But the
key ―empirical hypothesis‖ here derives from intuition, not observed choices in the sense
that modern experimental economics would suggest.
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Remember, L2 and L3 are each filled with 100 balls in unknown proportions of red
and black balls. Had our Ellsberg decision-maker believed either event red or black was
more likely to occur, he would have preferred to a bet paying on that color to
indifference. By stating indifference, he is revealing to us his prior uniform belief. By this
same logic, preferences for L1 over L2 and for L4 over L3 implies (Savage’s (1954) SEU)
that subjects believe the likelihood of drawing red and black balls from urn 2 are less than
1
2

, hence the paradox. The UP model (Neilson 1993, 2009; and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and

Mukerji 2005) rationalizes these preferences by applying Savage’s (1954) axioms to
second-order beliefs.
2.2.1 The Uncertain Priors Model
Using the terminology of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), let there be j  1,..., J
(uncertain) horse lotteries and k  1,..., K (certain) roulette lotteries. The decision-maker
holds i  1,..., I prior distributions over each horse’s ability to win the race – the outcome
of the uncertain process U . Denote the probability over these priors as ρ   1 ,...,  I  .
The set U i1 ,...,U iJ  is the set of uncertain processes with unknown probabilities for each
of the J horses winning the race. Define a set  C1 ,..., CK  as the set of certain processes
with known probabilities over each of the K roulette lotteries.
Let  ij1 ,..., ijK  define the subjective conditional probabilities assigned to j th
horse winning and the k th roulette lottery outcome under each prior i . The decisionmaker’s overall evaluation of his preference for the race is
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I
 J K

W  z    i u    ijk v  z jk   ,
i 1
 j 1 k 1


(2)

where W  z  is the evaluation of all I priors that the decision-maker holds, and

 ijk   ijU  kC with  ijU defined as the probabilistic belief of each horse j winning and  kC
the known probability of the k th certain event. The function v   measures utility over
final payoffs z jk , and u   is the evaluation of the decision-maker’s subjective expected
utility over final payoffs from the certain roulette lotteries. The curvature of u  
measures uncertainty associated with the priors i  1,..., I . To illustrate how the UP model
is able to account for the preferences depicted in Ellsberg’s example, I recreate the
numerical example found in Andersen, Harrison, Fountain, and Rutström (2009).
0.9
For some argument x , define v  x   x and u  x   x . Define balls drawn

from urns 1 and 2 as belonging to the sets k  R,B and j  r,b , respectively.
Further assume the decision-maker holds three priors over the distribution of balls in urn
U
U
2. That is,  1, 2 , 3    0.6,0.2,0.2  , with 1rU , 1bU    0.5,0.5 ,  2r
,  2b
   0.4,0.6 ,

and



U
3r

U
,  3b
   0.6,0.4 . For each of these priors, the decision-maker evaluates

 ijk   ijU  kC as 1rU  RC ,1bU  RC ,1rU  BC ,1bU  BC    0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25 for his first prior set
U C
U
U
of probabilistic beliefs,  2r
 R , 2b
 RC , 2rU  BC , 2b
 BC    0.2,0.3,0.2,0.3 for his second

set of prior beliefs, and finally for his third set of priors the decision-maker believes
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U
3r

U C
U C
 RC , 3b
 R , 3rU  BC , 3b
 B    0.3,0.2,0.3,0.2  . For each of these priors, the evaluation

of

 v  z  for lottery L
J

K

j 1 k 1

ijk

1

jk

(see Table 1) is then given by

L1 :

0.25 10  0.25  10  0.25  0  0.25  0  5 ,

L1 :

0.20 10  0.30  10  0.20  0  0.30  0  5 ,

L1 :

0.30 10  0.20  10  0.30  0  0.20  0  5 ,

under prior 1,

under prior 2, and

under prior 3. Similar calculations are made for lotteries L2 , L3 , and L4 . Evaluating
preferences for each lottery,

W  L1   0.6  50.9  0.2  50.9  0.2  50.9  4.257 ,

W  L2   0.6  50.9  0.2  60.9  0.2  40.9  4.254 ,
W  L3   0.6  50.9  0.2  40.9  0.2  60.9  4.254 ,

W  L4   0.6  50.9  0.2  50.9  0.2  50.9  4.257 .
For this numerical example, W  L1   W  L4  , W  L2   W  L3  , W  L1   W  L2  ,
and W  L4   W  L3  , which explains the hypothesized pattern of preferences in
Ellsberg’s example. It is easy to see that, if there is no aversion to uncertainty, such that

u  x   x apart from arbitrary normalizations, then W  L1   W  L2   W  L3   W  L4  .
This is the prediction of conventional subjective expected utility theory.
Although the hypothesis that individuals exhibit uncertainty aversion has been
studied extensively (Camerer and Webber 1992), prior investigations of the uncertainty
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aversion hypothesis failed to verify the background assumption: the decision-maker
believes that the realization of events is equally likely for both the known and unknown
urns. Given this gap in the existing literature, the first hypothesis to be tested is:
HYPOTHESIS 1:

In Ellsberg’s (1961) 2-color problem (p. 650), subjects behave as if
the realization of each uncertain event is equally likely as each
certain event and bets on certain events are preferred to bets on
uncertain events.

Smith (1969, p. 329) conjectured that Ellsberg’s (1961) pattern of preferences
would also be observable for bets where the distribution of balls in the ambiguous urn
was determined by a uniform random integer 0-100. Since then, experimentalists (Sarin
and Weber 1993; Harrison 2009) have considered compound lotteries as attractive tools
for inducing uncertainty in laboratory settings. Because Smith’s (1969) conjecture
remains untested, the following two hypotheses emerge as important methodological
inquiries:
HYPOTHESIS 2:

The proportion UP/SEU consistent choices are equal for both the
Ellsberg (1961) and Smith (1969) treatments.

HYPOTHESIS 3:

Attitudes towards uncertainty are equivalent for both the Ellsberg
(1961) and Smith (1969) lotteries.

The remainder of this chapter presents the UP model in the context of privacy.
Finally, the analysis is extended to include two uncertain processes.
2.3 Explaining Privacy Behavior with the Uncertain Priors Model
The Ellsberg (1961) example(s) and the UP model (Neilson 1993, 2009; and
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005) demonstrate how the uncertainty averse
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individual, will discount more heavily those processes which are described as ―more
uncertain.‖ The utility spread for L2 and L3 are greater than that of L1 and L4 .
The ―loyalty card‖ problem is used as to illustrate the role of uncertain priors in
privacy decisions. This behavior can occur in any privacy decision. The acts of
confession or being an ―anonymous source‖ are other examples of the privacy paradox.
Redefine k  g,b for the good and bad outcomes. Let the J uncertain events be
given by j  c,n for when the vendor has upheld the confidentiality of the decisionmaker and when confidentiality was violated. The following example shows that the UP
model with only one uncertain process explains the alleged privacy paradox when the
objective probabilities of experiencing either a good or bad events are conditional on the
decision-maker’s state of confidentiality.
Assume the decision-maker has an initial wealth level given by w (e.g.,

w  $100 ) and, in exchange for identifying information, he is offered some positive
amount of money y (e.g., y  $20 ). Unconditional on the decision to sell information, if
the decision-maker is successfully defrauded, he will lose some portion of his wealth. For
simplicity, assume he loses 1   percent, retaining either  w or   w  y  . Specifically,
let   0.5 ,  w  $50 and   w  y   $60 . Assume the decision-maker holds 2 priors

ρ   0.5,0.5 for the uncertainty that the decision-maker’s confidentiality is violated. For
U
each of these priors, let the distribution of events j  c,n be 1cU , 1n
   0.7,0.3 and



U
2c

U
,  2n
   0.3,0.7  . These beliefs assume the decision-maker has joined the loyalty
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card program. If the decision-maker does not make an indirect sale, then he forms a set of
U
degenerate beliefs 1cU , 1n
   2cU , 2nU    0,1 .

Let the objectively-known probabilities of a bad event conditional on a privacy
breach be



C
g|c

decision-maker



1cb

C
,  b|c
   0.65,0.35 and

holds



C
g|n

subjective

C
,  b|n
   0.35,0.65 . For prior one the

probabilistic

belief

given

by

,1nb ,1cg ,1ng    0.245,0.195,0.455,0.105 , and for prior two his beliefs are given



by

2cb

, 2nb , 2cg , 2ng    0.105,0.455,0.195,0.245 . Defining

v x  x

and

u  x   x0.7 , equation (2) implies that if the decision-maker makes an indirect sale, he
expects utility
W  z|indirect sale   0.5  0.245  60  0.195  60  0.455  120  0.105  120 
0.5  0.105  60  0.455  60  0.195  120  0.245  120 

0.7

0.7

 4.781 .

If he does not make an indirect sale, the decision-maker’s information remains
confidential and he forms beliefs



2cb



U
1c

, 1Un    2Uc ,  2Un   1,0  , which imply that

, 2nb , 2cg , 2ng   1cb ,1nb ,1cg ,1ng    0.35,0,0.65,0  , and

W (z|noindirect sale)  0.35  50  0.65  100 

0.7

 4.646  W  z|indirect sale  ,

and the decision-maker decides to make the indirect sale because he expects a higher
utility.
Calculating utilities for the direct sale part of the alleged paradox is similar to the
first part of the example. The direct sale decision removes the uncertainty from the
decision-maker’s problem. He forms one of two degenerate beliefs, 100% or 0%
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confidentiality. By not directly selling his information, the decision-maker forms the
U
degenerate belief 1cU , 1n
   2cU , 2nU   1,0 . Thus,

W (z|nodirect sale)  0.35  50  0.65  100 

0.7

 W (z|noindirect sale) .

By directly selling his personal information, the decision-maker holds beliefs



U
1c



U
, 1n
   2cU , 2nU    0,1 ,

2cb

such

that

his

beliefs

are

objectively

given

by

, 2nb , 2cg , 2ng   1cb ,1nb ,1cg ,1ng    0,0.65,0,0.35 , and so

W (z|direct sale)  0.65  60  0.35  120 

0.7

 4.608  W (z|no direct sale) .

With the objective probabilities of either a bad or good event occurring
conditioned on confidentiality of the decision-maker’s information, we see how decisionmakers evaluate uncertainty in privacy decisions. Extending the UP model to include two
uncertain processes is a straightforward exercise.
2.4 Explaining the Privacy Paradox with Two Uncertain Processes
Extending the UP model to account for subjective belies for both a privacy breach
and the consequences of such a breach is a conceptually straightforward exercise,
although it does impose some notational burden. Consider the preference function


W  z     i1i2 u     i11 j1 2j1i2 j 2 v z j 2
 j1 c,n j 2 g,b
i1 11 i 2 12

I1



   .

I2



(3)

In addition to his first I 1 priors for his identifying information remaining
confidential, the decision-maker has now formed the additional I 2 prior probabilistic
1
beliefs of a bad event, conditioned on the j  c,n events. This formulation of the UP

model assumes ROCL applies between the two uncertain processes. Beliefs represented
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by  2j1i2 j 2 , and  i1i2 j1 j 2   i11 j1 2j1i2 j 2 are the decision-maker’s beliefs of realizing the events

j1  c,n and j 2  g,b . Finally,  i are the probabilities over the I 2 priors.
2

In equation (3), curvature of u  x  at the point x measures the decision-maker’s
aversion to his I 1  I 2 uncertain beliefs of the J 1  J 2 events. To show how equation (3)
explains privacy behavior, use the same payoffs and functions before. Denote the





subjective beliefs of good or bad events by 122 g|c , 122 b|c , 122 g|n , 122 b|n   0.7,0.3,0.3,0.7 





and  222 g|c ,  222 b|c ,  222 g|n ,  222 b|n   0.6,0.4,0.4,0.6  which are his beliefs of bad and good
events under each prior, conditional on his state of confidentiality.

  as the decision-maker’s prior

Define SEU i1i2   j1 c,n  j 2 g,b  i11 j1 2j1i2 j 2 v z j 2

subjective expected utilities over the final outcomes g or b, conditioned on c or n. Beliefs
of having his identifying information remain confidential after engaging in an indirect
sale are given by 111 c , 111 n ,  211 c ,  211 n    0.7,0.3,0.3,0.7 
If the decision-maker indirectly sells his information

SEU1112  0.58 120  0.42 60  9.607 ,
SEU1122  0.42 120  0.58 60  9.094 ,

SEU 2112  0.54 120  0.46 60  9.479 , and
SEU1122  0.46 120  0.54 60  9.222 .
The decision-maker expects final utility
W  z | indirect sale   0.25  9.607  0.25  9.094
0.7
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0.7

0.25  9.479  0.25  9.222
0.7

0.7

 4.781 .

If the decision-maker decides not to make the indirect sale, then he recognizes
that he will be in a confidential state with certainty, and he forms the degenerate prior





conditional probability distributions π1  111 c , 111 n ,  211 c ,  211 n  1,0,1,0  , which implies

SEU1112  SEU1122  0.70 100  0.30 50  9.992 , and
SEU 2112  SEU1122  0.60 100  0.40 50  9.671 .
By deciding not to make the indirect sale, the decision-maker expects final utility
W  z | no indirect sale   0.5  9.992  0.5  9.671
0.7

0.7

 4.646  W  z | indirect sale  .

The decision-maker will make the indirect sale because he expects to be better-off.
Not making a direct sale is equivalent to not making an indirect sale of identifying
information. Thus, W  z | no direct sale   W  z | no indirect sale   4.646 . Making the
direct

sale,



the

decision-maker

forms

the

degenerate

beliefs



π1  111 c , 111 n ,  211 c ,  211 n   0,1,0,1 by recognizing that he will be in a non-confidential

state. Hence,

SEU1112  SEU1122  0.30 100  0.70 50  8.709 , and
SEU 2112  SEU1122  0.40 100  0.60 50  9.029 .
By deciding not to make the direct sale, the decision-maker expects final utility
W  z | direct sale   0.5  8.709  0.5  9.029
0.7

0.7

 4.607  W  z | no direct sale  ,

and the decision-maker decides not to sell his information.
These numerical examples have shown how uncertainty aversion is incorporated
into reported privacy behavior. The two-process UP model specified by equation (3) has
20

two alternative interpretations. First, the decision-maker cognitively differentiates
between the probabilities he assigns to his I 1 and I 2 priors (Kramer and Budescu 2002),
and his preferences are given by

 I2

W  z    i1 u   i2 u 2     i11 j1 2j1i2 j 2 v z j 2
 j1 c,n j 2 g,b
 i2 12
i1 11



 

I1

1


 ,



(4)

which is consistent with the interpretation that the decision-maker believes the uncertain
confidentiality process determines the fraud process, which finally determines his payoff
(Nielson’s 1993, 2009). The second (re)interpretation says the resolution of the fraud
event determines the uncertain confidentiality process which determines confidentiality,
and preference are given by

 I1

W  z    i2 u   i1 u1     i11 j1 2j1i2 j 2 v z j 2
 j1 c,n j 2 g,b
 i1 11
i 2 12



 

I2

2


 .



(5)

Each of these last two models reduces to equation (3) when the decision-maker’s
attitudes are neutral towards the uncertainty of his priors over confidentiality or fraud,
respectively. Chapter 4 introduces the experimental instrument used to vary each
uncertainty, confidentiality breach and consequences, to identify the model (equation (3),
(4),or (5)) which best describes individual privacy behaviors.
Chapter 4 also accomplishes two objectives. First, the analysis is extended to
identify attitudes towards commodity identification. The experimental design of Heath
and Tversky (1991), which elicits preferences for probabilistically equivalent certain and
uncertain lottery pairs, is adapted to Harrsion, List, and Towe (2007) which elicits
preferences for lotteries paying with a field commodity rather than cash. The experiment
is used to demonstrate that separate attitudes towards different uncertain processes are
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identifiable. And, these estimates are behaviorally meaningful. The primary hypothesis
tested is:
HYPOTHESIS 4:

Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain
processes.

Chapter 5 collects all of these concepts together and offers the first true test for
uncertainty aversion in the context of privacy decisions. The main hypotheses to be tested
are:
HYPOTHESIS 5:

Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a
direct mechanism to harm the subject.

HYPOTHESIS 6:

Subjects

cognitively

differentiates

between

uncertain

confidentiality breach and consequences.
Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) techniques were used to estimates the
structural parameters of the SEU and UP models presented in the preceding discussion.
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CHAPTER 3: TESTING ELLSBERG’S PARADOX & SMITH’S HYPOTHESIS
This chapter presents a study of uncertainty aversion in individual decisionmaking. This study is a methodological inquiry to replicate Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color
thought experiment using real monetary rewards in a controlled laboratory environment.
Although experimental evidence has been offered suggesting uncertainty aversion is a
good description of individual decision-making (Becker and Brownson 1964; Yates and
Zukowski 1976; Chow and Sarin 2002; Halevy 2007), verification of symmetric beliefs
for both the known and unknown urns, necessary for uncertainty aversion, have not been
verified. Ellsberg’s (1961, p. 653) three-color problem has been replicated by Ford and
Ghose (1998) and Schmidt and Neugebauer (2003).
The three-color problems, as well as supporting arguments for the two-color
problem (Ellsberg’s 1961, p. 651 fn. 1), offer inappropriate support for uncertainty
aversion. This argument has been previously recognized by Wakker (2001, p. 1040) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, §1.3). Like the Allais paradox, multi-color and single-urn
problems are also explained without reference to uncertainty attitudes. As a result, singleurn problems do not isolate uncertainty aversion, a violation of simple ordering9, from
violations of independence or the sure-thing principle, or even a systematic resolution of
indifference (see Appendix B).10 Neilson (1993, 2009) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005), as well as other multiple-prior models (e.g., maxmin EU of Gilboa and

9

Cox and Epstein (1989) found that preference reversals were the result of violations of the completeness
axiom, rather than violations the sure-thing principle.
10
It must also be recognized that direct replication of the three-color problem, as in the case of Ford and
Ghose (1998), omits the possibility of indifference which allows for an explanation of the preference
reversal as (possibly) the result of a systematic resolution of indifference (see Appendix B). Those
decision-maker’s choices should not be considered significant (Savage 1954, p. 17).
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Schmeidler (1989) and anticipated utility of Segal (1987)), capture the essence of UA, as
describing attitudes towards expectations of expectations.
The closest replication of Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem was offered by
Chow and Sarin (2002).11 In their experiments, an unopened bag of M&Ms was used to
simulate Ellsberg’s unknown urn. Chow and Sarin (1976, p. 135) report that ―…there was
virtually no difference in the mean prices…‖ for bets on red, blue, or orange and bets on
green, brown, or yellow. The M&Ms test reveals the most compelling evidence in favor
of uncertainty aversion. Lacking statistical verification of symmetric probabilistic beliefs,
certainty equivalents reported in Chow and Sarin (2002) are consistent with both aversion
to acts with uncertain or ambiguous probabilities, and the formation of asymmetric
beliefs. Consider the following example.
Chow and Sarin (2002) asked subjects to report their willingness-to-pay for a bet
that the color of a candy drawn from an M&M’s bag. The first bets paid if the color
candy was red, blue, or orange. The second paid if the color was green, brown, or yellow.
On average subjects were willing to pay $11.95 when the true distribution of color groups
was known to be 50-50. Assuming EUT applied, the mean report is consistent with
moderate risk aversion crra≈0.326, assuming also the utility function u  xcrra . For an
unknown distribution of candies, average willingness-to-pay decreased $5.57 to $6.38.
This value is consistent with either the belief that a favorable outcome is ≈41% and there
is no uncertainty, or the subject has many uncertain priors and attitudes towards their
uncertainty.

11

Halevy (2007, p. 516, footnote 14) notes that the background assumption that subjective beliefs for the
composition of the unknown urn needs to be 50-50 for either color. However, he offers no test of the
assumption.

24

Halevy (2007) used four urns, with varying degrees of ambiguity, to extend Yates
and Zukowski (1976). Each urn contained ten balls with distributions either known with
certainty or determined using Smith’s (1969) compound objective lottery. Values of each
lottery were elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) (BDM) mechanism.
There was considerable heterogeneity between elicited values which were shown to be
consistent with three popular decision theories: SEU, rank dependent utility, and the less
popular uncertain priors model. Use of the BDM mechanism to elicit incentive
compatible values has come into question, however; especially when preferences violate
reduction of compound lotteries (Segal 1987; Holt 1986; and Karni and Safra 1987).
Approximately 35% of subjects revealed values consistent with the UP model,
another 35% were consistent with a recursive rank dependent utility specification (Segal
1987), and the last 30% exhibited preferences consistent with SEU. In principle, had the
mechanism worked properly and subjects were known to assign 50-50 probabilities to the
uncertain events, this discussion would be mute. Criticisms raised by Segal (1987) (as
well as Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987)) would validate Halevy’s (2007)
conclusions. However, unknown subjective beliefs raise behavioral doubts and question
the validity of Halevy’s design.
These criticisms point to the need to control for subjective beliefs in order to
properly identify attitudes towards uncertainty. Heath and Tversky (1991) addressed
control of beliefs by eliciting probabilistic reports for the occurrence of a series of
uncertain events. Reports were subsequently used to present subjects with paired lottery
choices between the status quo uncertain prospect and an equivalent objective lottery
with probabilities equal to subjects’ reports. The crux of the problem with the Heath and
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Tversky (1991) design is that unless reports are honest in the sense of Myerson (1981),
arguments in favor or against the presence of uncertainty aversion are confounded. It is
well known that reports elicited without properly aligned incentives are biased by
attitudes towards risk and/or uncertainty. Or, maybe, because it was costless to do so,
subjects simply felt like misrepresenting their true belief (Harrison 1994), which is why
the experimental design presented in the sequel used a large stakes belief elicitation task.
Beliefs were elicited and symmetry tested by using a mechanism such as a scoring rule
(Andersen et al. 2009a).
To identify uncertainty attitudes, a design using paired lotteries is capable of
alleviating the criticisms of previous experimental designs. Structural estimation of the
UP model’s parameters and the identification of attitudes towards uncertainty do not
suffer from the criticisms of the BDM procedure. By eliciting beliefs and using a binary
choice mechanism to control risk attitudes, testing the uncertainty aversion hypothesis in
Ellsberg’s (1961) thought experiment becomes practical from both theoretical and
empirical perspectives.
Replicating Ellsberg’s two-color problem with simple binary choice tasks allows
for the identification of attitudes towards uncertainty as explanations of choice behavior
when probabilities may not be well formed. The two-color problem using compound
objective lotteries was also replicated to test Smith’s (1969) hypothesis that behavior
similar to the predictions of Ellsberg (1961) would be observed using compound
objective lotteries to induce second-order distributions.
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3.1 Experimental Design
Subjects were recruited from the student population at the University of Central
Florida in the spring 2010 semester. In total 167 subjects participated in 10 different
sessions during the spring 2010 semester. The experimental instruments were designed to
test for uncertainty aversion and the validity of Smith’s (1969) hypothesis12 on a between
subject basis. Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem is tested on a between subject basis.13
The exact instructions used for these experiments are reproduced in Appendix D.
Subjects were confronted with two bingo cages which were used in place of
Ellsberg’s urns. One of these cages remained covered until a ball was drawn from it at the
end of the session. The covered cage represented Ellsberg’s (1961) unknown urn. Half of
the designs were used for the Ellsberg treatment and the other half for the Smith
treatment. To save space the remainder of this section will focus on the Ellsberg’s twocolor problem. Smith’s choice problem is comprised of the same three variations, the
difference was the randomization devices.
To control for the range hypothesis, the number of balls in the visible cage were
set to 30 or 50. Half (51%) of subjects participated in each treatment. To control for
potential center effects, the distributions of orange balls were set to 50% or 20%.

12

Smith’s (1969) hypothesis sates that similar choice patterns from Ellsberg’s two-color problem are
observed when the unknown urn is replaced with an objective compound lottery.
13
To the best of my knowledge, there are no presentations of individual decisions that support the
hypothesis that subjects believe the draw of red or black from the Ellsberg’s unknown urn is 50-50. Becker
and Brownson (1964, p. 66) claim ―…subjects given a choice of colors … are typically indifferent…‖,
however, no statistical evidence to support the 50-50 background assumption is presented. Chow and Sarin
(1988 p. 134) acknowledge subjects having 50-50 beliefs for the colors of M&M candies in a bag (their
unknown urn), yet they offer no test statistics. The background assumption of 50-50 beliefs for the
distribution of balls in Ellsberg’s uncertain urn is a necessary condition for any Ellsberg test. Ellsberg
(1961) was aware of this fundamental issue. However, Kadane (1992) shows that Ellsberg’s pattern of
preferences is possible without 50-50 beliefs provided the subjects distrust the experimenter. Kadane’s
model is nearly untestable hypothesis tantamount to a faith based argument.
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Following the preference elicitation task subjects participated in a belief
elicitation task that paid according to a linear scoring rule (LSR). To identify and control
for anchoring biases in reporting, approximately half of the subjects in each session were
exposed to each skew frame of the LSR. Section 3.1.2 explains the LSR and skew frames
in detail. Table 2 summarizes the full experimental design which was used.

Session
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Table 2. Ellsberg/Smith Experimental Design
Probability Probability
LSR
Ellsberg / Smith
Range
Center
Anchoring
Urns
(Balls)
(Orange)
(Skew)
High
Ellsberg
50
50%
Low
High
Smith
50
50%
Low
High
Ellsberg
30
20%
Low
High
Smith
30
20%
Low
High
Ellsberg
30
50%
Low
High
Smith
30
50%
Low
High
Ellsberg
50
20%
Low
High
Smith
50
20%
Low

Subjects
13
12
9
8
8
8
12
11
12
10
13
12
11
10
11
7

3.1.1 Preference Elicitation Tasks
3.1.1.1 Ellsberg’s Treatment
The two bingo cages used to represent Ellsberg’s urns were labeled ―cage I‖ and
―cage II.‖ Cage I represented the known urn with a verified number and distribution of
orange and white balls. The number of balls in cage I were counted and verified prior to
the end of the session, when one of its balls was randomly drawn. Cage II also remained
covered until one of its balls was randomly drawn at the end of the session.
Reproductions of the decision sheets presented to subjects can be found in Appendix D.
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To avoid potential contamination from portfolio effects, one row was selected at random
from each subject’s decision sheet to be played for real rewards. Each bet paid either $10
or $0.
3.1.1.2 Smith’s Treatment
For the Smith treatment the distribution of balls in cage II was determined by the
number 0 to 30 of a ball drawn from a third bingo cage, cage III. To operationalize cage
III, each ball was labeled with a number 0, 1, 2, …, 30 to indicate the distribution of
orange balls that would be used to play each bet. For the 50-ball frame, cage III was filled
with balls numbered 0, 1, 2, …, 50.
At the end of the session, when all bets had been finalized, one subject selected at
random drew a ball from cage III. Cage II was then filled with orange balls in the amount
of the number written on the ball drawn from the cage III. The remaining balls were
white.14 A research assistant then drew one ball from both cage I and cage II, and all bets
were paid accordingly.
3.1.1.3 Controlling for Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were controlled using subject responses to a series of 45 random
lottery pairs, consistent with the classic Hey and Orme (1994) experiments. All bets were
in the gain domain with payments of $0, $15, $35, and $50. An example screen shot of
the computer interface used to elicit preferences is in Appendix D.
3.1.2 Elicitation of Beliefs
Beliefs regarding the distribution of balls in cage II, the covered bingo cage were
elicited using a LSR. The design of Holt and Laury (2002) was adopted to avoid portfolio
14

For example, if the ball drawn from cage III was labeled ―13,‖ then cage II would be filled with 13
orange balls and 17 white balls, for the 30-ball frame. In the 50-ball frame, the remaining 37 balls in cage II
would be white.
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effects. Once subjects completed the individual choice task and knew which option of
which row they would be paid from, the LSR betting task was introduced. Subjects were
informed about the belief task with the following statement:
[E]ach of you have [sic] the chance to make another choice, with much
higher potential payoffs. Our research assistants are passing around the
decision sheets for this task. If you choose to participate in this task, we
will not pay you for the decision that you just made. You have the choice
which decision we will pay you for: the one you just completed, or the
new one we are offering you now.
When deciding whether or not to participate in the LSR bet, subjects evaluated
their original Ellsberg/Smith choice, which pays at most $10, with giving up that choice
to participate in the LSR betting task. The range of LSR bets were from $0 to $50, with a
―safe‖ bet paying $25 for sure. With the $25 safe bet, there was at least one LSR bet
which strictly dominated all Ellsberg/Smith bets. As expected, all subjects gave up their
previous choice to participate in the belief elicitation task. Table 3 shows an example of
the LSR betting sheet used in the experiment.
Table 3. Example Betting Sheet for Linear Scoring Rule
Choice
1
2
3
⁞
12
13
14
⁞
49
50
51

Payment if Ball Drawn
from Cage #2 is Orange
$0.00
$2.00
$4.00
⁞
$23.00
$25.00
$25.50
⁞
$48.50
$49.50
$50.00
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Payment if Ball Drawn
from Cage #2 is White
$50.00
$48.00
$46.00
⁞
$27.00
$25.00
$24.50
⁞
$1.50
$0.50
$0.00


For report  , that an orange ball occurs, the LSR was defined as payment

S    |Orange occurs   50  50 1     and S    |White occurs   50  50    . As the
subject becomes more confident that cage II is filled entirely with orange (white) balls, he
should choose a lower (higher) numbered choice. Row ―1‖ is consistent with the belief
that cage II is entirely filled with white balls. Row ―51‖ is consistent with a belief that
cage II is entirely filled with orange balls. These two reports, respectively, pay $0 and
$50 if orange occurs. Row ―13‖ is the ―safe‖ bet with a guaranteed payoff of $25. The
risk neutral subject should choose 1 (51) for any belief greater than 50% that white
(orange) will occur and 13 if his beliefs are exactly 50%. As this representative subject
becomes more risk averse, his optimal bet will move closer towards row 13, the safe bet.
The LSR was administered using paper and pencil. To control and identify
anchoring biases, an anchoring treatment varied the skewness of the payoffs (and their
implicit probabilities). For the skew low treatment, the safe bet occurred at row 13 of the
betting sheet. The safe bet occurred at row 39 in the skew high frame. As a result,
anchoring would have a positive reporting bias in the skew low treatment and a negative
bias in the skew high treatment. Appendix D contains copies of the actual scoring rules
that were included with the subject instructions.
3.2 Econometric Model
3.2.1 Controlling Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were controlled assuming the utility over risky choices is given by
an expo-power utility function15 of the form

15

The two parameter expo-power form is chosen due to its empirical consistency over a wide range of real
payoffs (Holt and Laury 2001).

31

v  x   1  exp   x1r   ,

(6)

where   0 and r  1 are parameters to be estimated, and x is income from observed
lottery choices. The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is given by

r   1  r  x1r , which is increasing (decreasing) as   0 (   0 ). Moreover, constant
absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion are nested special cases as
r  0 and   0 , respectively.

With observed lottery choices, equation (6) is estimated using structural
maximum likelihood techniques, assuming some latent structural model of choice such as
EUT. For  outcomes in each of the two paired Hey-Orme lotteries,

EU1    p1 v  x



and EU 2 





p2 v  x  ,

where p1 and p2 are the known, certain, chances of winning prize x from each
lottery, 1 and 2.
Assuming the link function between choices and the maximum likelihood
procedure is represented by logistic distribution, the probability that the subject chooses
the lottery 1 is given by the index function

EU 
Equation (7) adopts

exp  eu1  , r  0 

exp  eu1  , r  0   exp  eu 2  , r  0 

.

(7)

Wilcox’s (2009) contextual error specification16 where

eui  , r   EUi  , r  0 , with 0  v  v defined as the difference between the highest
and lowest possible utility obtainable in the lottery pair. EU1 and EU 2 are the vNM

16

Contextual utility theory applies an adjustment to the Fechner error term, defined by the difference in
value between maximum and minimum prizes in each choice context. Wilcox (2009) shows that without
such normalization risk aversion does not imply probabilistically more risk averse.
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utilities of lotteries 1 and 2, and 0 is a noise parameter which is proportional to the
standard deviation of the decision-maker’s perceptual (or computational) error,
conditional on the assumed logistic distribution. As 0  0 subject responses become
more precise and the probability of choosing the utility maximizing choice converges to
one. For noisier responses, as 0  0 choice probabilities are random and not explained
by utility differences.
Dropping indifference, the log-likelihood to be maximized is written as
T

ln L  r ,  , 0 ; y, X    yt ln EU + 1  yt  ln 1  EU  ,   0 r  1 ,

(8)

t 1

where yt  1(0) indicates the t th choice of lottery 1(2), and X is data pertaining to the
choice tasks and/or subject characteristics.
3.2.2 Identifying Subjective Beliefs and Uncertainty Attitudes
Subjective beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were identified from
responses to the LSR bets and choices in the individual choice task.
For the LSR betting task, the contents of the bingo cage with the known
distribution a priori does not enter the subjects’ UP preference functions. Subjects are
asserted to maximize
I


W  z    i u    ijU v  z j | report   ,
 j o,w

i 0



(9)

where I = 30 and 50 for each range treatment, and utility over final prizes are identified
by v   from equation (6). The subjective priors  iUo ,  iUw  for the distribution of orange
and white balls in the covered (unknown) bingo cage are given by  i I ,1  i I  . Second-
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order utilities are assumed to be characterized by constant relative uncertainty aversion
where

u  x   x1 1    .

(10)

For a given report   , the multinomial logistic link functions is written as

W1 

where



exp w   ρ, π,  ;  , r  1







exp  w   ρ, π,  ;  , r  1 

w   ρ, π, ; , r   W  ρ, π, ; , r  1

with

,

(11)

1  u  v  50   u  v  0 

is the

contextual error specification for the UP values, analogous to equation (7). The loglikelihood function is
T

ln L  ρ, π,  , 1; y, X,  , r    yt ln W + 1  yt  ln 1  W  ,   0 , r  1 ,

(12)

t 1

where yt  1 for the report   and yt  0 for all other    .
For the Ellsberg/Smith choice tasks subjects’ UP preferences are given by
equation (2) in chapter 2.
I
 J K

W  z    i u    ijk v  z jk   ,
i 1
 j 1 k 1


(2)

U C
where  ijk   ij  k and  j  iI i ij are the subject’s weighted average beliefs for

each of the J events – draw an orange ball and draw a white ball from cage II. The  kC
terms are known to be 0.5 for both orange and white balls drawn from cage I.
For the logistic link function, the probability of each subject choosing option A is

W2 

exp  w A  ρ, π,  ;  , r  2 

exp  w A  ρ, π,  ;  , r  2   exp  w B  ρ, π,  ;  , r  2 
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,

(13)

w  ρ, π, ; , r   W  ρ, π, ; , r  2

where

with

2  u  v 10   u  v  0 

is

the

contextual error specification. The log likelihood function is
T

ln L  ρ, π,  , 2 ; y, X,  , r    yt ln W2 + 1  yt  ln 1  W2  ,   0 , r  1 , (14)
t 1

where yt  1 for a choice of option A and yt  0 for a choice of option B.
3.3 Data and Results
Chapter 2 identified three behavioral hypotheses for Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color
problem.
HYPOTHESIS 1:

In Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem (p. 650), subjects behave
as if the realization of each uncertain event is equally likely as each
certain event and bets on certain events are preferred to bets on
uncertain events.

HYPOTHESIS 2:

The proportions of UP and SEU consistent choices are equal for
both the Ellsberg (1961) and Smith (1969) lotteries.

HYPOTHESIS 3:

Attitudes towards uncertainty are equivalent for both the Ellsberg
(1691) and Smith (1969) treatments.

Before reporting the tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3, analysis of the raw choices in
the Ellsberg/Smith task supports hypothesis 2. Smith’s conjecture ―choice behavior‖ is
unchanged if the contents of the ambiguous urn is determined by the draw of a random
integer. Table 4 reports the raw classifications of choices in the Ellsberg and Smith tasks
when each bet on orange or white from cage I had a known 50% chance of paying. The
p-value for the Fisher exact probability test is 0.398 and the null that there is no
difference in the distributions is not rejected.
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Table 4. Raw Classification of Choices in Ellsberg & Smith Tasks
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Treatment
Neither SEU
Averse
Seeking
Ellsberg
43
4
0
0
Smith
37
3
2
0
Total
80
7
2
0
Note:

Subject choices are pooled across range treatments (see Table 2).
With a p-value of 0.85, the Fisher exact test rejected the null of
range effects.

In Table 4, subjects were classified as SEU if their choice pattern was: 1) bets on
orange I ~ white I, orange II ~ white II, orange I ~ orange II, and white I ~ white II; 2)
bets on orange I ~ white I, orange II

white II, orange I

white II; or 3) bets on orange I ~ white I, orange II
white I

orange II, and white I

white II, orange I

orange II, and

white II. Uncertainty averse behavior was classified according to Ellsberg’s

predicted pattern of preferences. No subjects exhibited uncertainty seeking behavior, in
their raw choices.
The distribution of responses in Table 4 presents evidence against Ellsberg’s
(1961) hypothesis while supporting Smith’s (1969) conjecture. Eighty out of 89 subjects’
choices were not consistent with either SEU or Ellsberg’s uncertainty aversion. A subject
was classified as ―Neither‖ when his preferences for bets on orange from cage I or cage II
and white from cage I or cage II contradicted his preference (and implied belief) from his
bet of orange or white cage II. For example, a subjects reporting preferences orange I ~
white I, orange II

white II, orange I

orange II, and white I

classified as ―Neither.‖ His preference orange II

white II would be

white II implies a belief that orange is

more than 50% likely in cage II and contradicts the preference orange I
Uncertainty aversion cannot be claimed here because his preference white I
and orange I ~ white I are consistent with SEU.
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orange II.
white II

The parametric structural FIML model simultaneously controls for risk attitudes
and (possibly) asymmetric beliefs when estimating the degree of relative uncertainty
aversion and, as such, is superior to the nonparametric test from Table 4 for identifying
non-neutral attitudes towards uncertainty. The remainder of this chapter will report the
results of parametric structural UP, SDRA, and SEU likelihood models derived from
equations (8), (12), and (14).
3.3.1 Risk Attitudes Alone
The lottery choice data identified risk attitudes. Assuming subjects made
decisions under risk according to the mandates of EUT, the average relative risk aversion
of the subject pool over prizes x = ($0, $15, $35, and $50) was estimated from the CRRA
utility function v  x   x

1 r 

1  r  . Table 5 shows the estimate of average relative risk

aversion. Over the domain of prizes, the subject pool exhibited an average relative risk
aversion rˆ  0.4422 , with a p-value less than 0.0001.
Table 5. Estimated Parameters from CRRA Utility Function
Variable
r
µ0

Description
CRRA coefficient
RLP Fechner error

Coefficient
0.4422
0.0926

Standard
Error
0.0602
0.0078

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.3242
0.0773

Upper
95% CI
0.5601
0.1079

Pseudo log-likelihood = -4921.5341
Observations = 7261

Coefficient estimates from the expo-power specification (equation (6)) are shown
in Table 6. Estimates r̂ and ̂ are highly significant. The estimated degree of relative
risk aversion
RRA  rˆ  ˆ 1  rˆ x1rˆ , rˆ  1
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(15)

is increasing when ˆ  0 , decreasing for ˆ  0 , and remains constant if ˆ  0 . Choices
exhibit risk aversion for low stakes gambles ( rˆ  0.7265 ), which decreases as lottery
prizes increase to $50 ( ˆ  0.7082 ).
Table 6. Estimated Parameters from Expo-Power Utility Function
Variable
r
α
µ0

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7265
-0.7082
0.0742

Standard
Error
0.0236
0.0567
0.0053

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6802
-0.8194
0.0638

Upper
95% CI
0.7727
-0.597
0.0845

Pseudo log-likelihood = -4872.891
Observations = 7261

3.3.1 The Uncertain Priors Model
The maximum likelihood estimator shows evidence of decreasing relative risk
aversion, with relatively high risk aversion at low stakes. In the absence of uncertainty,
estimated risk attitudes imply raw bets in the belief elicitation task are substantially closer
to the safe 50-50 bet that true beliefs. A large number of subjects placed bets at the 50-50
mark, ensuring a payoff of $25. Note, however with evidence of significant treatment
effects. Subjects in the low skew treatment tended to place larger bets than in the high
skew treatment. The largest difference in bets between low and high treatments is 30
percentage points, which is significant that the 0.001 level. However, there does not
appear to be evidence of lower bets for subjects in the high skew treatment.
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Figure 1. Raw LSR Bets for Color Ball Drawn From Cage II





30 0
1 29
For each possible set of beliefs πUo , πUw   300 , 30
30 ; 30 , 30 ;...; 30 , 30  when there are





50 0
1 49
30 balls in each cage and πUo , πUw   500 , 50
50 ; 50 , 50 ;...; 50 , 50  when there are 50 balls in

each cage, prior weights, ρ, were modeled using a Beta function with probability mass
function
f  io ; a, b  

To obtain mass at the beliefs

 iao1 1   io 

b 1

i0  iao1 1   io 
1

b 1

 0o , 1o    0,1 ,

, for  io   0,1 .

(16)

f 1o ; a, b  and f  0o ; a, b  were

calculated using the approximation  0o , 1o    0.0001,0.9999 . Figure 2, illustrates the
prior weights given estimated shape parameters, aˆ  0.0065 and bˆ  0.0052 .
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Figure 2. Estimated Beta Mass Function for Prior Weights
Coefficent estimates from the UP model (equation (2)) are shown in Table 7. The
risk coefficients have the expected signs and magnitudes, rˆ  0.7233 and ˆ  0.6895 .
Estimated shape parameters imply subjects behaved as if the experiment were almost
surely ―rigged‖ and believed there was a 49.5% chance the unknown cage was filled
entirely with white balls and a 50.3% chance it was filled entirely with orange balls.
While the shape parameters imply a SDRA consistent belief structure, the estimated
coefficient of relative uncertainty aversion, ˆ  0.1007 , is significant at the 10.9% level,
suggesting that SEU may be a better predictor of behavior than the UP model.17

17

Contrary to previous estimates of uncertainty aversion presented in Anderson et al. (2009b) who found
evidence of moderate uncertainty seeking, here small insignificant amounts of uncertainty aversion with a
p-value of 0.109 were estimated. These differences warrant further analysis and replication to test a new
hypothesis: in unfamiliar ambiguous choice situations subjects revert to SEU preferences assigning equal
weight to the degenerate outcomes and willing to trade bets for a certain 50% chance at the high payoff.
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Table 7. Coefficient Estimates for Uncertain Priors Model
Variable
r
α
µ0
a
b
ϕ
µ1
µ2

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Shape parameter for prior weights ρ
Shape parameter for prior weights ρ
CRUA coefficient
LSR Fechner error
Ellsberg Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7233
-0.6895
0.0742
0.0065
0.0052
0.1007
0.1631
0.1938

Standard
Error
0.0237
0.0572
0.0053
0.0145
0.0107
0.0628
0.1167
0.0230

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.6540
0.6310
0.1090
0.1620
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6768
-0.8015
0.0639
-0.0220
-0.0159
-0.0224
-0.0656
0.1487

Upper
95% CI
0.7698
-0.5774
0.0846
0.0350
0.0262
0.2238
0.3918
0.2390

Pseudo log-likelihood = -5853.4699
Observations = 8026

Table 8 shows the coefficient estimates from the SDRA model. As expected, prior
weights, ρ, are approximately evenly distributed, with cage II containing all orange balls
with probability ˆ  0.5039 . With a standard error of 0.0158, ̂ is equal to 50.3 at the
5% level. The estimated coefficient of relative uncertainty aversion ˆ  0.1006 is
significant at the 10.9% level.
Table 8. Coefficient Estimates for Source-Dependant Risk Attitudes Model
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρ
ϕ
µ1
µ2

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight for cage II all orange
CRUA coefficient
LSR Fechner error
Ellsberg Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7233
-0.6895
0.0742
0.5039
0.1006
0.1631
0.1938

Standard
Error
0.0237
0.0572
0.0053
0.0158
0.0627
0.1167
0.0230

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1090
0.1620
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6768
-0.8015
0.0639
0.4730
-0.0223
-0.0656
0.1487

Upper
95% CI
0.7698
-0.5774
0.0846
0.5349
0.2236
0.3918
0.2390

Pseudo log-likelihood = -5853.4695
Observations = 8026

I used the Clarke (2003, 2006) paired sign test of the log-likelihood ratios to test
the auxiliary hypotheses: SDRA explains behavior better than UP. The other well-known
test for non-nested models was developed by Vuong’s (1989) and is only appropriate
when likelihood ratios are normally distributed (Clarke 2006). The Shaprio-Wilk test fails
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to reject normality at the 5% level, W = 0.898 n = 765.18 Figure 3 graphically depicts the
distribution of likelihood ratios.
Kernel density estimate
Kernel density estimate of data and normal density for comparison
25000
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Figure 3. Likelihood Ratio Distribution
The SDRA model yields higher likelihood values for 437 out of 762 non-zero
differences. The sign test rejects equality of the models in favor of SDRA with a p-value
< 0.0001.19 Coupled with a coefficient of relative risk aversion ˆ  0 significant at the
10.9% level and ˆ  0.50 with 12  815.26 , the SDRA model without accounting for
treatment effects presents evidence in favor of hypothesis 1.
In Table 9, treatment variables are added to the SDRA model. Each treatment
variable is a binary indicator. The treatment variable Smith takes on a value of 1 if
uncertainty was facilitated by cage III, which determined the distribution of orange and
white balls in cage II. The Smith variable equals 0 for sessions where subjects were
confronted with Ellsberg’s original problem. Hypothesis 3, that uncertainty is not
18

The 7261 observations from the random lottery pair task were dropped from the model selection test. The
Clarke statistics are calculated using only the 765 decisions from the Ellsberg/Smith and LSR tasks, those
decisions the latent choice models are dependent on purely subjective beliefs.
19
The Vuong statistic is 0.5384 which is less than 1.96, the critical value from the standard normal
distribution.
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affected by the generating mechanism and predicts the coefficient of smith is
insignificantly different from zero.
Center equals to 1 when the distribution of balls in the known cage was 50%
orange and 0 when the distribution was 20% orange. Range indicates the number of
bingo balls used in cages I and II. Range equals 1 when 50 bingo balls were used and 0
when 30 bingo balls were used. If the range hypothesis of Becker and Brownson (1964)
is correct, subjects’ attitudes towards uncertainty covary with the ranges of second-order
probabilities. The null is that range has no effect on estimated uncertain aversion.
Finally, Skew controls for anchoring biases in the LSR betting task, and varies
within each session. Skew is set to 1 for subjects in the ―high‖ treatment, where the safe
bet was lower on the betting sheet. Skew is 0 for subjects in the ―low‖ treatment, when
the safe bet was higher on the betting sheet.
Estimates of the SDRA model controlling for treatment effects are presented in
Table 9. Estimates for Range and Smith, treatments on the coefficient of RUA, are both
insignificant. The coefficient for the range treatment ˆRange  0.0037 is highly
insignificant, with a p-value = 0.975. There are no differences in uncertainty attitudes
between subjects in the 50 ball and 30 ball treatments. The point estimate for the smith
treatment variable is ˆSmith  0.0198 with p-value = 0.907.
Conditional on SDRA preferences, the coefficient ˆRange does not support the
range hypothesis (Becker and Brownson 1964). Subjects’ attitudes towards uncertainty
do not covary with the ranges of second-order probabilities. There is evidence in support
of Smith’s (1969) conjecture, hypothesis 3. With ˆSmith  0 , attitudes towards uncertainty
are not affected by the uncertainty generating mechanism.
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Table 9. SDRA Model Estimates with Treatment Variables Added
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρ
Constant
Center
Skew
ϕ
Constant
Smith
Range
µ1
µ2

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight for cage II all orange
Known probability center effect
Anchoring effect
CRUA coefficient
Compound objective lottery effect
Probability range effect
LSR Fechner error
Ellsberg Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7233
-0.6895
0.0742

Standard
Error
0.0240
0.0580
0.0053

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6764
-0.8033
0.0639

Upper
95% CI
0.7703
-0.5758
0.0846

0.4615
0.0495
0.1513

0.0210
0.0269
0.0942

<0.0001
0.0660
0.1080

0.4204
-0.0033
-0.0333

0.5026
0.1023
0.3359

0.0753
0.0249
0.0092
0.1465
0.1774

0.0777
0.1133
0.1022
0.0953
0.0206

0.3330
0.8260
0.9280
0.1240
<0.0001

-0.0771
-0.1972
-0.1910
-0.0403
0.1371

0.2277
0.2471
0.2095
0.3333
0.2177

Pseudo log-likelihood = -5845.1253
Observations = 8026

3.3.3 The Subjective Expected Utility Model
The final model estimated was Savage’s (1954) SEU theory. The coefficient for
subjective beliefs that an orange ball is drawn from cage II, ˆ  0.5052 , is highly
significant (Table 10). Subjects believed the contents of the covered cage II were
approximately evenly distributed between orange and white ping-pong balls.
Table 10. Coefficient Estimates for Subjective Expected Utility Model
Variable
r
α
µ0
π
µ1
µ2

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Subjective belief of orange cage II
LSR Fechner error
Ellsberg Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7232
-0.6871
0.0742
0.5052
0.1299
0.2020

Standard
Error
0.0236
-0.0570
0.0053
0.0154
0.0791
0.0239

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1000
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6770
-0.7988
0.0639
0.4751
-0.0251
0.1550

Upper
95% CI
0.7694
-0.5753
0.0845
0.5353
0.2848
0.2489

Pseudo log-likelihood = -5854.3914
Observations = 8026

Adding treatment variables to control for center and anchoring affects, coefficient
estimates reported in Table 11 demonstrate that beliefs regarding the unknown urn are
conditioned on the known probabilities. Subjects in the low center treatment, where the
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known urn had a 20% of yielding an orange ball, held beliefs only 4.88% lower than
subjects in Ellsberg’s original 50/50 treatment.
Table 11. SEU Model Estimates with Treatment Variables Added
Variable
r
α
µ0
π
Constant
Center
Skew
µ1
µ2

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Subjective belief of orange cage II
Known probability center effect
Anchoring effect
LSR Fechner error
Ellsberg Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7231
-0.6871
0.0742

Standard
Error
0.0238
0.0577
0.0053

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6764
-0.8003
0.0639

Upper
95% CI
0.7698
-0.5739
0.0845

0.4599
0.0489
0.1222
0.1188
0.1841

0.0203
0.0265
0.0599
0.0621
0.0216

<0.0001
0.0650
0.0410
0.0560
<0.0001

0.4200
-0.0031
0.0049
-0.0030
0.1418

0.4998
0.1008
0.2396
0.2406
0.2264

Pseudo log-likelihood = -5846.0054
Observations = 8026

The chi-square test clearly rejects the null that all treatment effects are jointly zero
(  22  7.72 ). Testing the distinction between SDRA (Table 8) and SEU (Table 11) is
accomplished by testing the hypothesis that ˆConstant  ˆSmith  ˆRange  0 from Table 9. The
SEU model with covariates is a nested special case of the SDRA model with covariates.
The likelihood ratio statistic 32  2.77 with p-value = 0.429 fails to reject the null that
subjects behave as if maximizing SEU as estimated in Table 11. As such, this experiment
reports evidence that contradicts Ellsberg’s thought experiment.
3.4 Experiment Summary
In Ellsberg’s two-color urn experiment, subjects behave as if the realization of
each uncertain event is equally likely. However, bets on certain events are not preferred
to bets on uncertain events. The data does not support hypothesis 1, Ellsberg’s predicted
preferences.
Hypothesis 2 and 3 are supported. The nonparametric test of the distributions of
preferences between subjects failed to reject the null of hypothesis 2. Choices were
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unaffected by the mechanism used to generate uncertainty. Econometric estimates fail to
reject both hypothesis 3 and neutral attitudes towards uncertainty. Smith was right. Using
a compound objective lottery instead of Ellsberg’s urn would elicit the same preferences,
although in entirely different way than intended.
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CHAPTER 4: QUALITY, IDENTIFICATION, AND UNCERTAINTY
The previous chapter tested the Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem using the
uncertain priors model (Neilson 1993, 2009; KMM 2005) and tested the model’s key
assumption, uncertainty aversion. Attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, along with
beliefs were jointly estimated using a structural econometric model. Estimates in chapter
3 demonstrated that (for subjects participating in experiment) behavior is best
characterized by Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility.
Here, I build upon the chapter 3 and develop an experimental instrument to
identify attitudes towards uncertainty under less abstract conditions and test for separate
attitudes towards two separate uncertain processes. To facilitate the identification of
separate attitudes, subjects completed a series of binary choices using a multiple price list
(MPL) format (Holt and Laury 2002) paying in a branded commodity where information
possessed by the decision-maker was noisy.
To understand how uncertain processes are at work when evaluating graded
commodities such as online security (Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt (2002),
Berendt, Günther, and Spiekerman (2005)), food products (Heyes, Shogren, Shin, and
Kliebenstein 1995), or even gem stones, a two-uncertain process UP model is developed
sequentially from the expected utility model. Consider the comparison of two bets, I and
II. Bet I is a bet on receiving one of two commodities B or C, with known certified (i.e.,
branded) quality (e.g., security) g, g  G where g

g and objective chances of

winning given by Pr  B and Pr  C  . The second bet, bet II, is a bet on receiving one of
two otherwise identical certified commodities A and D, with objective probabilities
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Pr  A  and Pr  D  . When deciding between which bet to choose, the EU decision-maker
evaluates each according to the expected utilities
EU  B,C  Pr  B v  Bg   Pr  C  v  Cg  ,

(17)

EU  A, D   Pr  A  v  Ag   Pr  D  v  Dg  .

(18)

for bet I and

for bet II.
If the commodity qualities are unknown (i.e., generic or not branded), the Savage
(1954) consistent decision-maker evaluates the likelihood each commodity, A, B, C, and
D, belong to the class of commodities with qualities g and g .20 Given beliefs regarding
each commodity’s quality, preferences would be evaluated by

SEU  B,C   Pr  B  Bgv  Bg    Bgv  Bg 

 Pr  C   Cgv  Cg    Cgv  Cg  , and

(19)

SEU  A, D   Pr  A   Agv  Ag    Agv  Ag 
 Pr  D   Dgv  Dg    Dgv  Dg  ,

(20)

where the π are the subjective beliefs that A, B, C, and D are either g or g .
When the decision-maker is unsure of his beliefs, he may form a sets of IA
subjective distributions that A is g or g . Denote the ith prior belief πAi   Aig ,  Aig 





and the probabilities over all the IA priors ρA  A1 ,..., AIA . Similarly, for B, C, and D,
the decision-maker has prior beliefs π Bi π Ci , and π Ci with respective weights ρ B , ρ C ,
20

The experiment designed below uses Coke and Pepsi, ―familiar‖ products, as the experimental metaphor
for more general economic concepts of differentiation.
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and ρ D . Extending equations (19) and (20) to account for these prior beliefs, preference
for the Neilson consistent decision-maker are given by

UP  B,C   iI i u



UP  A, D   iI i u

kg,g





 Bi k Pr  B v  Bk    Ci k Pr  C  v  Ck  , and (21)

kg,g

B

C



 Ai k Pr  A  v  Ak    Di k Pr  D  v  Dk  ,
A

D



(22)



with I  I A  I B  I C  I D and ρ  A1B1C1D1 ,...AiA BiB CiC DiD ,..., AIA BIB CIB DID .
In many instances however, commodities are accompanied by noisy quality
signals. To better understand how noisy reports ―change‖ the UP model in equations (21)
and (22), consider once again the Savage consumer. With such a noisy signal, preferences
can be separated into two component parts: EU if signal is accurate and the SEU given an
inaccurate signal. Assuming the signal that B is g and C is g , equation (19) is rewritten

SEU  B,C   1   w  Pr  B v  Bg   Pr  C  v  Cg 
 W  Pr  B  Bg|w v  Bg    Bg|w v  Bg   Pr  C   Cg|w v  Cg    Cg|w v  Cg   , (23)



where  w is the belief that the signal is wrong (inaccurate) and thus  g|w and  g|w are
beliefs that B and C are g or g give inaccuracy. For the personal belief that the signal
was wrong, the Savage consumer’s beliefs are  Bg|w  1   Bg and  Cg|w  1   Cg , the
consumer’s unconditional beliefs that each brand is not those of the signal, g for B and

g for C. Equation (20) then becomes
SEU  A,C   1   w  Pr  A  v  Ag   Pr  D  v  Dg 
 w  Pr  A   Ag|w v  Ag    Ag|w v  Ag 
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 Pr  D   Dg|w v  Dg    Dg|w v  Dg   ,


(24)

with conditional beliefs  Ag|w  1   Ag and  Dg|w  1   Dg for the quality of A and D,
given an inaccurate signal. Equations (23) and (24) can also be extended to account for
uncertain beliefs for signal accuracy. Define a set of priors J for the belief that the
prediction is wrong,  jW , with probabilistic weights θ  1 ,..., J  .
Allowing for J signal accuracy beliefs and I quality beliefs, the two processes at
work in the Nielson subject’s preference function can be modeled as



UP  B,C   iI i j u  jW  kg,g 1   Bik  Pr  B v  Bk   1   Cik  Pr  C  v  Ck 


jJ



 1   jW  Pr  B v  Bg   Pr  C  v  Cg  ,

(25)



UP  A, D   iI i j u  jw  kg,g 1   Aik  Pr  A  v  A k   1   Dik  Pr  D  v  Dk  


jJ



 1   jw  Pr  A  v  Ag   Pr  D  v  Dg  ,

(26)

where A and B are predicted to be quality g , and C and D are predicted to be quality g
(Model 1). The UP preferences assumed in equations (25) and (26) are analogous to the
preferences given by equation (3) in chapter 2. Alternative specifications given by
equations (27) and (28), Model 2:

UP  B,C   iI i u I



jJ



 j u J  jW  kg,g 1   Bik  Pr  B v  Bk 


 1   Cik  Pr  C  v  Ck    1   jW  Pr  B v  Bg   Pr  C  v  Cg 

UP  A, D   iI i u I



jJ



 ,

 j u J  jw  kg,g 1   Aik  Pr  A  v  Ak 
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(27)



 1   Dik  Pr  D  v  Dk    1   jw  Pr  A  v  A g    Pr  D  v  D g   ,

(28)

and equations (29) and (30), Model 3:



UP  B,C    jJ  j u J

iI



iu I  jW  kg,g 1   Bik  Pr  B v  Bk 




 1   Cik  Pr  C  v  Ck   1   jW  Pr  B v  Bg   Pr  C  v  Cg  ,

UP  A, D    jJ  j u J



iI



(29)

iu I  jw  kg,g 1   Aik  Pr  A  v  A k 




 1   Dik  Pr  D  v  Dk   1   jw  Pr  A  v  A g    Pr  D  v  D g   ,

(30)

where the concavity of u I   and u J   capture aversion to uncertainty over the I and J
subsets of prior beliefs.
The experimental design integrates the equivalent lottery pair procedure of Heath
and Tversky (1991) with a linear scoring rule used to identify subjective beliefs to test
hypothesis 4 and identify which UP preference specification describes behavior, Model 1,
2, or 3. The remainder of Chapter 4 is devoted to the experimental design used to test
hypothesis 4 and the results of said test.
4.1 Experimental Design
Appendix E contains detailed instructions for the experimental sessions used to
identify uncertainty aversion and test the hypothesis that subjects form separate sets of
uncertain beliefs and attitudes towards distinctly uncertainty processes, hypothesis 4.
HYPOTHESIS 4:

Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain
processes.

In summary, four individual choice tasks were employed to identify preferences
for uncertain lotteries, control for risk attitudes, elicitation of beliefs, and control for
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uncertainty. Each of these tasks is discussed in turn. In total, 82 subjects took part in four
sessions over a one month period at the University of Central Florida. Table 12
summarizes the experimental design used to test hypotheses 4.

Session

Commodity
Information

1

Branded

2

Ungraded

3

Graded

4

Graded

Table 12. Experiment Design
LSR
MPL
LSR Bets on
Anchoring Anchoring
Commodities
(Skew)
(Skew)
High
N/A
N/A
Low
High
High
Brand of
Low
Commodity won
High
in MPL
Low
Low
High
High
Brand of
Low
Commodity won
High
in MPL
Low
Low
High
High
Low
―Grade‖ prediction
Accuracy
High
High
Low
High
High
Low
―Grade‖ prediction
Accuracy
High
Low
Low

Subjects
13
12
6
7
6
6
2
0
0
3
0
3
3
0
5
6
5
5

4.1.1 Eliciting Preferences
Elicitation of preferences for the experimental graded commodity was conducted
using a multiple price list instrument with twenty paired choices. Soft drinks were chosen
as the experimental commodity, with their brand representing quality due to constraints
of using student research subjects. Students can be reasonably expected to be familiar
with taste differences between Coke and Pepsi. To control the ranking of utilities over
these brands, subjects were instructed:
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Each of these letters A, B, C, and D labels one of the sodas on the table in the
front of the room. If the soda you win is a Coke, we will pay you $10. If the
soda you win is Pepsi we will pay you $0…
At the conclusion of this session you can have either a Coke or a Pepsi, which
ever you prefer. You should not let the fact that you like to drink one soda
brand over the other influence the 20 choices you make. You can have
whichever soda you prefer at the end of the session.

An example of the MPL is shown here.
Table 13. Example Decision Sheet
Option I
Option II

Decision

5/100 of C, 95/100 of B 5/100 of D, 95/100 of A I
10/100 of C, 90/100 of B 10/100 of D, 90/100 of A I
15/100 of C, 85/100 of B 15/100 of D, 85/100 of A I

II
II
II

Commodities used in the experiment were labeled A, B, C, and D to match the
price list. Ambiguity was controlled in three treatment frames: branded (certified), graded
(uncertified), and ungraded. Each of these is discussed below in more detail. To detect
anchoring of subject responses towards the middle their decision sheets, the decision
sheet used two treatment frames, skew low and skew high.
4.1.1.1 Ungraded Commodity
For the ungraded treatment, subjects a priori did not know which soda brand,
Coke and Pepsi, was associated with each label A, B, C, and D . Sodas were entirely
covered with two to three layers of colored masking tape to completely conceal
identifying brand characteristics.
Prior to placing their bets, subjects were allowed to taste approximately 1 ounce
from each soda. By taste testing, subjects were able to form a set of beliefs for each of the
four commodities brands.
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4.1.1.2 Graded Commodity
In the graded treatment, a signal in the form of a brand prediction was added prior
to subjects making their decisions. One volunteer subject was selected to taste each soda
and report, to other subjects in the room, a binary prediction for each sodas correct brand.
To incentivize the volunteer to report truthfully, a $10 reward was added for correctly
predicting the brand of each soda A, B, C, and D.
Finally, before making their choices subjects were once again invited to taste each
soda to form their own sets of beliefs.
4.1.1.3 Certified Commodity
In the certified treatment, subjects knew in advance of betting that labels A and B
were applied to cans of Coke, and C and D were applied to cans of Pepsi. To keep things
equal subjects were invited to taste each soda prior to making their decisions – all
subjects declined.
4.1.1.4 Controlling for Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were controlled by using reciprocal probabilities in options I and II.
This means for the certified commodity treatment, excluding errors, subjects should have
choosen option I up to the row there each option has 50-50 probabilities and then choose
option II for the remaining rows of the MPL. Deviations in the switch point are assumed
to be explained by asymmetric subjective beliefs for the brand of each commodity, or
calculation errors.
4.1.2 Elicitation of Beliefs
Subjects’ beliefs for the correct brand of the soda they won and the accuracy of
the volunteer’s report for both sodas in their chosen option were elicited using a LSR.
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Subjects were assigned to only one of these two treatment frames. The LSR frame was
varied within-session for the graded commodity treatment. Only the grade frame of the
LSR was used in the ungraded commodity treatments.
To operationalize the LSR, each subject placed their bets on the uncertain events by
circling the appropriate row number on their decision sheets. Copies of the decision
sheets and instructions can be found in Appendix E. The first six rows of a decision sheet
used for the brand frame are shown in Table 14. To detect anchoring biases, two versions
of the scoring rule varied the payoffs to determine if subjects anchor their choices in the
center of the decision sheet.
Table 14. Example Betting Sheet for Linear Scoring rule

Row
0%
4%
8%
12%
15%
19%

Payment if the correct Payment if the correct
brand for the soda you brand for the soda you
won is Coke
won is Pepsi
$0.00
$50.00
$2.00
$48.00
$4.00
$46.00
$6.00
$44.00
$7.50
$42.50
$9.50
$40.50

Subjects placed their bets by circling the row number corresponding to the bet
they preferred. For the decision sheet here selecting row 19% would pay $9.50 if the
brand for the soda possessed by the subject was a Coke and $40.50 if the brand was
Pepsi. These prize amounts correspond directly to a report of  % report in the LSR
given by S  |Coke   50  50 1    if Coke and S  |Pepsi   50  50   if Pepsi.21

21

At least one subjects recognized the relationship between their implied beliefs and the row numbering.
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4.1.2.1 Equivalent Lottery Pairs: Controlling Uncertainty
The equivalent lottery pair (ELP) choice was the final decision subjects made.
After subjects placed their bets for either brand or accuracy, each one was given the
choice to either keep their bet, conditional on the uncertain event, or trade their bet for an
equivalent objective bet. Prior to making their choices subjects were given examples, for
betting row 19% and 77%. A subject who chose row 19% could either keep the bet or
replace the uncertainty with the spin of a bingo cage. If a number between 0 and 19 was
drawn the subject won the $9.50 prize. He would receive $40.50 for drawing a number
between 20 and 100. For a bet on row 77%, if a number between 0 and 77 was drawn, he
would receive $38.50. Numbers between 78 and 100 paid $11.50.
Assuming subjects have multiple prior probabilistic beliefs for each event; those
who are averse to the uncertainty associated with their bet would prefer to ―swap‖ for the
equivalent objective bet. Uncertainty seeking subject would strictly prefer to keep their
bet from the belief elicitation task. For subjects who expressed indifference, a 6-sided die
was used to determine if they kept their uncertain bet or swapped the equivalent objective
lottery.
For the accuracy frame, indifference suggests reduction and preferences are given
J
by Model 2, equations (27) and (28) with u  x   x or Model 1, equation (25) and (26)

I
with u  x   x . Preferences for the certain (uncertain) bet imply u   (or u   ) is

concave (convex) and the subject are uncertainty aversion (loving). Indifference in the
brand frame of the ELP suggests that reduction applies for the uncertain brand process
and UP preferences are of the form given by Model 3, equations (29) and (30) with

u I  x   x or Model 1, equation (25) and (26) with u  x   x .
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4.1.2.2 Controlling for Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were controlled using subject responses to a series of random
lottery pair choices consistent with the classic Hey and Orme (1994) experiments. All
bets were in the gain domain and in the range of $0 to $50. An example screen shot of the
computer interface used to elicit preferences is in Appendix D.
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4.2 Econometric Model
4.2.1 Controlling Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were controlled assuming the expo-power utility function
v  x   1  exp   x1r   ,

(6)

where   0 and r  1 are parameters to be estimated, and x is income from observed
lottery choices, $0, $15, $35, and $50. With many of the same subjects who participated
in the Ellsberg experiment reported in Chapter 3, I expected to find evidence of
decreasing relative risk aversion. Equation (6) was estimated using maximum likelihood
techniques, assuming EUT.
As in Chapter 3, the link function was assumed to be the logistic distribution. The
probability that the subject chooses lottery 1 was modeled with the index function

EU 

exp  eu1  , r  0 

exp  eu1  , r  0   exp  eu 2  , r  0 

.

(7)

where eu i  , r   EUi  , r  0 with  0 the contextual norm, and 0 the Fechner error
parameter. Maximizing the log-likelihood, equation (8) in chapter 3, I found evidence
that subjects exhibited decreasing relative risk aversion as predicted, with rˆ  0.7336 and

ˆ  0.7256 .
4.2.2 Identifying Subjective Beliefs and Uncertainty Attitudes
Beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were identified from choices made in the
MPL bets paying in the simulated commodity, LSR bets for the ―quality‖ of the
experimental commodity, and the ELP task where subjects are able to swap uncertainty
for objectivity.
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From the MPL task, subjects made choices between pairs of uncertain lotteries.
To simplify the discussion, I will only use the UP preference function defined in Model
1, equations (25) and (26). The utility of option I is evaluated by



UP  B,C   iI i j u  jw  kg,g 1   Bik  Pr  B v  Bk   1   Cik  Pr  C  v  Ck 


jJ



 1   jw  Pr  B v  Bg   Pr  C  v  Cg  ,
and option II by



UP  A, D   iI i j u  jw  kg,g 1   Aik  Pr  A  v  A k   1   Dik  Pr  D  v  Dk  


jJ



 1   jw  Pr  A  v  Ag   Pr  D  v  Dg  .
Second-order utilities were assumed characterized by constant relative uncertainty
aversion, u  x   x1 1    . The latent index was modeled using the logistic function

UP 

exp  upII  , π w , πA , πD ;  , r  1 

exp  upI  , π w , πB , πC ;  , r  1   exp  upII  , π w , πA , πD ;  , r  1 

, (31)

with log-likelihood
T

ln L  , π, 1; y, X,  , r    yt ln UP+ 1  yt  ln 1  UP  ,   0 , r  1 , (32)
t 1

where yt  1(0) indicates the t th choice of lottery II(I), and X is data pertaining to the
choice tasks and/or subject characteristics. To supplement identification of 1 , the
Fechner error for MPL choices, deviations in the switching point for the ―branded‖
commodity treatment are only explained by errors, 1 .
Beliefs π w , π A , π B , π C , and π D were identified using a linear scoring rule,
where subjects place bets that either the can they won was Coke or Pepsi, or both cans in
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their chosen option were correctly grade (―branded‖) by the motivated volunteer. 22 All 25
subjects in the ungraded sessions and 5 subjects in the first graded session made bets for
the brand of the experimental commodity they won.
For each belief, bets with the LSR were placed using identical experimental
procedures. To save space and avoid overly repetitive discussion, description of the LSR
component(s) of the FIML model will focus on bets contingent on the brand of
commodity A. In such an instance, subjects behave as if maximizing



UP  A    Ai u 

v  A g | report    .

A
ig
 g Coke,Pepsi

i 0


I

(33)

For a given report   , the multinomial logistic link functions is written as

W 



exp UP  , πA , ρA ;  , r  1







exp  UP  , πA , ρA ;  , r  1 

,

(34)

where UP  , πA , ρA ; , r   UP  , πA , ρA ; , r  1 is the contextual error specification
for the UP values, analogous to equation (7). The log-likelihood function is
T

ln L  , πA , ρA ; y, X,  , r    yt ln W + 1  yt  ln 1  W  ,   0 , r  1 , (35)
t 1

where yt  1 for the report   and yt  0 for all other   . (The likelihood functions
for those subjects betting on the brands of the other commodities are identical, except
subscripts ―A‖ in equations (33), (34), and (35) are replaced by either B, C, or D.)
In the final task, the ELP task, the subject in possession of commodity A and
having placed a bet   was afforded the opportunity to swap his uncertain bet, in

22

The motivated volunteer was given an incentive of $10 extra if he correctly identified the brand for each
soda can in options I and II. The volunteer for each ―graded‖ session was randomly chosen from a pool of
multiple volunteers.
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exchange for a bet defined by the objective probability PL  100 ACoke
     1 101 and

PR  100 1   ACoke
    101 that he receive payment from the left (L) or right (R) hand

columns of Table 14, where πA     is the implicit raw subjective belief given report   .
Subjects evaluated their objective
EU  PLv  zL   PR v  zR  ,

(36)

of making the swap, with their ambiguous
I


UP  A    Ai u 

v Ag |    ,

A
ig
 g Coke,Pepsi

i 0



(33)

of keeping their LSR bet.
With these the preferences, ELP choices were assumed logistically distributed,
with probability of replacing the uncertain bet given by

W 

exp  eu  PL , PR ;  , r  1 

exp  eu  PL , PR ;  , r  1   exp  up  , πA , ρA ;  , r  1 

,

(37)

where eu   and up   are the contextual normalizations of equation (36) and (33). The
log-likelihood is
T

ln L  , πA , ρA , 1; y, PL , PR ,  , r, X    yt ln W + 1  yt  ln 1  W  ,
t 1

  0 , r  1,

(38)

where yt  1(0) indicates the t th subject’s choice of replacing (keeping) his uncertain
LSR bet, and X is data pertaining to the choice tasks and/or subject characteristics.
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4.3 Data and Results
Hypothesis 4, identified in chapter 2, extends the economic concept of uncertainty
aversion and multiple priors to multiple uncertain processes. For each process, the subject
may have different sets of prior beliefs and attitudes towards each uncertainty embodied
in those sets.
HYPOTHESIS 4:

Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain
processes.

Hypothesis 4 is tested as follows. Section 4.3.2 estimates risk attitudes alone,
assuming EUT. Section 4.3.3 estimates three models of uncertain priors. First, both brand
beliefs for each commodity as well as signal (prediction) accuracy of a volunteer
―grader‖ is assumed uncertain with multiple beliefs (Model 1), equation (25) and (26).
Second, subjects are assumed uncertainty neutral23 with respect to prediction accuracy
(Model 2), equations (27) and (28) with u J  x   x . Third, subjects are assumed
uncertainty neutral with respect to brand and UP preferences with respect to brand beliefs
(Model 3), equations (29) and (30) with u I  x   x . These preference specifications are
tested using Clarke’s (2003, 2006) sign test.24 Finally, an estimated ―SEU model‖, where
subjects were assumed to be uncertainty neutral over both brand and prediction accuracy
is compared to the better model out of Model 1, 2, or 3.

23

I purposely avoid describing uncertainty neutral preferences as SEU. In the context of Ellsberg’s (1961)
two-color problem SEU implies subjects believe balls are only distributed 50-50 (or some other
distribution), for example. However, in the context of a soda’s brand, the single belief interpretation
appears to be inappropriate. There are only two possibilities: the commodity is either Coke, not Pepsi, or it
is Pepsi, not Coke. Sodas are not 50% Coke and 50% Pepsi. The subject logically weights these two
possibilities. But this interpretation is clearly not the same as SEU preferences in an ―Ellsberg‖ context.
24
Vuong’s (1989) non-nested test was inappropriate. The Shapiro-Wilk test rejected the null that the
likelihood ratios for each model comparison were normally distributed.
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4.3.2 Estimating Risk Attitudes Alone
Before estimating the expo-power utility function (equation (6)), average relative
risk aversion of the subject-pool was estimated using the CRRA utility function,

v  x   x

1 r 

1  r  , over the domain

of RLP prizes used to calibrate risk attitudes ($0,

$15, $35, and $50). On average, subjects were moderately risk averse over the prize
domain, rˆ  0.4587 (Table 15).
Table 15. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from CRRA Utility
Variable
r
µ0

Description
RRA at zero income
RLP Fechner error

Coefficient
0.4587
0.0881

Standard
Error
0.0791
0.0098

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.3037
0.069

Upper
95% CI
0.6136
0.1073

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2479.5339
Observations =3667

Table 16 reports coefficient estimates assuming an expo-power utility
specification. The expo-power specifications allows relative risk aversion to either
increase, decrease, or remain constant over the domain of prizes ($0, $15, $35, and $50).
The degree of relative risk aversion is
RRA  r   1  r  x1r ,

(15)

which is increasing when   0 , decrease for   0 , and remain constant if   0 . From
Table 16, ̂ is highly significant and CRRA is rejected. Choices exhibit risk aversion for
low stakes gambles ( rˆ  0.7336 ), which decreases as lottery prizes increase to $50 (

ˆ  0.7256 ).

63

Table 16. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from Expo-Power Utility
Variable
r
α
µ0

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7336
-0.7256
0.0712

Standard
Error
0.0317
0.0783
0.0067

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6714
-0.8790
0.0581

Upper
95% CI
0.7957
-0.5722
0.0843

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2455.1592
Observations =3667

4.3.3 The Uncertain Priors Model
For the unbranded and graded treatments, where each commodity was not known
with certainty, 15 subjects won commodity A and 5 placed LSR bets on the commodity’s
brand. The average report was 0.616, with a median of 0.58 and each bet was: 0, 0.5 0.58
and 1. The left hand column of Figure 4 graphically depicts these bets for each anchoring
treatment, high and low. The kernel density of each bet is shown in the last row. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test failed to reject the null hypotheses of no anchoring biases for
LSR bets placed on the correct brand of commodities A (p-value = 0.20, n = 5).
Anchoring bias is also rejected for commodities B, C, and D.
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Figure 4. Raw Elicited Brand Beliefs
Thirteen out of 23 subjects winning commodity B placed LSR bets on the
commodities brand. The average report was 0.495, with median 0.62 and 2 bets that B
was Pepsi for sure and 2 bets that B was Coke for sure. Bets for commodity C’s brand
were similar. Eight out of 12 subjects who won commodity C in the MPL task placed
bets on its brand. The mean report was 0.486, with median 0.71. Reports from the 4
subjects betting on the brand of commodity D were similar to those of commodity A.
There was a low number of subjects placing bets (4 out of 7 possible). Three of the 4
subjects placed bets consistent with risk and uncertainty neutral preferences. Two
subjects were certain commodity D was Pepsi and one was certain it was Coke. The last
subject bet 0.4, consistent with a belief it was more likely commodity D was Pepsi than
Coke.
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The remaining 27 subjects participating in the ungraded and graded treatment
placed LSR bets on the accuracy of their chosen option in the MPL task. Subjects who
chose option I placed their bets that commodities B and C were correctly identified by the
financially motivated volunteer.25
The majority of subjects betting each option were more than 50% sure the
volunteers’ predictions were correct. The median reports were 0.81 for option I and 0.905
for option II. The 25th percentile for each set of reports was greater than or equal to 0.5.
Figure 5 shows these reports graphically. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
failed to reject the null hypotheses of no anchoring biases for LSR bets placed on the
accuracy of brand signal for each MPL option I (p-value = 0.898, n = 15) and II (p-value
= 0.990, n = 12).

25

The volunteers in each graded session made the same prediction. Commodities A and B were predicted
to be Coke, B and C were predicted to be Pepsi.
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Figure 5. Raw Elicited Signal (Prediction) Accuracy Beliefs
Coefficient estimates for the UP model with brand and prediction uncertainty are
shown in Table 17. The identifying assumption that subjects’ preferences are SDRA with
respect to individual commodity brand beliefs and prediction accuracy of the volunteer
was made. Specifically, I A  I B  I C  I D  2 . Economically, the SDRA assumption is
based on the argument that subjects believe either the commodity is all Coke or all Pepsi
and weight these priors by their subjective probability that each outcome will occur.
This interpretation is distinctly different from that of the UP model as it was
applied to the Ellsberg problem in chapter 3. In chapter 3, it was reasonably assumed that
subjects believed the priors were equal to the possible distributions of colored balls in the
unknown bingo cage. Prior weights then represented the subjective belief that the
experimenter filled the cage with a particular distribution of bingo-balls. Here, there is no
such set of possibilities. Each commodity is either one brand or the other. The same
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argument applies for the assumption of SDRA with respect to the volunteer’s prediction
accuracy. Table 17 reports the coefficient estimates for Model 1, the UP model given by
equations (25) and (26). Subjects were very confident that commodity A was coke,

ˆ A  0.7223 . Subjects were also more confident that commodity C was Coke
( ˆC  0.6421 ), than they were for commodities B ( ˆ B  0.3390 ) and D ( ˆ D  0.2255 )
which was insignificant at conventional levels. A contradiction to the raw LSR reports in
Figure 5, Model 1 estimates that subjects were very confident the volunteer’s prediction
was incorrect, ˆ W  0.6513 with p-value = 0.003.
Table 17. Model 1: Brands & Prediction Accuracy
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
ρA
ρB
ρC
ρD
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
Prior weight: soda A Coke
Prior weight: soda B Coke
Prior weight: soda C Coke
Prior weight: soda D Coke
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.716
-0.6413
0.0718
0.6513
0.7223
0.3390
0.6421
0.2255
-0.1560
0.3514

Standard
Error
0.0209
0.0205
0.0072
0.2214
0.2110
0.1977
0.2210
0.1993
0.1399
0.0944

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0030
0.0010
0.0860
0.0040
0.2580
0.2650
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.675
-0.6815
0.0578
0.2174
0.3088
-0.0485
0.2089
-0.1650
-0.4302
0.1665

Upper
95% CI
0.757
-0.6011
0.0858
1.0852
1.1358
0.7264
1.0752
0.6161
0.1181
0.5364

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3608.5548
Observations = 5313

Statistical control for anchoring biases in the MPL decisions are added to the
model in Table 18. At the beginning of this section, the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test failed to
reject the null of no anchoring biases in LSR bets. Coefficient estimates for ρˆ Anchor are
jointly zero at the 0.9733 level ( 52  0.86 ). The model reported in Table 17 is the better
model, assuming UP preferences with both brand and prediction uncertainty.
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Table 18. Model 1: Brands & Prediction Accuracy with Treatment Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
Constant
Anchor
ρA
Constant
Anchor
ρB
Constant
Anchor
ρC
Constant
Anchor
ρD
Constant
Anchor
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda A is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda B is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda C is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda D is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7172
-0.6461
0.0717

Standard
Error
0.0232
0.0864
0.0071

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6717
-0.8154
0.0579

Upper
95% CI
0.7626
-0.4767
0.0856

0.5835
0.2055

0.2504
0.4238

0.0200
0.6280

0.0928
-0.6251

1.0741
1.036

0.7059
0.0838

0.2215
3.3025

0.0010
0.9800

0.2718
-6.3890

1.1401
6.5565

0.3509
-0.1827

0.2240
0.3455

0.1170
0.5970

-0.0882
-0.8599

0.7899
0.4946

0.6434
0.0196

0.2396
3.3823

0.0070
0.9950

0.1737
-6.6096

1.1131
6.6488

0.2033
-0.1780
-0.1646
0.3570

0.2593
0.2854
0.1643
0.1041

0.4330
0.5330
0.3160
0.0010

-0.3049
-0.7374
-0.4866
0.1531

0.7116
0.3814
0.1573
0.5609

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3607.3399
Observations = 5313

4.3.3.1 Uncertain Distinctions
Two alternative UP-consistent preference models assume either:
1. Model 2, subjects are uncertainty neutral in the prediction accuracy and
uncertainty seeking/averse in the brand domain (equations (27) and (28) with

u J  x   x ), or
2. Model 3, subjects are uncertainty seeking/averse in the prediction accuracy
domain and uncertainty neutral in the brand domain (equations equations (29)
and (30) with u I  x   x ).
Table 19 and Table 20 show the likelihood estimates for Model 2. Anchoring
biases are tested in Table 20. The chi-square test fails to reject the null of no bias and all
treatment variables are jointly zero at the 0.1122 level, with 52  8.92 .
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Table 19. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Prediction Domain
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
ρA
ρB
ρC
ρD
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
Prior weight: soda A Coke
Prior weight: soda B Coke
Prior weight: soda C Coke
Prior weight: soda D Coke
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7240
-0.6842
0.0716
0.1876
0.7964
0.3357
0.6623
0.1353
-0.1155
0.3927

Standard
Error
0.3686
2.1441
0.0079
0.3198
0.2545
0.2567
0.2899
0.3254
0.2739
0.1911

p-value
0.0490
0.7500
<0.0001
0.5580
0.0020
0.1910
0.0220
0.6780
0.6730
0.0400

Lower
95% CI
0.0016
-4.8866
0.0561
-0.4393
0.2976
-0.1675
0.0941
-0.5024
-0.6523
0.0181

Upper
95% CI
1.4464
3.5182
0.0871
0.8144
1.2952
0.8388
1.2304
0.7730
0.4213
0.7674

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.637
Observations = 5313

Table 20. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Prediction Domain with Treatment Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
Constant
Anchor
ρA
Constant
Anchor
ρB
Constant
Anchor
ρC
Constant
Anchor
ρD
Constant
Anchor
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda A is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda B is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda C is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda D is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7229
-0.6772
0.0716

Standard
Error
0.0574
0.2504
0.0071

p-value
<0.0001
0.0070
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6105
-1.1680
0.0578

Upper
95% CI
0.8354
-0.1863
0.0854

0.1633
0.0546

0.3067
0.3271

0.5940
0.8670

-0.4379
-0.5865

0.7645
0.6957

0.8012
-0.6249

0.3074
0.6043

0.0090
0.3010

0.1988
-1.8094

1.4037
0.5596

0.3726
0.6133

0.2453
0.2385

0.1290
0.0100

-0.1082
0.1458

0.8535
1.0807

0.6513
-0.6124

0.3286
0.5006

0.0470
0.2210

0.0072
-1.5934

1.2953
0.3687

0.0488
0.7733
-0.1292
0.3908

0.4433
0.5155
0.2907
0.1089

0.9120
0.1340
0.6570
<0.0001

-0.8200
-0.2371
-0.6989
0.1773

0.9176
1.7837
0.4404
0.6042

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3598.7185
Observations = 5313

Estimates reported in Table 19 suggests that subjects were highly confident that
the volunteer prediction was correct, ˆ W  0.1876 with p-value = 0.558. This is
consistent with the raw reports in Figure 5. Subjects remain confident that commodities A
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and C are Coke ( ˆ A  0.7964 and ˆC  0.6623 ) the coefficient ˆ B  0.3357 is now
insignificant at the 0.19 level. The coefficient ˆ D  0.1353 remains insignificant. The
estimated coefficient of relative uncertainty ˆ  0.1155 in the brand domain is
insignificant.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of likelihood ratios comparing Models 1 and 2.
The Shapiro-Wilk test clearly rejects the null that the ratios are normally distributed. The
Clarke (2003, 2006) sign test is appropriate to discriminate between these two models.
The Clarke test rejects equality of the models in favor of Model 2 at the 0.0622 level.
There is evidence that the assumption subjects are uncertainty neutral with respect to
prediction accuracy explains the data better than Model 1, where subjects are assumed
uncertainty seeking / averse for both brand and prediction accuracy.
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Figure 6. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 1 vs. Model 2
Table 21 reports the likelihood estimates from Model 3, where subjects are
assumed uncertainty neutral in the commodity brand domain only. Subjects place more
weight on the volunteer prediction was incorrect than correct. The estimated coefficient
of relative uncertainty ˆ  0.0404 in the prediction domain is insignificant. Point
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estimates of beliefs that each commodity A, B, C and D is coke are consistent with earlier
observations, ˆ A  0.81 and ˆC  0.6728 , while ̂ B and ̂ D are insignificant. Consistent
with raw reports in Figure 5, ˆW  0.1798 is insignificant at the 0.479 level. Coefficient
estimates reported in Table 22 fail to reject the null of no anchoring biases in the MPL
task at the 0.78 level ( 52  2.47 ).
Table 21. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Brand Domain
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
ρA
ρB
ρC
ρD
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
Prior weight: soda A Coke
Prior weight: soda B Coke
Prior weight: soda C Coke
Prior weight: soda D Coke
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7266
-0.7014
0.0716
0.1798
0.8100
0.3042
0.6728
0.0913
-0.0404
0.3949

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.8614
Observations = 5313
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Standard
Error
0.0324
0.0765
0.0071
0.2540
0.2991
0.2748
0.3402
0.2825
0.1252
0.1065

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.4790
0.0070
0.2680
0.0480
0.7470
0.7470
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6631
-0.8513
0.0578
-0.3181
0.2236
-0.2344
0.0061
-0.4624
-0.2857
0.1861

Upper
95% CI
0.7900
-0.5515
0.0855
0.6777
1.3963
0.8428
1.3396
0.6450
0.2049
0.6037

Table 22. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Brand Domain with Treatment Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
Constant
Anchor
ρA
Constant
Anchor
ρB
Constant
Anchor
ρC
Constant
Anchor
ρD
Constant
Anchor
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda A is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda B is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda C is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda D is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7273
-0.7063
0.0716

Standard
Error
0.0326
0.0795
0.0071

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6634
-0.862
0.0578

Upper
95% CI
0.7912
-0.5505
0.0855

0.1440
0.0519

0.3034
0.3456

0.6350
0.8810

-0.4506
-0.6254

0.7387
0.7292

0.8211
0.1524

0.3012
0.3072

0.0060
0.6200

0.2306
-0.4497

1.4115
0.7545

0.3541
-0.1529

0.2361
0.3559

0.1340
0.6670

-0.1086
-0.8504

0.8168
0.5446

0.6657
0.1538

0.3446
0.4635

0.0530
0.7400

-0.0097
-0.7547

1.3411
1.0623

0.0003
0.0338
-0.0151
0.3974

0.0120
0.0413
0.1387
0.1069

0.9830
0.4130
0.9130
<0.0001

-0.0232
-0.0471
-0.2870
0.1880

0.0237
0.1147
0.2568
0.6069

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.0641
Observations = 5313

The Shapiro-Wilk test rejects normality of the likelihood ratios between Models 1
and 3 (Figure 7). Clarke’s (2003, 2006) test rejects equality of the individual log
likelihoods in favor of equations Model 3 at the 0.0988 level. There is a moderate amount
of evidence that subjects are uncertainty neutral in the commodity brand domain with

uI  x  x .
The Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null hypothesis of normality of the likelihood
ratios between Model 2 and Model 3. The distribution of likelihood ratios is shown in
Figure 8. The Clarke (2003, 2006) test clearly favors Model 3 as the better model to
explain subjects’ choices when compared to Model 1. More than 63% of non-zero
likelihood differences (1049 out of 1629) favor subjects being uncertainty neutral with
respect to brand accuracy.
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Figure 7. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 1 vs. Model 3
It has been demonstrated that Model 2 (Table 19) and Model 3 (Table 21) both
outperform Model 1 (Table 17). As expected, the Shapiro-Wilk test (see Figure 8) rejects
normality of the likelihood differences for these two models and the Clarke (2003, 2006)
test is appropriate to discriminate between Model 2 and 3. The Clarke test favored Model
3 over Models 2 and 1 (p-value < 0.0001).
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Figure 8. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 2 vs. Model 3
Assuming subjects were uncertainty neutral in both the brand and prediction
accuracy domains, point estimates reported in Table 23 describe subjects as believing the
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volunteer’s prediction was correct, ˆ W  0.166 is insignificant. Subjects also believed
commodities A and C were Coke with ˆ A  0.8094 and ˆC  0.6722 , respectively.
Subjects were very confident commodities B and D were Pepsi, ̂ B and ̂ D are both
insignificant. The point estimates reported in Table 24 fail to reject the null of no
anchoring biases at the 0.6055 level, 52  3.62 .
Table 23. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral in Brand and Prediction Domains
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
ρA
ρB
ρC
ρD
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
Prior weight: soda A Coke
Prior weight: soda B Coke
Prior weight: soda C Coke
Prior weight: soda D Coke
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7276
-0.7087
0.0716
0.1660
0.8094
0.3064
0.6722
0.0926
0.3981

Standard
Error
0.0329
0.0794
0.0071
0.2213
0.3000
0.2704
0.3376
0.2768
0.1005

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.4530
0.0070
0.2570
0.0460
0.7380
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6630
-0.8642
0.0578
-0.2677
0.2213
-0.2234
0.0106
-0.4500
0.2012

Upper
95% CI
0.7921
-0.5531
0.0855
0.5997
1.3974
0.8363
1.3339
0.6352
0.5951

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.9313
Observations = 5313

With ˆ from Model 3 insignificant (p-value = 0.673) and no evidence of
treatment effects for the ―SEU‖ model which assumes subjects are uncertainty neutral
over both brand and prediction domains, the likelihood ratio test applied to observations
from the WTA, LSR, and ELP decision tasks failed to reject the equivalence of Model 2
and the ―SEU‖ mode reported in Table 23 ( 12  0.5486 ).
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Table 24. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral Preferences with Treatment Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρW
Constant
Anchor
ρA
Constant
Anchor
ρB
Constant
Anchor
ρC
Constant
Anchor
ρD
Constant
Anchor
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: brand prediction
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda A is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda B is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda C is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Prior weight: soda D is Coke
MPL anchoring treatment
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.7277
-0.7091
0.0716

Standard
Error
0.0328
0.0787
0.0071

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.6634
-0.8633
0.0578

Upper
95% CI
0.7920
-0.5549
0.0855

0.1375
0.0549

0.2552
0.3349

0.5900
0.8700

-0.3626
-0.6015

0.6377
0.7112

0.8210
0.1652

0.3006
0.2997

0.0060
0.5820

0.2318
-0.4222

1.4101
0.7525

0.3561
-0.1589

0.2300
0.3499

0.1220
0.6500

-0.0947
-0.8447

0.8069
0.5269

0.6656
0.1671

0.3431
0.4543

0.052
0.713

-0.0069
-0.7233

1.3381
1.0575

0.0001
0.0306
0.3986

0.0032
0.0377
0.1027

0.9830
0.4160
<0.0001

-0.0062
-0.0432
0.1973

0.0064
0.1045
0.5999

Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.0736
Observations = 5313

4.4 Experiment Summary
This chapter set out to develop an experimental design to test the hypothesis that
individuals differentiate between different uncertainties.
HYPOTHESIS 4:

Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain
processes.

To test hypothesis 4, three different specifications of the uncertain priors model
were estimated using structural likelihood methods. The first, Model 1 (equation (25) and
(26)), assumed attitudes towards uncertainty were singular and subjects did not
differentiate between uncertain processes. Model 2 (equations (27) and (28)) assumed
subjects had neutral attitudes towards prediction accuracy uncertainty and non-neutral
attitudes towards brand uncertainty. Model 3 (equations (29) and (30)) assumed nonneutral attitudes towards prediction accuracy and neutral attitudes towards brand
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uncertainty. Application of Clarke’s (2003, 2006) sign test for non-nested models
rejected equality of Models 2 and 3, in favor of Model 2. The Clarke test also rejects
equality of Models 1 and 2, in favor of model 2 at the 6.22% level.
Empirical analysis can neither reject nor fail to reject hypothesis 4. Results from
the Clarke tests yield evidence in favor of hypothesis 4. There is evidence that one
process models, Model 2 (Table 19) and Model 3 (Table 21), explains behavior better
than assuming subjects are have attitudes towards uncertainty over both processes.
Estimated beliefs from Model 2, Model 3, and the ―SEU‖ model are consistent with each
other as well as raw elicited beliefs. Subjects believed the volunteer’s prediction was
correct. But if he was wrong, subjects believed commodities B and D more likely to be
Coke while commodities A and C were more likely to be Pepsi. There is also strong
evidence that subjects are uncertainty neutral in both the prediction accuracy and brand
domains.
The empirical results are ambiguous.
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CHAPTER 5: PRIVACY, IDENTIFICATION, AND UNCERTAINTY
Chapter 3 demonstrated that uncertainty aversion in Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color
problem only survives a laboratory setting at the 11.7% level. In chapter 4, the Clarke
(2003, 2006) test for non-nested model selection favored constraining subjects to have
neutral attitudes towards prediction accuracy. The Clarke test supports hypothesis 4.
However, the empirical evidence rejected non-neutral attitudes towards quality
uncertainty. As a result, the evidence presented in favor of hypothesis 4 is mixed.
The experimental design presented in the sequel retests hypothesis 4 in the
context of privacy uncertainties, confidentiality and consequences. The experiment is
designed to test hypothesis 5 and 6.
HYPOTHESIS 5:

Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a
direct mechanism to harm the subject.

HYPOTHESIS 6:

Subjects

cognitively

differentiates

between

uncertain

confidentiality breach and consequences.
Testing hypothesis 5 and 6 requires that only behavior in the laboratory
characterizes privacy loss as well as its consequences. To do that, privacy must be salient
to the design. There must be a link between subject A’s chosen strategy and subject B’s
valuation of the knowledge of A’s strategy. Confounds represented by uncontrolled
strategies and interpersonal comparisons outside of the lab must be controlled.
Table 25 lists several well-known games and a lesser known game and tasks that
generate private information, which human subjects may value. These include:
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Social Dilemma Games, where the payoff to each individual is higher from defecting
behavior than those from cooperative behaviors, and all individuals are worse off
when cooperation is not unanimous,
Bargaining Games, where common knowledge of otherwise private information is
known to change the solution concept (Roth and Malouf 1979),
Joy-of-Destruction, a new game designed to measure ―nastiness‖ towards others, and
Lottery Choice Tasks.
Excluding the Joy-of-Destruction game, introduced by Abbink and Sadrieh (2008)
and simple lottery choice tasks, anonymity loss may alter the way subjects play these
games (Gächter and Fehr 1999). Anonymity loss may engender other-regarding
preferences such as social approval, possibilities for reciprocal actions outside the lab,
exhibitionism, or plain old nastiness.
Multiple mechanisms and institutions generate different pieces of information for
each subject. Histories of play (actions) are the most salient types of information
generated in the games listed in Table 25. Knowing Player A’s payoff indirectly informs
Player B of Player A’s history of play, and vice versa. The qualifying criterion for a
candidate experimental design is that actions by Player A map into the payoffs and
strategies of Player B, such that Player B’s payoffs are partly determined by Player A’s
chosen strategy. Player A’s effect on Player B’s payoff, coupled with an appropriate
mechanism for reciprocal action would lead Player A to value keeping his history private
from Player B.
Consider the joy-of-destruction game. Each player (A or B) can either earn their
endowment, or be assigned one at random. Abbink and Sadrieh (2008) used an earnings
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based mechanism to avoid house money effects26 in their experimental analysis of
anonymity and players’ willingness to impose financial damage on others. The analysis
of Abbink and Sadrieh (2008) focuses on changes to Player A’s (the dictator) actions, not
his belief regarding possible repercussions, such as the possibility of reciprocal actions
from Player B (the victim) knowing Player A’s identity. Confounds represented by
uncontrolled opportunities for reciprocity that may exist outside the lab makes this
particular design inappropriate, since beliefs would not be identifiable and utilities would
not be controlled.
Furthermore, Rutström and Williams (2000) concluded that irrespective of the
way in which endowments were earned subject behavior may be best described as selfinterested. Poorer subjects prefer distributions that increase own payoffs, while richer
subjects prefer distributions that leave their payoffs intact. These results suggest that
Player A ―knowing‖ Player B’s potential payoff would not alter Player A’s chosen
strategy in the joy-of-destruction in any meaningful way. Player A would rather be nasty,
destroying Player B’s wealth to maximize the likelihood that he earns at least as much as
Player B. In the experimental design of Abbink and Sadrieh (2008), Player B’s beliefs for
the occurrence of a bad outcome will be unchanged by a loss of privacy over wealth.
Player B would have little incentive to be willing to pay to maintain privacy.
Burnham (1997) reported on a series of dictator games where, in one treatment,
Player A would receive Player B’s photo prior to deciding whether or not to split a $10
endowment between himself and Player B. Burnham (1997) found that receiving player
26

Thaler and Johnson (1990, p. 643-644) define the house money effect as when ―… under some
circumstances a prior gain can increase subjects’ willingness to accept gambles.‖ Contemporary
experimental economics uses the term house money effect to describe behavioral differences between those
subjects who earn money in the lab as consequences to choices made and those subjects who are ―given‖
money by the experimenter.
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B’s photo does not change the likelihood that Player A chooses to keep the entire $10.
However, conditional on Player A already giving Player B a portion of the $10, losing
anonymity increases Player A’s giving. These results suggest that the classic dictator
game is also an inappropriate design to elicit values of privacy. Both the dictator game
and joy-of-destruction game lack mechanisms that would induce dictators to behave in a
more self-interested way following the recipients’ loss of confidentiality.
In a series of related experiments, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Goette, Huffman,
and Meire (2006), Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006), and Chen and Xin Li (2009)
measure the effects of induced group identities and real group identities. Using prisoner’s
dilemma and dictator games, each analysis measured punishment levels associated with
deviations from social norms. Within-group and between-group designs were employed
in each experiment. In-group members were robustly found to punish deviation more
severely than out-group members, and this finding was statistically significant.
Supporting the saliency of laboratory induced (group) identities to explain the
privacy behavior, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, Fig. 1 and 2) show that subjects form
expectations of punishment that increase with violations of social norms. Their results
suggest that a dictator game, coupled with the formation of identities and opportunities
for reciprocal punishment, may allow subjects to form values of identifying information
that are endogenous to the experiment.
The joy-of-destruction and dictator games using real subject identities have
therefore been eliminated as potential institutions that allow subjective values of privacy
to emerge as a result of salient consequences from strategies chosen in the laboratory.
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Integrating (repeated) prisoner’s dilemma games with punishment opportunities would
allow for experimental control of previously identified confounds.
Public goods and common pool resource games with punishment accomplish this
task. Consider the simple linear public goods game, where each players’ payoff is the
sum of the social composition function and the part of their endowment not contributed to
the public good. Although full cooperation is the social optimum, as long as the marginal
return from own contributions to the public good is less than the marginal private return,
Players A, B, and any other subject will completely free-ride. Although the free-rider
hypothesis27 tends to fail one-shot tests, under repeated play behavior tends toward
complete free-riding by each player (Camerer 2002, p. 46; Fehr and Gächter 2000).
Behavior converges towards full cooperation within a relatively short period of time after
the introduction of punishment opportunities, (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ostrom, Walker,
and Gardner 2001).28
Observations that punishment opportunities increase contributions to the public
good are explainable by a simple subjective expected utility model. Player A evaluates
the probability that other players punish him for each possible contribution level. He then
chooses the contribution level that maximizes his subjective expected utility. This
contribution level would minimize his expected punishment. As punishments are
realized, Player A updates his beliefs, and contributions continue to increase towards full
cooperation.

27

The free-rider hypothesis tells us that nonexcludability imparts, on each individual, an incentive to
contribute less than his marginal value to the cost of providing a public good.
28
Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (2001) found that sanctions need not be financial. ―Cheap talks‖
communication is sufficient to substantially reduce over use of the resource.
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Players presented with a non-anonymous public goods game with punishment
should have a willingness to pay for anonymity that is no more than the amount of money
that dissipates all gains from anonymous play. Subjects form beliefs about the likelihood
and severity of punishment without anonymity, and then compare these beliefs to their
expected utility from anonymous play. This is essentially the same evaluation process
that individuals make when evaluating privacy decision similar to the privacy paradox.
From the games discussed above and decision tasks presented in Table 25, public
goods games, common pool resource games, and other appropriately designed repeated
interaction social dilemma problems appear as natural institutions that may be used to
generate individualized histories of play that allow subjects to endogenously value
keeping their histories of play private.
In section 5.1, the public goods game is incorporated into an experimental design
to elicit subjective beliefs and attitudes towards privacy uncertainties, confidentiality and
consequences. The econometric model used to analyze the data is presented in section
5.2. The data analysis results are discussed in section 5.3 and summarized in section 5.4.
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Table 25. Candidate Games/Tasks with Private Information

Dictator Games
One person divides a pie between
himself and another.

Information Generating
Process
1) Contributions
a) Amount of freeriding behavior.
2) Endowment
a) Earned / Random
1) Consumption
a) Amount of resource
use.
2) Endowment
a) Earned / Random
1) Endowment
a) Earned / Random
2) Allocation

Ultimatum Games
One person makes an offer to
another. The second person may reject
the offer, leaving both with zero.

1) Endowment
a) Earned / Random
2) Proposal
3) Acceptance / Rejection

Prisoner’s Dilemma
Each player must choose whether to
obtain security, to the detriment of the
common good.
Joy-of-Destruction
Players can mutually destroy each
others’ wealth.
Lottery Choice tasks
Lotteries are randomly presented to
subjects, who then state preference for
the same lotteries.

1) Defection(s)
a) One-shot play
b) Iterated play

Games/Tasks
Public Goods
Non-rivalrous and non-excludable
goods and services.

Common Pool Resource
Rivalrous and (usually) nonexcludable goods, such as grazing
lands in the tragedy of the commons.

1) Endowment
a) Earned / Random
1) Randomly determined
lottery pairs
2) Randomly determined
prizes

Stake Holder of Privacy and
Payoffs
1) Contributors
a) lose money
2) Free-riders
gain money

Saliency of Keeping Privacy
1) Free-riders reduce payoffs to
contributors
2) Controlled punishment opportunities
inside of the lab.

1) Over-users
a) Increase payoffs
2) Everyone else
a) Relatively lower payoffs

1) Over-users reduce payoffs to all
others.
2) Controlled punishment opportunities
inside the lab.

1) Dictator
a) Unilaterally allocates
payoffs
2) Receiver
a) No laboratory Identity
1) Proposer
a) Offers a payoff
2) Receiver
a) Accepts or rejects payoff.

1) Uncontrolled punishment
opportunities outside of the lab.
2) Controlled punishment opportunities
inside of the lab.

1) Cooperators
a) Loose money
2) Defectors
a) Gain money
1) Victim loses money.
2) Nasty player gains no money

1) Controlled punishment opportunities
inside of the lab.
2) Uncontrolled punishment
opportunities outside of the lab.
1) Privacy (hidden-action) would tend
to reduce social distance, increasing
players’ nastiness to one another.
1) Prize differences are random
2) Uncontrolled punishment
opportunities outside of the lab.

1) No laboratory identities
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1) Controlled punishment opportunities
inside of the lab.
2) Uncontrolled punishment
opportunities outside of the lab.

5.1 Experimental Design
Experimental instruments used to elicit privacy values must accomplish two
things. First, privacy values should emerge endogenously as a result of real choices made
by subjects. Second, values should be elicited with incentive compatible mechanisms. A
four stage design is sufficient to satisfy these two criteria. In the first stage, subjects play
a public goods game. The second stage introduces the prospect of punishment
opportunities and uses a BDM mechanism in a bargaining situation where subjects have
the opportunity to sell information pertaining to their choices in the public good stage of
the experiment. The third stage elicits subjects’ beliefs and presents subjects with an ELP
choice task to identify UP preferences and attitudes towards uncertainty. Finally, Stage 4
resolves punishment.
Table 26. Experimental Design

Session

Public Goods
Private
Endowment
Return

WTA/BDM Interval
Public
Return

Low

High

1

20

3

1

$0.00

$20.99

2

30

3

1

$0.00

$20.99

3

30

3

2

$0.00

$20.99

4

20

3

2

$0.00

$20.99

5

30

3

1

$000

$20.99

LSR
Anchoring
(Skew)
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low

Sellers,
Senders,
punishers
5, 3, 6
5, 2, 4
4, 1, 3
2, 2, 3
4, 3, 6
6, 2, 4
4, 1, 4
4, 3, 4
3, 2, 1
3, 1, 5

5.1.1 Stage 1: The Public Goods Game
In the first stage of the experiment, subjects played a public goods game designed
using the Veconlab29 website and software. The game used a 2×2 design where per
period endowments were 20 or 30 tokens and the social return was either 1 or 2 cents per
29

http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu
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token. Private return was a fixed 3 cents per token for each experimental session. Subject
endowments and the social return were held fixed for each of the ten rounds played. Ten
rounds were played in each session to allow subjects to learn that complete free-riding is
in their selfish best interest (Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984; Isaac, McCue, and Plott
1985).
At the conclusion of the public goods game, subjects knew only their earnings for
that task and the total contributions of the remainder of the group. At this point in the
experiment, no subject possessed any information regarding the payoffs of any other
subject. The punishment phase was played at the end of each session, after the value
elicitation and belief elicitation tasks were completed.
5.1.2 Stage 2: Eliciting Privacy Values
In the value elicitation stage, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
roles: seller, sender, or punisher. Panels A and B of Figure 9 illustrate the bargaining and
punishment groups used to simulate the canonical privacy problem. Subject pairings used
were direct-sale groups (including a seller and punisher) and indirect-sale groups
(including a seller, sender, and punisher).
Panel A depicts the direct-sale groups where sellers trade directly with punishers.
To facilitate the transaction, subjects sold their record sheets to the experimenters, who in
turn gave the records to the punisher. For the indirect-sale treatment (panel B), the
experimenters gave the sold records to senders who then decided to either keep it
confidential or pass it to the punisher. The instructions describing these roles to subjects
were accompanied with a cartoon used to help privately convey their roles to subjects.
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Referring to Figure 10 panel B (indirect-sale), sellers decided whether or not to
sell their records. If the seller’s records were sold to the experimenter, they were given to
the sender with certainty. Records that did not sell stayed secret, with certainty. Senders
then decided whether or not to pass the record sheet to a punisher, whom in turn decided
whether or not to deduct 50% of the seller’s earnings from the public goods game.
Utilizing the public goods game in this way reverses the ―good guy‖ and ―bad
guy‖ roles from the loyalty card example. The difference was that in the later, the person
responsible for conferring the bad event on the seller wants to defraud the seller in an
attempt to better themselves. While in the former, the person conferring the bad event on
the seller wants to punish the seller for perceived free-riding behavior. The kernel of
reported privacy behavior remains unchanged. Sellers have private information, which if
released may incentivize the receiver of that information to harm the subject of that
information.
Sale of information was facilitated by a (reverse) BDM mechanism. Subjects
assigned to the role of seller were instructed to state a price between $0.00 and $20.99 at
which they would be willing to sell their record sheet. Their price was then compared to
the experimenter’s randomly determined bid price. If the seller’s asking price was less
than or equal to the experimenter’s bid, the transaction took place. The seller received the
randomly determined bid, and the seller’s record sheet was given to his counterpart, a
punisher or sender. If the asking price was greater than the random bid, then no
transaction took place. The seller’s personal information remained private. Consider the
following example, illustrating the truth telling properties of the transaction mechanism.
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Assume Player A is assigned to the role of seller, and let WTA be his actual
willingness-to-accept a privacy loss. With random bid b , his payoff will be b  WTA  0
if WTA  b and 0 otherwise. Reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy. If Player A
reports WTAr  WTA  b , then he is equally well off with either a true or false report. If
he reports WTAr  b  WTA , then he loses b  WTA  0 and would have been better off
by reporting truthfully. Over-reporting is dominated by reporting honestly. Similarly, if
Player A reports WTA  WTAr  b , then he receives 0 with either a true or false report.
However, by reporting WTA  b  WTAr , Player A loses b  WTA  0 and would have
been better off by reporting truthfully. Under-reporting is dominated by truthful
reporting.
5.1.2.1 Maintaining Real-World Privacy
To maintain real-world privacy for the experimental subject, record sheets were
purchased from all subjects. If a sale did not take place, the earnings information was
replaced with ―no sale,‖ indicating that the records were not sold. All subjects had no
way to know the experimental roles of other subjects. Subjects in the roles of sender and
punisher were given an explicit guarantee of confidentiality. Their optimal response to
the BDM was a price of $0.30

30

Mean WTA for all senders and punishers was $7.99 with median 7.64, maximum 20.99, and standard
deviation 4.98.
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Seller

Experimenter
as Buyer

Experimenter
as Buyer

Seller

100% chance

100% chance
Subjective
Probability of
Occurring

Buyer / Punisher

Sender
Subjective
Probability of
Occurring

Subjective
Probability of
Occurring
Receiver /
Punisher

(A) Direct-Sale Group

(B) Indirect-Sale Group

Direction of Information Sale:
Direction of Confidentiality Loss:
Direction of Punishment:
Figure 9. Subject Pairs for (A) Direct-Sale and (B) Indirect-Sale Groups
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Seller

Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you

We
give
to
you

You

Seller loses
half of
Punish Seller
money
Seller
Don’t punish seller loses no
money

Seller loses
half of
money
Give to punisher
You

(A) Punisher in Direct-Sale Group

Keep secret

Punisher

(B) Sender in Indirect-Sale Group

Figure 10 Instructional Cartoons Depicting Subject Roles and Tasks
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Seller
loses no
money

5.1.3 Stage 3: Belief Elicitation
Sellers’ beliefs for confidentiality loss and consequences were elicited using a
LSR. Sellers were assigned to only one of these two treatment frames. The LSR was
administered using paper and pencil. Each seller placed bets on the uncertain events by
circling the appropriate row number on their decision sheets. Copies of the decision
sheets and instructions can be found in Appendix F. The first six rows of a decision sheet
used for the confidentiality frame are shown here. To detect anchoring biases, two
versions of the scoring rule varied the distribution of payoffs to determine if subjects
anchor their choices in the center of the decision sheet. In the absence of anchoring
biases, reports would be distributed equally across both treatments.
Table 27: Example Betting Sheet for Linear Scoring rule

Row
0%
4%
8%
12%
15%
19%

Payment if your
Payment if your
record sheet is passed
record sheet is not
to the Punisher
passed to the Punisher
$0.00
$50.00
$2.00
$48.00
$4.00
$46.00
$6.00
$44.00
$7.50
$42.50
$9.50
$40.50

Sellers placed their bets by circling the row number corresponding to the bet they
preferred. For the decision sheet here selecting row 19% would pay $9.50 if the sender
passed the seller’s record sheet to the punisher and $40.50 otherwise. These prize
amounts correspond directly to a report of  % report in the LSR given by

S  |passed   50  50 1    and S  |not passed   50  50   .
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5.1.3.1 Maintaining Real-World Privacy
To maintain the real-world privacy of each subject and avoid role identification
during the belief elicitation task, senders and punishers place LSR bets that they would
receive the record sheet from seller counterpart. Senders place bets that the seller they
were paired with would sell his record sheet. Punishers bet on one of two events.
Punishers in the direct-sale groups bet that the seller they were paired with would sell his
records. Punishers in the indirect-sale bet that the seller sold his records and the sender
decided to breach the seller’s confidentiality.
5.1.3.2 Equivalent Lottery Pairs: Controlling Uncertainty
The ELP choice was the final decision sellers made. After placing their LSR bets,
sellers were given the choice to either keep their uncertain bet on confidentiality or
consequences, or to trade their bet for an objective bet. Prior to choosing sellers were
given examples for bets at row 19% and 77%. A seller who chose row 19% could either
keep the bet or replace the uncertainty with the spin of a bingo cage. If a number between
0 and 19 was drawn the subject won the $9.50 prize. He would receive $40.50 for
drawing a number between 20 and 100. For a bet on row 77%, if a number between 0 and
77 was drawn, he would receive $38.50. Numbers between 78 and 100 paid $11.50.
Sellers who are averse to the uncertainty associated with their bet would prefer to
―swap‖ for the objective bet. Uncertainty seeking sellers would prefer to keep their bet
from the belief elicitation task. For sellers who expressed indifference, whether they kept
their uncertain bet or swapped the equivalent objective lottery was randomly determined.
For bets place on consequences, indifference suggests preferences are given by
equation (4) with u 2  x   x , Model 2, or equation (3) with u  x   x , Model 1.
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2
Preferences for the certain (uncertain) bet imply u   (or u   ) is concave (convex) and

sellers are uncertainty aversion (loving). Indifference between keeping and swapping bets
on confidentiality suggests that reduction applies for the uncertain consequences and UP
preferences are of the form given by equation (5) with u1  x   x , Model 2, or equation
(3) with u  x   x , Model 1.
5.1.4 Stage 4: Resolution of Punishment
Confidentiality and punishment were resolved in two steps. First, record sheets
for sellers in indirect-sale groups who sold their information were given to those subjects
assigned to the role of sender. If a seller in an indirect-sale group did not sell his records,
the sender received an indication of ―no sale‖ in place of the seller’s earnings from the
public goods game. To maintain real-world anonymity for the senders, sellers and
punishers were given blank slips of paper. Every subject in the lab received a slip of
paper. Subjects could not determine who had been assigned the role of sender. Senders
were instructed to make their decisions and all record sheets and blank slips were
collected.
Step two resolved the consequences of privacy loss. Records sheets were given to
the punishers in accordance with the senders’ decision for the indirect-sale groups and the
outcome of the BDM mechanism for sellers in the direct-sale groups. Real-world
anonymity was maintained by giving blank slips of paper to sellers and senders. Every
subject in the lab received a slip of paper, minimizing the chances that subjects could
determine who was assigned to what roles. Finally, punishers were instructed to make
their decision. Punishment was determined by a binary yes/no (punish/don’t punish)
choice. Punishment resulted in a fixed 50% loss of earning from the public goods game.
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Punishment was proportional to earnings to guarantee non-negative earnings and avoid
the possibility of bankruptcy. It is important maintain positive earnings to eliminate the
need for house money because its effects have been shown to confound identification of
―risky‖ behavior (Thaler and Johnson 1990).
All earnings from the value and belief elicitation tasks were retained by sellers,
regardless of the resolution of punishment. This was made clear to subjects prior to the
elicitation of their beliefs in Stage 3.
5.2 Econometric Model
5.2.1 Testing the Privacy Paradox
Sellers in the WTA task reported their minimum willingness-to-accept
compensation in exchange for (i) giving their earnings information from the public goods
game directly to another subject (a punisher) whom had the option to reduce the seller’s
earnings by 50% or (ii) giving their contributions information to a third party (sender)
whom may, or may not, pass that information to a punisher. To test hypothesis 5, a hurdle
model was estimated to control for the upper payment limit of $20.99 used in the BDM
mechanism.
Intuition for the hurdle model is as follows. Upon instruction for the WTA task
and assignment to either a direct-sale or indirect-sale group, a seller interrogated himself,
determining his minimum WTA loss of privacy. Once the seller mentally calculated his
minimum value, he determined if that value is above or below the $20.99 maximum
experimenter WTP. If the seller’s WTA was greater than $20.99, he marked some
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arbitrary value greater than $20.99.31 If the seller’s WTA was less than or equal to
$20.99, the ―hurdle‖ is crossed and he expressed that value.
Under this framework, likelihood model is given as follows. The probability of
stating a WTA less than or equal to $20.99 is given by

  , y  $20.99
Pr  WTA  y   
1   , y  $20.99

(39)

Conditional on having a WTA within the bounds of the BDM mechanism, the seller’s
WTA is given by
T

 f  β X  , WTA  $20.99
,
WTA  
otherwise

$21,



(40)

where X are explanatory variables: earnings in the voluntary contributions game and a
dummy variable indicating group membership. Given equations (39) and (40), the
unconditional log-likelihood for the seller’s WTA privacy loss is

ln  ,

WTA  $20.99
ln L  
,
T
ln 1    f  β X  , WTA  $20.99







(41)

where    is the normal density function. Hypothesis 5 predicts the  coefficient for
group membership is positive and ―large.‖
5.2.2 Controlling Risk Attitudes
Given the domain of potential experimental payoffs ($0 to $50), risk attitudes
were controlled using an expo-power utility function
v  x   1  exp   x1r   ,

31

(6)

One subject in the direct sale treatment asked $30 in exchange for his personal information, guaranteeing
his information remained private.
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where   0 and r  1 are parameters to be estimated, and x is income from observed
lottery choices. The probability that the subject chooses lottery 1 was modeled with the
logistic distribution

EU 

exp  eu1  , r  0 

exp  eu1  , r  0   exp  eu 2  , r  0 

.

(7)

where eu i  , r  are the contextually normalized EUs, and 0 the Fechner error
parameter.
5.2.3 Identification of Subjective Beliefs and Uncertainty Attitudes
Subjective beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were identified from subjects’
decisions to participate in the belief elicitation task, LSR bets for the events of having
confidentiality breached and having earnings reduced (conditional on privacy), and the
ELP task where subjects were able to swap their (uncertainty) subjective bets for
objective bets with identical payoffs.
Sellers in the direct-sale treatment reported minimum selling price, WTAr , to
equate their UP preferences given that a sale of information has taken place
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with final voluntary contributions earnings given that no sale takes place
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(44)

with second-order crra utilities characterized by constant relative uncertainty aversion,

u  x   x1 1    . Similarly, sellers in the indirect-sale treatment report WTAr such that
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satisfies
W  z  WTAr   W  z | c  .







(46)



Beliefs and priors ρ, π1 and θ, π 2 were isolated by the sellers’ LSR bets for
either a confidentiality breach or having their earnings reduced by a punisher. Sellers in
the indirect-sale treatment bet on confidentiality. Sellers in the direct-sale treatment bet
on earnings deduction.
Four sellers decided not to participate in the LSR betting task.32 Participation
decisions were made by comparing the UP preference of not participating in the LSR task
to the optimal bet, conditional on deciding to participate. Defining BDM as earnings from
the BDM mechanism, sellers’ UP preferences for not participating are given by
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for direct-sale groups and
I1
I2
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for indirect-sale groups.
Conditional on participating in the belief elicitation task, sellers in direct-sale
groups placed LSR bets (reports),  , to maximize

32

One of the sellers opting out of the LSR bet was in an indirect-sale group. The other three sellers were in
direct-sale groups.
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where q  are the LSR payments given report  . Sellers in the indirect-sale groups
placed bets to maximize
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The decision to participate in the LSR and optimal report, conditional on
participation, were modeled as a simultaneous decision,     ,1   λ,1 using the link
function

W 
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(51)

for bets made by sellers in the direct-sale, and

W 



exp W  , ρ, π1;  , r , θ, π2  1
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,

(52)

for bets made by sellers in the indirect-sale. W   is defined as the contextual norm of
sellers UP preferences, W   . Implicit in equation (52) is the assumption that sellers in





the indirect sale have the same priors and beliefs ρ, π1 as those sellers in the direct sale.
The log likelihood function for equations (51) and(52) is
T

ln L  ; y, X,  , r    yt ln W + 1  yt  ln 1  W  ,   0 , r  1 ,
t 1
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(53)

where yt  1 for the report   and yt  0 for all other   33.
The ELP task controlled attitudes towards uncertainty and varied probabilities.
Sellers opting to participate in the LSR bet were allowed the option of swapping their
bets on the uncertain events in exchange for bets defined by
PL     1 101 and PR  100     101 .34

The objective bets were assumed evaluated as
EU  PLv  zL   PR v  zR  ,

(54)

and ELP choices were assumed logistically distributed, with the probability
W 

exp  eu  PL , PR ;  , r  1 



exp  eu  PL , PR ;  , r  1   exp W  , ρ, π1;  , r , θ, π 2  1



,

(55)

of a seller replacing the uncertain bet on confidentiality and
W 

exp  eu  PL , PR ;  , r  1 



exp  eu  PL , PR ;  , r  1   exp W  , θ, π2 ;  , r  1



,

(56)

for consequences. The contextual normalizations of equation (54) is given by eu   and

1 is a Fechner error parameter. The log-likelihood is
T

ln L  , πA , 1; y, PL , PR ,  , r, X    yt ln W + 1  yt  ln 1  W  ,   0 , r  1 ,
t 1

where yt  1(0) indicates the t th subject’s choice of replacing(keeping) his uncertain LSR
bet, and X is data pertaining to the choice task and/or subject characteristics.
33

To remove portfolio and wealth effects subject participation in the LSR betting task was voluntary. Four
sellers, one in the indirect sale and three in the direct sale treatments, opted not to participate in the LSR
betting task. Thus, the set of reports Λ includes the nonparticipation option of keeping their status quo UP
following the WTA task.
34
Sellers opting not to participate in the LSR betting task were not afforded the opportunity to swap their
status quo UP preference for the EU bet equation (54). By not participated in the LSR task, probabilities PL
and PR were undefined.
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5.3 Data and Results
Data gathered by the experimental design was used to test hypotheses 5 and 6.
HYPOTHESIS 5:

Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a
direct mechanism to harm the subject.

HYPOTHESIS 6:

Subjects cognitively differentiate between uncertain confidentiality
breach and consequences.

Section 5.3.1 reports the estimated hurdle model given by equation (41) to test
hypothesis 5, the ―privacy paradox.‖ The null is no difference in asking prices for sellers
in the direct-sale (DS) and indirect-sale (IS) groups.
r
H50: WTADS
 WTAISr  0

r
H5A: WTADS
 WTAISr  0

A positive difference, H5A, supports hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 was tested as follows.
Section 5.3.2 reports estimated risk attitudes alone, assuming EUT. Section 5.3.3 offers a
partial test for hypothesis 6. Three models were estimated. First Model 2, equation (4),
assumed subjects were uncertainty neutral in the consequences domain only. Second,
Model 3, equation (5), assumed subjects were uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality
domain only. Finally, sellers were assumed uncertainty neutral in both the confidentiality
and consequences domains and an ―SEU‖ model35, assuming sellers were uncertainty
neutral over both confidentiality and consequences, was estimated. The Clarke (2003,

35

I purposely avoid describing uncertainty neutral preferences as SEU. In the context of Ellsberg’s (1961)
two-color problem SEU implies subjects believe balls are only distributed 50-50 (or some other
distribution), for example. However, in the context of a privacy loss, the single belief interpretation appears
to be inappropriate. There are only two possibilities: confidentiality is either breached or not breached.
Seller’s arguably do not believe their confidentiality is only partially lost, as the Ellsberg example would
imply.
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2006) test was used to choose among Models 2, 3, or ―SEU‖ as the specification that
explains sellers’ privacy preferences.
5.3.1 Testing the Privacy “Paradox”
Average contributions by round for each of the four public goods treatments are
shown in Figure 11. In each session, the private return from not investing in the public
good was held fixed at 3 cents/tokens. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from
investment was set to 2 cents/tokens for half the sessions and 1 cent/token for the other
half. Token endowments were set to 20 or 30 tokens. Comparing the right and left
columns of Figure 11, previous empirical observations (Isaac and Walker 1988) were
replicated. A higher MPCR results in greater efficiency providing the public goods.
Average Contributions by Round
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Figure 11. Public Goods Game Contributions
The distributions of raw WTA values for sellers in the direct-sale and indirect-sale
groups are shown in Figure 12. The minimum asking price in direct-sale groups was $5,
whereas the minimum asking price in indirect-sale groups was $0.01. Mean asking prices
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in the direct-sale treatment were $3.02 higher than asking prices from seller in indirectsale groups.
Kernel Density Estimates
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Figure 12. Distribution of WTA Values by Sale Type
The scatter diagram in Figure 13 plots sellers’ stated WTA amounts against their
earnings from the voluntary contributions game. Bid prices for sellers in the direct sale
treatment are shown as blue dots and bids made by sellers in the indirect sale treatment
are shown as a red ×. Trend lines for each group are also indicated. Mean asking prices
for sellers in direct-sale groups are higher than sellers in indirect-sale groups for all
earnings levels from the public goods game.
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Figure 13. Scatter Plot WTA v. Wealth, by Sale Treatment
Controlling for the $20.99 upper threshold of the BDM mechanism, coefficient
estimates from the hurdle model reported in Table 28 provide evidence supporting the
―privacy paradox.‖ Controlling for wealth earned in the public goods game, the mean
asking price in the indirect-sale groups was $3.98. Asking prices from sellers in the
direct-sale groups were significantly higher ($2.00) at the 0.117 level.
After controlling for previously identified experimental confounds, hypothetical
bias, other regarding preferences, and deceitful practices, data gathered by the
experimental design offer support for previously observed privacy behavior at levels
greater than 10%. When selling personal earnings information directly to someone who
may harm them, sellers’ minimum willingness-to-accept compensation was higher than
situations when the buyer did not have a direct mechanism to do harm but could give the
information to someone who may do harm.
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Table 28. Coefficient Estimates for Hurdle Model Testing the ―Privacy Paradox‖
Variable Description
Participation Equation
φ
Probability WTA ≤ $20.99
Constant
PGearn Voluntary Contribution Earnings
Direct
Direct Sale = 1 Indirect Sale = 0
WTA Bid Equation
Constant
PGearn Voluntary Contribution Earnings
Direct
Direct Sale = 1 Indirect Sale = 0
σ
Standard Error of Regression

Coefficient

Standard
Error

p-value

Lower
95% CI

Upper
95% CI

7.4101
-0.1317
-3.8115

158.8722
0.1281
158.8556

0.9630
0.3040
0.9810

-303.9738
-0.3827
-315.1627

318.7939
0.1193
307.5397

3.9827
0.3543
1.9973
3.9813

2.0286
0.1495
1.2755
0.4508

0.0500
0.0180
0.1170
<0.0001

0.0067
0.0614
-0.5027
3.0978

7.9588
0.6473
4.4973
4.8648

Pseudo log-likelihood = -112.5437
Observations = 40

5.3.2 Risk Attitudes Alone
Average relative risk aversion for the subject pool was estimated with the CRRA
utility function, v  x   x

1 r 

1  r  . On

average, for the domain of RLP prizes ($0 to

$50), all36 subjects were risk averse with rˆ  0.6899 (Table 29).
Table 29. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from CRRA Utility
Variable
r
µ0

Description
CRRA Coefficient
RLP Fechner error

Coefficient
0.6899
0.1210

Standard
Error
0.0725
0.0201

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.5478
0.0815

Upper
95% CI
0.8321
0.1604

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2803.8896
Observations =4164

Parameter estimates assuming an expo-power utility function reject constant
relative risk aversion in favor decreasing relative risk aversion as the prize rises (Table
30). Subjects exhibited risk aversion for low stakes gambles ( rˆ  0.8271 ) which is
decreasing as lottery prizes increase to $50 ( ˆ  0.997 ). Relative risk aversion,

36

Risk attitudes were estimated / controlled using RLP choices for all subjects: sellers, senders, and
punishers.
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RRA  r   1  r  x1r . For the $15 prize, RRA = 0.552. At $50, RRA decreases to
0.488.
Table 30. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from Expo-Power Utility
Variable
r
α
µ0

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8271
-0.9970
0.0974

Standard
Error
0.0306
0.1032
0.0124

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Lower
95% CI
0.7672
-1.1992
0.0731

Upper
95% CI
0.8870
-0.7947
0.1216

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2796.9236
Observations =4164

5.3.3 The Uncertain Priors Model: Uncertain Distinctions
Figure 14 shows the distributions of raw LSR reports elicited from sellers. Four
sellers decided not to participate in the LSR betting task, one from a direct-sale group and
three from indirect-sale groups. The left two columns of Figure 14 show raw punishment
beliefs for seller in the direct-sale groups. Raw confidentiality beliefs for sellers in
indirect-sale groups are shown in the right-hand column. The ten sellers in the indirectsale groups who did not sell their records were guaranteed privacy and their LSR bets on
confidentiality were uninformative and dropped from the remainder of the analysis. Out
of the remaining ten sellers in indirect-sale groups who sold their records, only one
decided not to participate in the LSR betting task.
Out of twenty sellers in direct-sale groups, ten sold their records and ten did not.
The mean report for the seven sellers betting on punishment given non-confidential
records was 0.671, with median 0.62 and standard deviation 0.30. The KolmogorovSmirnov test rejects anchoring biases at the 0.057 level. For the ten sellers betting on
punishment given confidentiality anchoring bias was rejected at the 0.695 level and the
mean report was 0.359, with median 0.455 and standard deviation 0.303. For the nine
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sellers in the indirect-sale groups betting on confidentiality, the mean raw report was
0.393, with median 0.39 and standard deviation 0.24. Anchoring biases are rejected at the
0.556 level.
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Figure 14. Raw LSR Beliefs
Raw beliefs summarized in Figure 14 suggest that sellers believed confidentiality
loss had a low chance of occurring. However, if confidentiality was lost the likelihood of
a being punished was substantially larger than when confidentiality was upheld.
Controlling for risk and uncertainty attitudes, maximum likelihood estimates confirm
these observations.
Likelihood estimates when subjects were assumed uncertainty neutral in the
consequences domain (Model 2) are shown in Table 31. Controls for anchoring bias in
punishment beliefs given non-confidentiality are shown in Table 32. The variable Anchor
takes on values of 1 if the sellers’ LSR bets were in the skew high treatment when the
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―safe‖ bet was at row 39 of the decision sheet, and 0 otherwise. Anchoring bias is
rejected at conventional levels, ˆ b|nAnchor  0.0202 with p-value = 0.974. Assuming
sellers were uncertainty neutral in the consequences domain; estimates reported in Table
31 explain seller beliefs and preferences.
Under Model 2, sellers weight the event of confidentiality loss by ˆ n  0.2951
with p-value = 0.031. When records are not confidential, ˆ b|n  0.8834 (p-value <
0.0001) and sellers believed there was approximately an 88% chance their earnings from
the public goods game would be reduced by the punisher. Sellers place insignificant
weight ˆ b|c  0.1635 (p-value = 0.202) on being punished when their records were
confidential.
Table 31. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Consequences Domain
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρn
ρb|n
ρb|c
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: confidentiality
Prior weight: consequence | nonconfidential
Prior weight: consequence |
confidential
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8267
-0.9964
0.0971
0.2951

Standard
Error
0.0178
0.0898
0.0123
0.1369

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0310

Lower
95% CI
0.7919
-1.1723
0.0731
0.0267

Upper
95% CI
0.8615
-0.8204
0.1212
0.5636

0.8839

0.2008

<0.0001

0.4903

1.2776

0.1635

0.1283

0.2030

-0.0880

0.4149

-0.4745
0.1363

0.4278
0.0703

0.2670
0.0520

-1.3131
-0.0014

0.3640
0.2740

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.5533
Observations = 4217
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Table 32. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Consequences Domain with Treatment Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρn
ρb|n
Constant
Anchor
ρb|c
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: confidentiality
Prior weight: consequence | nonconfidential
LSR anchoring treatment
Prior weight: consequence |
confidential
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8266
-0.9951
0.0971
0.2955

Standard
Error
0.0202
0.0460
0.0127
0.1795

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1000

Lower
95% CI
0.7871
-1.0852
0.0722
-0.0562

Upper
95% CI
0.8661
-0.9050
0.1220
0.6472

0.8973
-0.0202

0.3224
0.6323

0.0050
0.9740

0.2654
-1.2594

1.5293
1.2190

0.1643

0.1316

0.2210

-0.0935

0.4222

-0.4715
0.1356

0.4677
0.1039

0.3130
0.1920

-1.3882
-0.0679

0.4451
0.3392

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.5524
Observations = 4217

Table 33 shows the likelihood estimates from Model 3 where sellers are assumed
to be uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality domain. Table 34 estimates Model 3 with a
treatment variable to control for anchoring bias in seller beliefs that they will be punished
when their information is not held in confidentiality. Controlling for risk and uncertainty
attitudes, the p-value for ˆ b|nAnchor  0.0371 is large (0.918) and the null of no bias is not
rejected.
Estimated prior weights shown in Table 33 suggest that sellers trusted that their
confidentiality would be kept by senders in the indirect-sale groups, ˆ n  0.186 with pvalue = 0.188. This result contrasts with that of Model 2 (Table 31) which estimated that
subjects were somewhat distrusting of the senders. Sellers did not place significant
weight on the event that confidentiality would be breached and their records would be
given to a punisher.
In the event that records were not confidential and punishers knew the earning
from the public goods game, sellers weight ˆ b|n  0.756 (p-value < 0.001) on the being
punished and having their public goods earning reduced by 50%. Sellers place
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insignificant weight ˆ b|c  0.2852 (p-value = 0.185) on being punished when their
records were confidential. The p-value (0.514) for the coefficient or relative uncertainty

ˆ  0.1746 suggests sellers were uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality domain.
Table 33. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality Domain
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρn
ρb|n
ρb|c
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: confidentiality
Prior weight: consequence | nonconfidential
Prior weight: consequence |
confidential
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8249
-0.9882
0.0963
0.1860

Standard
Error
0.0218
0.0204
0.0119
0.1413

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.1880

Lower
95% CI
0.7821
-1.0283
0.0729
-0.0909

Upper
95% CI
0.8677
-0.9481
0.1197
0.4628

0.7560

0.2070

<0.0001

0.3503

1.1617

0.2852

0.2155

0.1860

-0.1371

0.7075

-0.1746
0.1559

0.2678
0.0790

0.5140
0.0490

-0.6994
0.0001

0.3503
0.3107

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.4906
Observations = 4217

Table 34. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality Domain with Treatment
Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρn
ρb|n
Constant
Anchor
ρb|c
ϕ
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: confidentiality
Prior weight: consequence | nonconfidential
LSR anchoring treatment
Prior weight: consequence |
confidential
CRUA coefficient
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8246
-0.9859
0.0962
0.1886

Standard
Error
0.0147
0.0870
0.0122
0.1567

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.2290

Lower
95% CI
0.7958
-1.1564
0.0724
-0.1184

Upper
95% CI
0.8534
-0.8153
0.1201
0.4957

0.7837
-0.0371

0.2487
0.3612

0.0020
0.9180

0.2964
-0.7451

1.2711
0.6709

0.2849

0.2279

0.2110

-0.1618

0.7317

-0.1719
0.1539

0.2883
0.0977

0.5510
0.1150

-0.7370
-0.0375

0.3931
0.3454

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.4837
Observations = 4217

Figure 15 graphically compares the distribution of likelihood ratios from Models
2 and 3 to the normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk statistic, W = 0.922 n = 53, rejects
normality of the distribution and Clarke’s (2003, 2006) sign test is appropriate to
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discriminate between models. Model 3 yields higher likelihood values for 31 out of 52
non-zero differences. With a p-value = 0.1058, Model 3 is ―better than‖ Model 2.
Kernel density estimate
Kernel density estimate of data and normal density for comparison
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Figure 15. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 2 vs. Model 3
Constraining sellers to be uncertainty neutral in both confidentiality and
consequences domains, point estimates in Table 35 describe a belief structure comparable
to Models 3. Table 36 rejects anchoring bias at conventional levels, ˆ b|nAnchor  0.0397
with p-value = 0.941.
Table 35. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality and Consequences
Domains
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρn
ρb|n
ρb|c
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: confidentiality
Prior weight: consequence | nonconfidential
Prior weight: consequence |
confidential
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8256
-0.9868
0.0969
0.1657

Standard
Error
0.0167
0.0617
0.0121
0.1419

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.2430

Lower
95% CI
0.7930
-1.1078
0.0731
-0.1125

Upper
95% CI
0.8583
-0.8659
0.1207
0.4438

0.8720

0.1994

<0.0001

0.4812

1.2629

0.1739

0.1257

0.1670

-0.0726

0.4204

0.2034

0.0621

0.0010

0.0816

0.3252

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.685
Observations = 4217
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Table 36. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality and Consequences
Domains with Treatment Effects
Variable
r
α
µ0
ρn
ρb|n
Constant
Anchor
ρb|c
µ1

Description
RRA at zero income
Positive income RRA normalization
RLP Fechner error
Prior weight: confidentiality
Prior weight: consequence | nonconfidential
LSR anchoring treatment
Prior weight: consequence |
confidential
Fechner error

Coefficient
0.8258
-0.9899
0.0969
0.1689

Standard
Error
0.0176
0.0550
0.0123
0.1511

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.2640

Lower
95% CI
0.7914
-1.0976
0.0728
-0.1272

Upper
95% CI
0.8602
-0.8821
0.1209
0.4651

0.8992
-0.0396

0.2945
0.5411

0.0020
0.9420

0.3220
-1.1002

1.4765
1.0209

0.1754

0.1260

0.1640

-0.0716

0.4224

0.2002

0.0789

0.0110

0.0455

0.3549

Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.6808
Observations = 4217

The ―SEU‖ model (Table 35) is nested in Models 3 (Table 33) by the constraint

  0 . The likelihood ratio test applied to observations from the LSR and ELP decisions
failed to reject the equivalence of Model 3 and the ―SEU‖ model ( 12  0.5224 ).
5.4 Experiment Summary
Chapter 5 set out to test two hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 5:

Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a
direct mechanism to harm the subject.

HYPOTHESIS 6:

Subjects cognitively differentiate between uncertain confidentiality
breach and consequences.

Estimates from the hurdle model (Table 28) in Section 5.3.1 demonstrated that the
―privacy paradox‖ survives strict experimental controls for hypothetical bias, deceitful
practices, and other regarding preferences at levels greater than 10%. The average WTA
privacy loss was estimated to be $1.99 higher when trading directly with someone who
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may do harm. The analysis failed to reject hypothesis 5 at the 0.117 level. Willingness-toaccept confidentiality loss was lower when making indirect sales of information to a
party that did not have a direct mechanism to do harm.
To test hypothesis 6, two different specifications of the uncertain priors models
were estimated. The first, Model 2 (equation (4)), assumed attitudes towards uncertainty
were neutral towards consequences and potentially non-neutral to confidentiality. Model
3 (equation (5)), assumed subjects were uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality domain
and potentially non-neutral in the consequences domain. Conclusions from the Clarke
(2003, 2006) test are evidence in favor of Model 3 and hypothesis 6. However, the
likelihood ratio test failed to reject equivalence of Model 3 (Table 33) and ―SEU‖
preferences (Table 35). It should also be recognized that estimated beliefs assuming
Model 3 and the ―SEU‖ model were behaviorally consistent, where as Model 2 assigned
significant positive weight on non-confidentiality.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
There is no ―privacy paradox.‖ The dichotomy in the canonical ―loyalty card‖
framework (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005a) is attributable to asymmetric subjective
beliefs (Syverson 2003; and Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis 2007) and subjects’ do not exhibit
significant amounts of uncertainty aversion (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004 and 2005a)
over either confidentiality or consequences. These conclusions are based on the results of
three separate studies.
Chapter 3 presented an experiment in individual decision making under
uncertainty, experimentally testing Ellsberg’s canonical two-color choice problem. The
data did not support Ellsberg’s hypothesis of uncertainty aversion. Subjects believed bets
on the color ball drawn from Ellsberg’s ambiguous urn were equally likely to pay and
estimated attitudes towards uncertainty were insignificant. Savage’s subjective expected
utility model explains subjects’ choices. The results contrast with previous findings
(Camerer and Webber 1992; Halevy 2007; and others). These differences deserve further
investigation. It was also demonstrated that use of an objective compound lottery to
induce uncertainty did not affect subjects’ choices. Smith’s hypothesis is supported,
however, in an entirely different way than expected.
Chapter 4 extended the concept of uncertainty to commodities where quality and
accuracy of a quality report are potentially ambiguous. The uncertain priors model was
naturally extended to allow for potentially different attitudes towards these two sources of
uncertainty, quality and accuracy. As they relate to privacy, quality and accuracy of a
quality report are metaphors for online security and consumer trust in e-commerce. The
results of parametric structural tests demonstrated that it is possible to discriminate

113

between econometric models allowing subjects to have different preferences towards
different uncertain processes. Allowing subjects to be uncertainty averse in the quality
domain and not the report domain outperformed the alternative which only allows for
uncertainty aversion in the accuracy domain only. Estimated beliefs placed significantly
more weight on report accuracy, supporting trust as an experimental confound in
Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt (2002), Berendt, Günther, and Spiekerman (2005).
Subjects weighted
Finally, chapter 5 identifies subjects’ privacy beliefs which support the hypothesis
of Syverson (2003) and Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis (2007), only. The difference between
WTA privacy loss in direct-sale and indirect-sale groups was positive and significant at
levels greater than 10%. The roles of asymmetric beliefs and attitudes towards
uncertainty were identified using parametric structural likelihood methods. Subjects were
uncertainty neutral and believed ―bad‖ events were more likely to occur when their
private information was not confidential. The uncertainty aversion hypothesis of Acquisti
and Grossklags (2004) and (2005a) was not supported. Asymmetric beliefs explained
subject’s privacy behavior (Syverson 2003).
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APPENDIX A: IRB HUMAN RESEARCH APPROVAL
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APPENDIX B: THREE-COLOR ELLSBERG PROBLEM
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Consider Ellsberg’s (1961, p. 653) three-color problem. There is one urn
containing 90 balls. Thirty balls are known to be red. The remaining 60 are black and
yellow, in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn from the urn at random and
decision-makers are to consider the four bets shown in Table 37.

I
II
III
IV

Table 37. Ellsberg’s Three One Urn, Three-Color Problem
Red
Black
Yellow
$100
$0
$0
$0
$100
$0
$100
$0
$100
$0
$100
$100

Choosing I is a bet on red, II is a bet on black, III is a bet on red or yellow, and IV
is a bet on black or yellow. Ellsberg hypothesizes that a frequent response pattern is

I

II and IV

III . These preferences violate the Sure-thing Principle. The two sets of

bets I vs. II and III vs. IV differ only by the payoff if yellow occurs, which is constant in
each pair of bets.
The preference of I to II implies decision-makers believe there are less than 30
black balls in the urn, which in turn implies the event ―red or yellow‖ has more than twothirds chance of occurring. Thus the contradiction occurs when decision-makers prefer
the two-thirds chance of winning $100 (bet IV) to a greater than two-thirds chance (bet
III). The uncertainty aversion hypothesis explains these preferences by claiming that
decision-makers ―don’t like‖ the possibility that there are really more than 30 black balls
in the urn. These preferences can be explained using the uncertain priors model
I
 J K

W  z    i u    ijk v  z jk   ,
i 1
 j 1 k 1


with K = 1 and j = {red, black, yellow}.
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(2)

Assume the decision-maker has two priors that he weights equally, ρ   0.5, 0.5 .
Under prior 1, he believes there are 40 black balls in the urn and his subjective
probabilities are σ1   13 , 94 , 92  . Under prior 2, he believes there are 20 black balls in the
urn and σ 2   13 , 92 , 94  . If his first-order preferences are defined by v  x   x , for some

 v  z  for bet I is
J

argument x, the evaluation of

j 1

ij

jk

I:

1
3

10  94 0  92 0  3.3333 ,

I:

1
3

10  92 0  94 0  3.3333 ,

under prior 1 and

under prior 2. With second-order utility defined by u  x   x0.9 , the decision-maker’s UP
preferences for bet I are
W  I   0.5 3.33330.9   0.5 3.33330.9   2.955 .

Similar calculations for bets II, III, and IV yield
W  II   0.5 4.44440.9   0.5  2.22220.9   2.9401 ,
W  III   0.5 5.55550.9   0.5 7.77770.9   5.5077 ,
W  IV   0.5 6.66660.9   0.5 6.66660.9   5.5146 .

Comparing these preference values, W(I) > W(II) and W(IV) > W(III) which
explains Ellsberg’s hypothesized pattern of preferences. If there was no aversion to
uncertainty such that u  x   x apart from arbitrary normalizations, then W(I) = W(II) and
W(III) = W(IV). This result is not what Ellsberg predicted and suggests the preferences
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I

II and IV

III may result from a systematic resolution of indifference where

decision-makers focus on bets I and IV.
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APPENDIX C: SOURCE-DEPENDENT RISK ATTITUDES
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Nau (2006, Model II, Theorem 2, p. 143) presents an axiomatic proof of the
source-dependant risk aversion (SDRA) model capable of explaining the behavior in
Ellsberg’s example. The SDRA model may formally be represented as a special case of
the UP model, and is interpreted as assuming that the decision-maker only considers
uncertain processes where the ambiguous urns contains either all red or all black balls
(Nau 2007).
From equation (1), if the decision-maker forms priors equal in number to the set
U
of possible uncertain events, let I  J and rewrite  ij as  iU . Then, by making the

U
further assumption that each prior i is degenerate, so that  i  1,0 , the UP model

becomes

 K C

W  z    i u    k v  zik   ,
i 1
 k 1

I

(A1)

which is the SDRA model, where by definition i  r, b and k  R, B .
In equation (2), the decision-maker can be viewed as if he evaluates v   first,
then he evaluates u   at the expectation of v   , taken over k  R,B . Finally,
preferences for the lotteries in Table 1 are determined by the evaluation of the
expectation of u   , taken over i  r,b . In this case, the decision-maker simply behaves
as if the uncertain urn contains either all red balls or all black balls.
For both lotteries L2 and L3 his expectation of utility over certain event k is

5  12  10  12  0 . Table 38 shows the decision-maker’s expectation of v   for each
lottery, under these assumptions.
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Table 38: Expected EU Assuming SDRA Model

U
events
Ur

5   10   0

0  0  0

10   10   10

5   10  12  0

Ub

5   10   0

10  12  10  12  10

0  12  0  12  0

5   10  12  0

L1
1
2
1
2

L2
1
2
1
2

1
2

L3
1
2

1
2

L4
1
2

1
2
1
2

From these calculations, it is easy to see how the SDRA model can also explain
the pattern of preferences assumed in Ellsberg’s example. The decision-maker will have
final utility for L2 equal to that of L3 , and utility from L1 will equal L4 . However, if the
decision-maker believes that ―r‖ is less likely than ―b‖ and u   is sufficiently concave,
then it is easy to see how he could have the preference relations described above.
Lotteries L1 and L4 hedge the uncertainty surrounding which color ball will be drawn
from urn 2.
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 3
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D.1 Experimenter Instructions
Experimenter Instructions
Welcome. This is an experiment in individual decision making. You can earn cash
based on the choices you make today. Money you earn today will be paid to you in cash
at the end of the experiment. You will be paid $5 for participating in the experiment. The
experiment will last no more than 2 hours. Please make sure that you can stay until the
end. In addition to the participation fee, your earnings will depend partly on chance and
partly on the choices you make today. The instructions are simple and you will benefit
from following them carefully.
There are three stages today:
1. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions,
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in.
2. We will then pause and provide instructions on some choices you are to make
over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring. These
choices will directly affect your earnings.
3. We will then pause again, and provide some instructions on the final task, which
involves you making some more choices over different amounts of money that
have different chances of occurring. These choices will also directly affect your
earnings.
The instructions for the second and third stage will provide more information on
the type of choices you are being asked to make.
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The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the
money you have earned.
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, to keep your earnings
private.
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so take
your time.
[Wait for everyone to finish demographics]
There is an instruction book in front of each of you. Please open it and follow
along as I read the instructions out loud.
[Do Ellsberg task, read instructions out load]
Before I spin Cage #1 and Cage #2, each of you have the chance to make another
choice, with much higher potential payoffs. Our research assistants are passing around
the decision sheets for this task. If you choose to participate in this task, we will not pay
you for the decision that you just made. You have the choice which decision we will pay
you for: the one you just completed, or the new one we are offering you now.
As you can see from the decision book just handed out, earnings from this next
choice may be very large, but they may also be small. If you decide not to participate in
this task, please use the pen on your desk to cross out the title of your new book:
DECISION TASK. This is your decision to make. If you decide to participate, please
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circle the title of the decision book and cross out the title of your old book: INDIVIDUAL
DECISION MAKING. We will pay you today for all money earned in this task if you
choose to participate. Are there any questions?
[Do belief elicitation task, read instructions out load]
Now that each of you has made your decisions for each of these tasks and we
know which decision you will be paid for, I will uncover Cage #2. As you can see, Cage
#2 is filled with orange and white balls. I would like to ask for one final volunteer to
come up and verify that there are exactly 50 balls in Cage #2.

I will now spin each cage. You will be paid according to the choices you have
made and the color ball chosen from each cage.
Now that everyone has completed the second stage of today’s experiment,
research assistants are passing around instruction books for the third and final stage.
[Do random lottery pairs task, read instructions out load.]
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D.2 Stage 1: Demographics Questionnaire
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D.3. Stage 2: Ellsberg / Smith Instructions
D.3.1 Ellsberg Task
We are interested in your choices, which might be different from the choices
someone else would make. The only right answer is what you really would choose. That
is why the choices are for real money.
In the front of the room there are two bingo cages, labeled Cage #1 and Cage #2.
There are 25 orange balls and 25 white balls in front of Cage #1. Cage #2 is covered and
contains 50 balls. Each ball is either orange or white. You will not be told how many
balls are orange or white. Before we start, I would like to ask one person to come up and
inspect Cage #1. The volunteer will verify that there are 25 orange balls and 25 white
balls and then place each ball in Cage #1. If you would like to volunteer please raise your
hand.

On the last page of this booklet there is a record sheet with four paired choices for
you to make between ―Option A‖ and ―Option B.‖ These four decisions are reprinted
here.
Row
1
2
3
4

Option A

Option B

Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1

Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2

Decision
A

B

Don’t
Care

A

B

Don’t
Care

A

B

Don’t
Care

A

B

Don’t
Care

In each row you will be asked to circle one of the three decisions. Only one of the
four decisions you make will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in
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advance which decision will be used. Your earnings from this decision will depend on
your choice and the outcome of a spin of each of the bingo cages in the front the room.
Please look at row 1, at the top of the table. Option A will pay $10 if the ball
drawn from Cage #1 is orange, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1
is white. The other decisions are similar. For the last row, Option A will pay $10 if the
ball drawn from Cage #1 is white, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage
#2 is white.
In the column labeled ―Decision‖ there are three choices for each row. For each
row, circle the letter of the option that you prefer. If you do not care whether you receive
Option A or Option B, circle ―Don’t Care.‖
After making each of your four decisions, please raise your hand and wait for
assistance. A research assistant will bring you a 6-sided die that you will roll to determine
which row from the record sheet you will be paid from. If you roll a 1, 2, 3, or 4 then you
will be paid according to that row. If a 5 or 6 are rolled, you will roll the die again until
you roll a 1, 2, 3, or 4. If you choose Don’t Care in the decision that we play out, we will
pick one for you using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to Option A and
the numbers 6-10 correspond to Option B.
After we know which decision is binding, we will uncover Cage #2 then spin both
bingo cages to see if you receive the higher amount or the lower amount for the choice
that you made. If you choose Option A you would be paid the appropriate amount in
Option A. If you choose Option B you would be paid the appropriate amount in Option
B.
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Before you circle your decisions, lets uncover the cages under this blue sheet and
use them to do an example together. For each of the four decisions, we will flip a coin to
determine if we choose option A or option B. We will use the white board to keep track
of our four decisions.
For row 1, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white.
For row 2, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white.
For row 3, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange.
For row 4, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white.
Now that we have made each of our four choices, we will roll a 6-sided die to
determine which row is played for this example.
Now that we know which row will be used to determine how we are paid, we will
pick one ball from Cage #1 and Cage #2 to determine what our earnings would be.
Are there any questions?
You may now mark your decisions for each row of the decision sheet. When you
are satisfied with the decisions that you have made, please raise your hand and wait for a
research assistant to bring the dice to determine which row you will be paid from.
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D.3.1.1 Smith Treatment
We are interested in your choices, which might be different from the choices
someone else would make. The only right answer is what you really would choose. That
is why the choices are for real money.
In the front of the room there are three bingo cages, labeled Cage #1, Cage #2,
and Cage #3. There are 25 orange balls and 25 white balls in front of Cage #1. Cage #2 is
empty, and will be filled with 50 balls. Each ball will be either orange or white. You will
not be told how many balls are going to be orange and how many are going to be white.
The composition of balls filling Cage #2 will be determined by drawing 1 out of 51
numbered balls from Cage #3. Each ball will have a number between 0 and 50 written on
it. Before we start I would like to ask one person to come up and inspect Cage #1. The
volunteer will verify that there are 25 orange and 25 white balls. If you would like to
volunteer please raise your hand.

On the last page of this booklet there is a record sheet with four paired choices for
you to make between ―Option A‖ and ―Option B.‖ These four decisions are reprinted
here.
Row
1
2
3
4

Option A

Option B

Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1

Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
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Decision
A

B

Don’t
Care

A

B

Don’t
Care

A

B

Don’t
Care

A

B

Don’t
Care

In each row you will be asked to circle one of the three decisions. Only one of the
four decisions you make will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in
advance which decision will be used. Your earnings from this decision will depend on
your choice and the outcome of a spin of each of the bingo cages in the front the room.
Please look at row 1, at the top of the table. Option A will pay $10 if the ball
drawn from Cage #1 is orange, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1
is white. The other decisions are similar. For the last row, Option A will pay $10 if the
ball drawn from Cage #1 is white, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage
#2 is white.
In the column labeled ―Decision‖ there are three choices for each row. For each
row, circle the letter of the option that you prefer. If you do not care whether you receive
Option A or Option B, circle ―Don’t Care.‖
After making each of your four decisions, please raise your hand and wait for
assistance. A research assistant will bring you a 6-sided die that you will roll to determine
which row from the record sheet you will be paid from. If a 1, 2, 3, or 4 is rolled, you will
be paid according to that row. If a 5 or 6 are rolled, you will roll the die again until you
roll a 1, 2, 3, or 4. If you choose Don’t Care in the decision that we play out, we will pick
one for you using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to Option A and the
numbers 6-10 correspond to Option B.
After we know which decision is binding, I will ask one person to come and
verify that there are 51 balls numbered between 0 and 50 in front of Cage #3. The same
person will then place each of these balls in Cage #3, and spin and draw one ball. The
number on that ball will determine the number of orange balls that we will place in Cage
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#2. The remaining balls, up to 50, will be white. We will then spin Cage #1 and Cage #2
and draw out one ball from each, to see if you receive the higher amount or the lower
amount for the choice that you made. If you choose Option A you would be paid the
appropriate amount in Option A. If you choose Option B you would be paid the
appropriate amount in Option B.
Before you circle your decisions, lets uncover the cages under this blue sheet and
use them to do an example together. For each of the four decisions, we will flip a coin to
determine if we choose option A or option B. We will use the white board to keep track
of our four decisions.
For row 1, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white.
For row 2, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white.
For row 3, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange.
For row 4, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white. Option
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white.
Now that we have made each of our four choices, we will roll a 6-sided die to
determine which row is played for this example.
Now that we know which row will be used to determine how we are paid, we will
pick one ball from Cage #3 to determine how many orange balls and how many white
balls there will be in Cage #2.
We will now fill Cage #2 with the appropriate number of orange and white balls.
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Now we will pick one ball from Cage #1 and Cage #2 to determine what our
earnings would be.
Are there any questions?
You may now mark your decisions for each row of the decision sheet. When you
are satisfied with the decisions that you have made, please raise your hand and wait for a
research assistant to bring the dice to determine which row you will be paid from.
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D.3.5 Ellsberg / Smith Task Decision Sheet
Record Sheet

Row
1
2
3
4

Option A
Option B
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2

To be completed by Staff:
Row Number Selected: __________

Option Selected: __________

Ball Chosen from Cage #1: __________

Ball Chosen from Cage #2: __________

Earnings: __________
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A
A
A
A

Decision
Don’t
B
Care
Don’t
B
Care
Don’t
B
Care
Don’t
B
Care

D.3.3 Belief Elicitation Instructions
Before I spin each cage you will make one decision which will be used to
determine how much money you make. Your decision sheet for this task is on the
following page. Before you make your choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and the color ball drawn from
Cage #2.
Choice 1, at the top of the decision sheet, pays $0 if the ball chosen from Cage #2
is orange and $50 if the ball chosen from Cage #2 is white. If you are certain that Cage #2
is filled entirely with white balls then you should select Choice 1.
Choice 51, at the bottom of the decision sheet, pays $50 if the ball chosen from
Cage #2 is orange and $0 if ball chosen from Cage #2 is white. If you are certain that
Cage #2 is filled entirely with orange balls then you should select Choice 51.
Choices with low numbers pay more if a white ball is drawn from Cage #2, and
less if an orange ball is drawn from Cage #2. Choices with high numbers pay more if an
orange ball is drawn from Cage #2, and less if a white ball is drawn from Cage #2.
Are there any questions?
Please circle your choice on the decision sheet.
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Choice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Payment if Ball Drawn
from Cage #2 is Orange
$0.00
$0.50
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
$5.50
$6.00
$6.50
$7.00
$8.00
$8.50
$9.00
$10.00
$10.50
$11.00
$12.00
$12.50
$13.00
$14.00
$14.50
$15.00
$16.00
$16.50
$17.00
$18.00
$18.50
$19.00
$19.50
$20.50
$21.00
$21.50
$22.50
$23.00
$23.50
$24.50
$25.00
$27.00
$29.00
$31.50
$33.50
$35.50
$37.50
$39.50
$41.50
$44.00
$46.00
$48.00
$50.00

Payment if Ball Drawn
from Cage #2 is White
$50.00
$49.50
$48.50
$48.00
$47.50
$46.50
$46.00
$45.50
$44.50
$44.00
$43.50
$43.00
$42.00
$41.50
$41.00
$40.00
$39.50
$39.00
$38.00
$37.50
$37.00
$36.00
$35.50
$35.00
$34.00
$33.50
$33.00
$32.00
$31.50
$31.00
$30.50
$29.50
$29.00
$28.50
$27.50
$27.00
$26.50
$25.50
$25.00
$23.00
$21.00
$18.50
$16.50
$14.50
$12.50
$10.50
$8.50
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00

Row Choice: __________
To be completed by Staff:
Ball Drawn from Cage #2: ________

Earnings: _________
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D.4 Stage 4: Lottery Task Instructions
Your Instructions
Here, you will be asked to choose between lotteries with varying prizes and
chances of winning. You will be presented with a series of lotteries where you will make
choices between pairs of them. There are 45 pairs in the series. For each pair of lotteries,
you should indicate which of the two lotteries you prefer to play. You will actually get
the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and will be paid according to the
outcome of that lottery, so you should think carefully about which lotteries you prefer.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries will
look like. The display on your screen will be bigger and easier to read.
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The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number
between 1 and 100. Each number between (and including) 1 and 100 is equally likely to
occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice.
In the above example the left lottery pays five dollars ($5) if the number on the
dice that is rolled is between 1 and 40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is
between 41 and 100. The yellow color in the pie chart corresponds to 40% of the area and
illustrates the chances that the number on the dice rolled will be between 1 and 40 and
your prize will be $5. The black area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of the area and
illustrates the chances that the number on the dice rolled will be between 41 and 100 and
your prize will be $15.
We have selected colors for the pie charts such that a darker color indicates a
higher prize. White will be used when the prize is zero dollars ($0).
Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the
number on the dice rolled is between 1 and 50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between
51 and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 91 and 100. As with the
lottery on the left, the pie slices represent the fraction of the possible numbers which
yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice is 10% of the total pie.
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each
screen, you should indicate which of the lotteries you prefer to play by clicking on one of
the three boxes beneath the lotteries. You should click the LEFT box if you prefer the
lottery on the left, the RIGHT box if you prefer the lottery on the right, and the DON’T
CARE box if you do not prefer one or the other.
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You should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the one out of the 45 that you
will play out. If you chose DON’T CARE in the lottery pair that we play out, you will
pick one using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the left lottery and
the numbers 6-10 to the right lottery.
After you have worked through all of the pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and an
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided die to determine which pair
of lotteries that will be played out. You roll the die until a number between 1 and 45
comes up, and that is the lottery pair to be played. If you picked DON’T CARE for that
pair, you will use the 10-sided die to decide which one you will play. Finally, you will
roll the two 10-sided dice to determine the outcome of the lottery you chose.
For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the above example. If
the random number you rolled was 37, you would win $5; if it was 93, you would get
$15. If you picked the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would get $5; if it
was 93, you would get $15.
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things:
• by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 45 such pairs
using the two 10-sided die;
• by which lottery you selected, the left or the right, for that pair; and
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the two 10-sided die.
This is not a test of whether you can pick the best lottery in each pair, because
none of the lotteries are necessarily better than the others. Which lotteries you prefer is a
matter of personal taste. The people next to you will have different lotteries in front of
them when you make your choices, and may have different tastes, so their responses
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should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking
carefully about each lottery.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the $5 show-up fee that you receive
just for being here and any earnings from the previous stage.
We will now come around to your computer and get you started. When you are
finished, please signal someone to come around to play out your lottery and record your
earnings.
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APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 4
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E.1 Experimenter Instructions
Experimenter Instructions
Welcome. This is an experiment in individual decision making. You can earn cash
based on the choices you make today. Money you earn today will be paid to you in cash
at the end of the experiment. You will be paid $5 for participating in the experiment. The
experiment will last no more than 2 hours. Please make sure that you can stay until the
end. In addition to the participation fee, your earnings will depend partly on chance and
partly on the choices you make today. The instructions are simple and you will benefit
from following them carefully.
There are three stages today:
4. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions,
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in.
5. We will then pause and provide instructions on some choices you are to make
over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring. These
choices will directly affect your earnings.
6. We will then pause again, and provide some instructions on the final task, which
involves you making some more choices over different amounts of money that
have different chances of occurring. These choices will also directly affect your
earnings.
The instructions for the second and third stage will provide more information on
the type of choices you are being asked to make.
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The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the
money you have earned.
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, to keep your earnings
private.
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so take
your time.
[Wait for everyone to finish demographics]
There is an instruction book in front of each of you. Please open it and follow
along as I read the instructions out loud.
[Do individual choice task, read instructions out loud]
Now that everyone has completed the second stage of today’s experiment,
research assistants are passing around instruction books for the third and final stage.
[Do random lottery pair task, read instructions out loud]
E.2 Stage 1: Demographics Questions
Demographics questions were identical to those in Appendix D.2.
E.3 Stage 2: Commodity Betting Instructions
E.3.1 Commodity Choice Task
On the last page of this booklet there is a decision sheet with twenty paired
choices between ―Option I‖ and ―Option II.‖ In each row you will be asked to circle one
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of the three decisions shown in the right-hand column. Before you start making your
twenty choices, let me explain how these choices affect you potential earnings.
Although you will make twenty decisions, only one choice will affect your
earnings. You will not know in advance which decision you make will end up affecting
your earnings. After completing the twenty choices you will roll a 20-sided die the result
corresponds to the row from the decision sheet you will play. Obviously, each decision
has an equal chance of being used in the end.
Once the row has been selected we will use a two 10-sided dice to play the option
I or II corresponding to your decision on the selected row. The final result will be written
on the decision sheet.
Please look at row 1, at the top of the table. Option I pays C if the die shows a
number between 1 and 5, and it pays B if the die shows a number between 6 and 100.
Option II pays A if the die shows a number between 1 and 5, and it pays D if the die
shows a number between 6 and 100. The other choices are similar.
Each of these letters A, B, C, and D labels one of the sodas on the table in the
front of the room. If the soda you win is a Coke, we will pay you $10. If the soda you win
is Pepsi we will pay you $0.
In the column labeled ―Decision,‖ there are three choices for each row. For each
row, circle the Roman numeral of the option that you prefer. If you do not care whether
you receive Option I or Option II, circle ―Don’t Care.‖
After making each of your twenty decisions, please raise your hand and wait for
assistance. A research assistant will bring you a 20-sided die that you will roll to
determine which row from the record sheet you will be paid from. For example, if you
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roll a 1 then your decision for row 1 will be binding. If you choose Don’t Care in the
decision that we play out, we will pick one for you using a 10-sided die, where the
numbers 1-5 correspond to Option I and the numbers 6-10 correspond to Option II.
After we know which decision is binding, you will roll the two 10-sided die to
determine which soda you will be paid for. Remember, we will pay you $10 if you win a
Coke. If you win Pepsi, we will pay you $0.
At the conclusion of this session you can have either a Coke or a Pepsi, which
ever you prefer. You should not let the fact that you like to drink one soda brand over the
other influence the 20 choices you make. You can have whichever soda you prefer at the
end of the session.
Consider the following examples.
If you chose Option I for row 1 and you then roll a 3 using the two 10-sided dice,
you will be paid based on the brand of soda C. In fact, if your roll any number less than
or equal to 5, you will be paid based on the brand of soda C. On the other hand, if you
roll a 6 or higher you will be paid based on the brand of soda B.
Alternatively, if you chose Option II for row 1 and you then roll a 3 using the two
10-sided dice, you will be paid based on the brand of soda A. In fact, if your roll any
number less than or equal to 5, you will be paid based on the brand of soda A. On the
other hand, if you roll a 6 or higher you will be paid based on the brand of soda D.
If row 20 is the row that we play out, and if you choose Option I, you will be paid
based on the brand of soda C. On the other hand, if you choose Option II then you will be
paid based on the brand of soda A.
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Remember, at the conclusion of this session you can have either a Coke or a
Pepsi, which ever you prefer. You should not let the fact that you like to drink one soda
brand over the other influence the 20 choices you make. You can have whichever soda
you prefer at the end of the session.
Before you make your choices, you may come to the front of the room to taste
each soda.
Are there any questions?
You may now mark your decisions for each row of the decision sheet. When you
are satisfied with the decisions that you have made, please raise your hand and wait for a
research assistant to bring the dice to determine which row you will be paid from.
E.3.1.1 Ungraded Treatment
In the ungraded treatment each soda A, B, C, and D was covered with 2 to 3
layers of blue painters tape. Soda labels were not visible. The instructions were identical
to those used in the branded treatment, above.
E.3.1.2 Graded Treatment
In the graded treatment the following text is inserted before subjects are asked to
make their choices.
Before you make your choices, I would like to ask for a volunteer to come taste
each soda and then make a guess whether each is Coke or Pepsi. This volunteer will write
his guesses on the index cards in front of each can. If this volunteer correctly guesses the
brand of each soda he will be paid $10 in addition to his/her earning from his/her
decisions.

150

If you would like to volunteer please raise your hand. If there is more than one
volunteer we will pick one randomly.

Before you make your choices, you may come to the front of the room to taste
each soda.

151

E.3.2 Commodity Choice Task Decision Sheet
Row
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Option I
5/100 of C and 95/100 of B
8/100 of C and 92/100 of B
11/100 of C and 89/100 of B
15/100 of C and 85/100 of B
18/100 of C and 82/100 of B
21/100 of C and 79/100 of B
24/100 of C and 76/100 of B
28/100 of C and 72/100 of B
31/100 of C and 69/100 of B
34/100 of C and 66/100 of B
37/100 of C and 63/100 of B
40/100 of C and 60/100 of B
44/100 of C and 56/100 of B
47/100 of C and 53/100 of B
50/100 of C and 50/100 of B
60/100 of C and 40/100 of B
70/100 of C and 30/100 of B
80/100 of C and 20/100 of B
90/100 of C and 10/100 of B
100/100 of C and 0/100 of B

Option II
95/100 of D and 5/100 of A
92/100 of D and 8/100 of A
89/100 of D and 11/100 of A
85/100 of D and 15/100 of A
82/100 of D and 18/100 of A
79/100 of D and 21/100 of A
76/100 of D and 24/100 of A
72/100 of D and 28/100 of A
69/100 of D and 31/100 of A
66/100 of D and 34/100 of A
63/100 of D and 37/100 of A
60/100 of D and 40/100 of A
56/100 of D and 44/100 of A
53/100 of D and 47/100 of A
50/100 of D and 50/100 of A
40/100 of D and 60/100 of A
30/100 of D and 70/100 of A
20/100 of D and 80/100 of A
10/100 of D and 90/100 of A
0/100 of D and 100/100 of A

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Decision
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care
II
Don’t Care

To be completed by Staff:
Row Number Selected: __________
Roll of 100-Sided Die: __________

Option Selected: __________
Prize Won: __________
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Dollar Value of prize: _________

E.3.3 Belief Elicitation Instructions
E.3.3.1 Brand Elicitation
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions
privately.
In this task you will place a bet that the soda you won is either Coke or Pepsi. At
the conclusion of this session, we will uncover each can to reveal the brands.
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and the brand of the soda you
won in the previous task. The true brand will be determined when we uncover each can at
the conclusion of this stage of today’s session. Before you make your report, lets discuss
the decision sheet.
If you believe with 100% certainty that the correct brand for the soda you won is
Coke then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if the correct brand for the
soda you won is Coke and $0 if the correct brand for the soda you won is Pepsi.
Similarly, if you are sure that the correct brand for the soda you won is Pepsi
then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there is a 0%
chance certainty that the correct brand for the soda you won is Coke. Row 0% pays $0
if that the correct brand for the soda you won is Coke and $50 if that the correct brand
for the soda you won is Pepsi.
Are there any questions?
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.
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DECISION SHEET
Row
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
7%
8%
9%
11%
12%
14%
15%
16%
18%
19%
20%
22%
23%
24%
26%
27%
28%
30%
31%
32%
34%
35%
36%
38%
39%
41%
42%
43%
45%
46%
47%
49%
50%
54%
58%
62%
65%
69%
73%
77%
81%
85%
88%
92%
96%
100%

Payment if the correct
brand for the soda you
won is Coke
$0.00
$0.50
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
$5.50
$6.00
$7.00
$7.50
$8.00
$9.00
$9.50
$10.00
$11.00
$11.50
$12.00
$13.00
$13.50
$14.00
$15.00
$15.50
$16.00
$17.00
$17.50
$18.00
$19.00
$19.50
$20.50
$21.00
$21.50
$22.50
$23.00
$23.50
$24.50
$25.00
$27.00
$29.00
$31.00
$32.50
$34.50
$36.50
$38.50
$40.50
$42.50
$44.00
$46.00
$48.00
$50.00

Payment if the correct
brand for the soda you
won is Pepsi
$50.00
$49.50
$48.50
$48.00
$47.50
$46.50
$46.00
$45.50
$44.50
$44.00
$43.00
$42.50
$42.00
$41.00
$40.50
$40.00
$39.00
$38.50
$38.00
$37.00
$36.50
$36.00
$35.00
$34.50
$34.00
$33.00
$32.50
$32.00
$31.00
$30.50
$29.50
$29.00
$28.50
$27.50
$27.00
$26.50
$25.50
$25.00
$23.00
$21.00
$19.00
$17.50
$15.50
$13.50
$11.50
$9.50
$7.50
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00

Row Choice: __________
To be completed by Staff:
Correct Brand Coke (yes/no)?: ________

Earnings: _________
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E.3.3.2 Prediction Accuracy Elicitation
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions
privately.
In this task you will place a bet that the brands of both sodas in your chosen
option were predicted correctly by our volunteer. At the conclusion of this session, we
will uncover each can to reveal the brands.
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and the accuracy of the brand
prediction marked on each index card for the sodas in you chosen option from the
previous task. The true brand will be determined when we uncover each can at the
conclusion of this stage of today’s session. Before you make your report, lets discuss the
decision sheet.
If you believe with 100% certainty that the brands for both sodas in your chosen
option were predicted correctly then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if
both sodas in your chosen option were predicted correctly and $0 if the brand for at least
one of the sodas in your chosen option was predicted incorrectly.
Similarly, if you are sure that the brand for at least one of the sodas in your
chosen option is not correct then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that
you believe there is a 0% chance certainty that the brands for both sodas in your chosen
option were predicted correctly. Row 0% pays $0 if the brands for both sodas in your
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chosen option were predicted correctly and $50 if the brand for at least one of the sodas
in your chosen option is not correct.
Are there any questions?
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.
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DECISION SHEET

Row
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
7%
8%
9%
11%
12%
14%
15%
16%
18%
19%
20%
22%
23%
24%
26%
27%
28%
30%
31%
32%
34%
35%
36%
38%
39%
41%
42%
43%
45%
46%
47%
49%
50%
54%
58%
62%
65%
69%
73%
77%
81%
85%
88%
92%
96%
100%

Payment if both soda
brands in your chosen
option are predicted
correctly
$0.00
$0.50
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
$5.50
$6.00
$7.00
$7.50
$8.00
$9.00
$9.50
$10.00
$11.00
$11.50
$12.00
$13.00
$13.50
$14.00
$15.00
$15.50
$16.00
$17.00
$17.50
$18.00
$19.00
$19.50
$20.50
$21.00
$21.50
$22.50
$23.00
$23.50
$24.50
$25.00
$27.00
$29.00
$31.00
$32.50
$34.50
$36.50
$38.50
$40.50
$42.50
$44.00
$46.00
$48.00
$50.00

Payment if at least one
soda brands in your chosen
option are predicted
incorrectly
$50.00
$49.50
$48.50
$48.00
$47.50
$46.50
$46.00
$45.50
$44.50
$44.00
$43.00
$42.50
$42.00
$41.00
$40.50
$40.00
$39.00
$38.50
$38.00
$37.00
$36.50
$36.00
$35.00
$34.50
$34.00
$33.00
$32.50
$32.00
$31.00
$30.50
$29.50
$29.00
$28.50
$27.50
$27.00
$26.50
$25.50
$25.00
$23.00
$21.00
$19.00
$17.50
$15.50
$13.50
$11.50
$9.50
$7.50
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00

Row Choice: __________
To be completed by Staff:
Correct Brand Predicted (yes/no)?: ________
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Earnings: _________

E.4 Stage 3: Lottery Task Instructions
Lottery task instructions were identical to those used in Appendix D.4.
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 5
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F.1 Experimenter instructions
Experimenter Instructions
Welcome. This is an experiment in individual decision making. You can earn cash
based on the choices you make today. Money you earn today will be paid to you in cash
at the end of the experiment. You will be paid $5 for participating in the experiment. The
experiment will last no more than 2 and ½ hours. Please make sure that you can stay
until the end. In addition to the participation fee, your earnings will depend partly on
chance and partly on the choices you make today. The instructions are simple and you
will benefit from following them carefully.
There are three stages today:
7. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions,
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in.
8. We will then pause and provide instructions on some choices you are to make
over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring. These
choices will directly affect your earnings.
9. We will then pause again, and provide some instructions on the final task, which
involves you making some more choices over different amounts of money that
have different chances of occurring. These choices will also directly affect your
earnings.
The instructions for the second and third stage will provide more information on
the type of choices you are being asked to make.
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The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the
money you have earned.
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, to keep your earnings
private.
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so take
your time.
[WAIT FOR EVERYONE TO FINISH DEMOGRAPHICS]
There is an instruction book in front of each of you. Please open it and follow
along as I read the instructions out loud.
[Do public goods game, read instructions out loud]
Now that everyone has finished this game, I would like to introduce the next
decision task. Our research assistants are handing out the decision books for this task.
[Do WTA task, read instructions out loud.]
Thank you. Now that everyone has finished this task, research assistants will
come by to play everyone’s decisions.
Before we record your earnings from the sale of your record sheet and play out
the punishment phase of this session, each of you has the chance to make another choice,
with much higher potential payoffs. Research assistants are passing around the decisions
book for the choice that Sellers will now be allowed to make if they want to. If you
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choose to participate in this task, we will not pay you for the decisions that you have
made so far.
Earnings from this next choice may be very large, they may also be small. If you
decide not to participate in this task, please use the red pen on your desk to cross out the
title of your new book: DECISION TASK. This is your decision to make. If you decide to
participate, please circle the title of the new decision book and cross out the title of your
old book: INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING. Remember, while some of the payoffs are
large, there is no catch. We will pay you today for all money earned in this task. You
have the choice which decision we will pay you for.
Before we proceed, if anyone has any questions please raise your hand and we
will answer your questions privately.
[Do belief elicitation task, read instructions out loud]
By now everyone should be finished making your selections. If you have not
finished please raise your hand.
Before you play your bet, each of you has a decision to make. You can replace the
bet you just made with the spin of a bingo cage. Let me explain how this works.
If you decide to replace the bet you just made with the spin of a bingo cage, write
REPLACE at the bottom of your decision sheet for the task we just completed. If you
don’t care, write DON’T CARE. If you write DON’T CARE, you will pick one using a
10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the keeping your bet and the numbers
6-10 to replacing your bet. If your bet is replaced, a research assistant will bring you a
small bingo cage filled with balls numbered between 0 and 100. Before you make this
decision, lets do an example to show you how this works.

162

For row 19%: If this bet is replaced and you draw a bingo ball numbered between
0 and 19 we will pay $9.50. On the other hand, if you draw a bingo ball number between
20 and 100 we pay $40.50.
Lets do one more example.
For row 77%: If this bet is replaced and you draw a bingo ball numbered between
0 and 77 we will pay $38.50. On the other hand, if you draw a bingo ball numbered
between 78 and 100 we pay $11.50.
Are there any questions?
[ANSWER QUESTIONS]
Remember, if you decide to replace the bet you just made with the spin of a bingo
cage, write REPLACE at the bottom of your decision sheet for the task we just
completed. If you don’t care, write DON’T CARE. If you write DON’T CARE, you will
pick one using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the keeping your bet
and the numbers 6-10 to replacing your bet. This decision is final. Make you decision
now.
[WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE]
Has everyone made their decision?
Please put your pens down and wait for a research assistant to come verify that
your decision has been made. If you chose REPLACE or DON’T CARE, you will play
that decision now.
[SPIN CAGE FOR THOSE SUBJECTS WHO REPLACE]
[FOLD WTA DECISION BOOKS SO SENDER & PUNISHER DECISIONS SHEETS
ARE SHOWING.]
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[FOLD WTA BOOKS OF SELLERS TO KEEP THEIR IDENTITIES SECRET]
[Task 4 – Punishment]
If you are a Sender and the seller you are paired with sold their record sheet we
will now pass it to you.
[PASS RECORD SHEETS AND BLANKS]
If your role is Sender, we would like you to make your decision to either keep the
sellers information confidential or pass it to the punisher now. Please circle either A or B
on the decision sheet in front of you. If you are not a Sender or you did not receive a
seller’s record sheet you have no decision to make.
[WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE]
We will now collect all record sheets and give them to the punishers according to
the decisions made by the sellers and senders they are paired with.
[COLLECT DECISION SHEETS FROM SENDERS]
[WRITE SENDER DECISION ON THE BOTTOM OF THE SELLER’S RECORD
SHEET]
[COLLECT BLANKS FROM ALL SELLERS AND PUNISHERS]
[PASS RECORD SHEETS AND BLANKS TO PUNISHERS]
[PASS BLANKS TO SELLERS AND SENDERS]
If you have been assigned the role of Punisher, we would like you to make your
decision now.
[WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE]
[COLLECT RECORD SHEETS AND BLANKS]
[IF SELLER IS PUNISHED, WRITE PUNISHED ON THEIR RECORD SHEET]
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Research assistant will now come by and calculate your final earnings for this
stage.
[COLLECT RECORD SHEETS FROM PUNISHERS. IF THEY PUNISH WRITE
PUNISHED ON THEM.]
[COLLECT BLANKS FOR SELLERS, SENDERS, AND SOME PUNISHERS]
[GIVE SELLERS THEIR ORIGINAL RECORD SHEET FROM FIRST GAME]
[GIVE BLANKS TO SENDERS AND PUNISHERS]
This stage is now over.
F.2 Stage 1: Demographics Questions
Demographics questions were identical to those in Appendix D.2.
F.3 Stage 2: Privacy task Instructions
F.3.1 Public Goods Instructions
The task that will be described to you next will be repeated 10 times. Each
repetition will be referred to as a round. In each round you will be matched with four
other people in this room.
You begin each round with 20 ―tokens.‖ Your task is to decide how to use your
tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to invest and how many
of the 20 tokens to keep for yourself. The people you are matched with will decide how
many of their tokens to keep, and how many to invest. The consequences of your
decision are explained in detail below.
At the beginning of each round a screen similar to this will appear:
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The round number and your ID number appear at the top middle of the screen.
The round number is also indicated in the left hand column titled ―Round.‖ Your decision
must be made before the next round can begin.
You have to decide how many tokens you want to invest by choosing a number
between 0 and 20 in the drop-down box labeled ―Number Invested,‖ located in the
middle of your screen. This field can be found by clicking ―please choose‖ next to
―Tokens to Invest.‖ As soon as you have decided how many tokens to invest, you have
also decided how many tokens you keep for yourself, since this is 20 tokens minus your
investment. After entering your investment, you must press ―Submit.‖ Once you have
done this, you will be asked to confirm your decision for that round. Once you confirm
your investment, your decision can no longer be revised.
After you and everyone else have made your decisions the following earnings
screen will show you the total amount of tokens invested. This screen also shows you
how much money you have earned during the round.
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Your earnings consist of two parts:
1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself
2) The earnings from investment. This is calculated as follows:
Your earnings from investment = 1 cents x the sum of the investments from everyone this
round.
Your earnings for each round are therefore:
3 cents x (20 - your investment) + 1 cents x (sum of all investments)
The earnings from investment that go to each of you are calculated in the same
way, which means that each person receives the same earnings from investment. Suppose
the sum of the contributions is 20 tokens. In this case each of you receives earnings from
investment of 1 cent x 20 = 20 cents. On the other hand, if the total investment is 3
tokens, then each member of the group receives earnings of 1 cent x 3 = 3 cents from
investment.
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Each token that you keep for yourself adds 3 cents to your earnings. If you
invested 1 additional token, then your earnings from investment would rise by 1 cents x
1=1 cents. The earnings of the other people would also rise by 1 cents, so that the
combined earnings for all of you from investment would rise by 5 cents. Your investment
therefore also increases the earnings of the other people. On the other hand you also get
earnings for each token invested by the others. For each token invested by the others you
also earn 3 cents x 1=3 cents.
Of course, every additional token you contribute to the project is 1 less token that
goes towards ―Earnings from private tokens kept.‖
To summarize: For each token you invest, your earnings are reduced 3 cents by
the token you invest and increased by the investment earnings of 1 cents. In addition,
your earnings are increased by 1 cents for each token contributed by the others. After you
review the earnings screen, please press the button at the bottom to begin the next round.
Before we start the actual experiment you will have a chance to practice this task
for two rounds.
F.3.1.1 Public Goods Treatments
The public goods game task used a 2  2 design, setting endowments to {20
tokens, 30 tokens} and public return from investment {2 tokens, 1 token}.
F.3.2 BDM / WTA Privacy Loss Instructions
In this task each of you has been assigned one of three roles: Seller, Sender, or
Punisher. Your role is indicated at the top of the next page of this booklet. Please do not
read ahead.
Let me explain these roles here.
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Sellers have the chance to sell us a copy of their record sheet from the game that
was just played. If the Seller sells us their record sheet we will then give the record
sheet to either a Sender or a Punisher. Sellers will know in advance the role of the
person who we would give the record sheet to. However, Sellers will not know their true
identity. And they will not know the Sellers true identity.
If a Seller’s record sheet is sold and then given to a Sender, that Sender will
decide whether to keep the records confidential or to share the records with a Punisher.
This decision is entirely up to the Sender. Remember that the Sender will not know the
true identity of the Seller or the Punisher. And the Punisher and Seller will not know the
true identity of the Sender.
At the end of this stage, each person assigned to the role of Punisher will have a
choice to make. Punishers will choose to:
(a) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game
(b) deduct no earnings.
Punishers may deduct earnings from a Seller even if the seller did not sell their
record sheet. This decision is entirely up to the Punisher.
Remember, each Sender will decide to keep a record sheet confidential or to share
the record sheet with a Punisher. Each Punisher will decide whether or not to deduct
earnings from the Seller.
The next page of this booklet indicates your role: Seller, Sender, or Punisher.
Please read the instructions, on the following page quietly to yourself. If you have
any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer
your questions privately.
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In this experiment, you are a Seller. The cartoon below shows your role, circled
in red, along with the roles of the people you are paired with.

YOU

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Your records
are secret

We
give
to
Sender

You lose
half of
money
Give to punisher
Sender

Keep secret

Punisher

You lose
no
money

If you sell your record sheet to us, we will give it to the Sender you are paired
with. The Sender will decide whether to keep your records confidential or to share the
records with a Punisher. The punisher will choose to:
(a) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game
(b) deduct no earnings.
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will
answer your questions privately.

Now that everyone has had a chance to understand their role and ask questions,
we will explain how Sellers can sell a copy of their record sheet from the first task.
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Before we explain how Sellers sell us their record sheet, Senders and Punishers
can also sell us their record sheet. But, we will keep Senders’ and Punishers’ record
sheets confidential.
To summarize, we would like to buy everyone’s record sheet. If your role is
Seller, we will give your record sheet to either a Sender or Punisher, as indicated on the
previous page of your instructions. If your role is Sender or Punisher we will keep your
record sheet confidential.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will
come by and answer your questions privately.
We will now explain how you can sell your record sheet.
On the last page of this decision book you have an decision sheet. It reads as
follows:
―I will sell record sheet for $______.‖
In order to provide you with an incentive to think about the value of your record
sheet, and tell us that value, we will do the following. We will randomly choose a price
between $0.00 and $20.99 to pay for a record sheet. We will not pay more than $20.99.
Before you write your offer in the blank space provided, let me explain how the sale will
work.
After you write your price in the blank provided on the last page of this booklet, a
research assistant will bring you one 20-sided die and two 10-sided dice. You will roll
each of these dice to determine how much money we are willing to pay for the record
sheet. Numbers on the 20-sided die will represent dollars. The numbers rolled with the
two 10-sided dice will represent cents. Consider the following examples.
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Example 1: ―John Doe‖ is willing to sell his record sheet for $7.78, so he would
write 7.78 on the last page of his booklet. If he then rolls a 5 on the 20-sided die and a 65
with the two 10-sided dice, then we are only willing to pay $5.65 for ―John Doe’s‖ record
sheet. Because we are not willing to pay the price that ―John Doe‖ has asked, no sale
takes place and ―John Doe‖ keeps his record sheet private.
Example 2: ―Jane Doe‖ is willing to sell her record sheet for $4.33, so she would
write 4.33 on the last page of her booklet. If she then rolls a 4 on the 20-sided die and a
73 with the two 10-sided dice, then we are willing to pay $4.73 for ―Jane Doe’s‖ record
sheet. Because we are willing to pay more than the price that ―Jane Doe‖ has asked, a
sale takes place and in exchange for a copy of her record sheet ―Jane Doe‖ will receive
$4.73.
Your best interest is served by simply telling us the value of the record sheet to
you. If the price you write down is too high or too low, then you are passing up
opportunities that you would prefer.
•

For example, suppose Jane would be willing to sell her record sheet for
$12 but instead she marked $15. If the amount of money drawn at random
is anything between the $12 and $15 (for example $13.50), she would
keep her record sheet and lose the $13.50 that she would have been willing
to make the trade for.

•

Suppose John would be willing to sell his record sheet for $15 but he
marked $12. If the amount of money drawn at random is between the $15
and $12 (for example $13.50) then he would be forced to sell the record
sheet even though at that price he prefers to keep the record sheet secret.
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You may now mark your decision on the decision sheet.
DECISION SHEET

YOU

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Your records
are secret

We
give
to
Sender

You lose
half of
money
Give to punisher
Sender

Punisher

Keep secret

You lose
no
money

Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the roles
of the people you are paired with. Please write the amount of money you are willing to
sell your record sheet for in the blank space provided on the next line.
I will sell record sheet for $__________

20sided Roll

1st
10-sided Die
Roll

Did sale take place? Yes

No

If yes, amount paid $___________
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2nd
10-sided Die
Roll

F.3.2.1 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Sender in Indirect-Sale
In this experiment, you are a Sender. The cartoon below shows your role, circled
in red, along with the roles of the people you are paired with.

Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you

Seller loses
half of
money
Give to punisher
You

Keep secret

Punisher

Seller
loses no
money

At the end of this session you may or may not receive the record sheet of a Seller.
If you receive a seller’s record sheet, it will include the Seller’s earnings in the game that
was just played.
You have a decision to make at the end of the session. You will need to decide to
either keep information confidential or pass the information to a punisher, who may or
may not reduce the Seller’s earning from the game that was just played by 50%. This
decision is entirely up to you.
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will
answer your questions privately.
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DECISION SHEET
Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you

Seller loses
half of
money
Give to punisher
You

Keep secret

Seller
loses no
money

Punisher

Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the roles
of the people you are paired with.
Please write the amount of money you are willing to sell your record sheet for in
the blank space provided on the next line.
I will sell record sheet for $__________
At the end of this stage you will have a decision to make. For this decision, you
will need to circle either A or B for your choice. Do not make this choice yet. We will tell
you when to make your decision.
Keep the Seller’s record sheet confidential:

A

Pass the Seller’s record sheet to the Punisher:

B

20sided Roll

1st
10-sided Die
Roll

Did sale take place? Yes

No

If yes, amount paid $___________
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2nd
10-sided Die
Roll

F.3.2.2 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Punisher in Indirect-Sale
In this experiment, you are a Punisher. The cartoon below shows your role,
circled in red, along with the roles of the people you are paired with.

Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you

Seller lose
half of
money
Give to punisher
Sender

Keep secret

You

Seller
loses no
money

You may or may not receive the record sheet of a Seller. If you receive a seller’s
record sheet, it will include the Seller’s earnings in the game that was just played.
You have a decision to make at the end of the stage. You will need to decide to
either
(a) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game
(b) deduct no earnings.
This decision is entirely up to you.
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will
answer your questions privately.
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DECISION SHEET

Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you

Seller lose
half of
money
Give to punisher
Sender

Keep secret

Seller
loses no
money

You

Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the roles
of the people you are paired with.
Please write the amount of money you are willing to sell your record sheet for in
the blank space provided on the next line.
I will sell record sheet for $__________
At the end of this stage you will have a decision to make. For this decision, you
will need to circle either A or B for your choice. Do not make this choice yet. We will tell
you when to make your decision.
Deduct none of the Seller’s earnings from the first game:

A

Deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game:

B

20sided Roll

1st
10-sided Die
Roll

Did sale take place? Yes

No

If yes, amount paid $___________
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2nd
10-sided Die
Roll

F.3.2.3 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Seller in Direct-Sale
In this experiment, you are a Seller. The cartoon below shows your role, circled
in red, along with the role of the person you are paired with.

You

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Your records
are secret

We
give
to
punisher

Punish you
Punisher Don’t punish you

You lose
half of
money
You lose
no
money

If you sell your record sheet to us, we will give it to the Punisher you are
paired with. The punisher will choose to:
(c) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game
(d) deduct no earnings.
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will
answer your questions privately.
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DECISION SHEET

You

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Your records
are secret

We
give
to
punisher

Punish you
Punisher Don’t punish you

You lose
half of
money
You lose
no
money

Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the role
of the person you are paired with. Please write the amount of money you are willing to
sell your record sheet for in the blank space provided on the next line.
I will sell record sheet for $__________

20sided Roll

1st
10-sided Die
Roll

Did sale take place? Yes

No

If yes, amount paid $___________
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2nd
10-sided Die
Roll

F.3.2.4 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Punisher in Direct-Sale
In this experiment, you are a Punisher. The cartoon below shows your role,
circled in red, along with the role of the person you are paired with.

Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you

You

Seller loses
half of
Punish Seller
money
Seller
Don’t punish seller
loses no
money

You may or may not receive the record sheet of a Seller. If you receive a seller’s
record sheet, it will include the Seller’s earnings in the game that was just played.
You have a decision to make at the end of the stage. You will need to decide to
either
(c) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game
(d) deduct no earnings.
This decision is entirely up to you.
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will
answer your questions privately.
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DECISION SHEET

Seller

Sell
Records

Don’t
Sell
Records

Us the
Experimenter

Seller’s records
are secret

We
give
to
you
Seller loses
half of
money
Seller
Don’t punish seller
loses no
money
Punish Seller

You

Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the role
of the person you are paired with.
Please write the amount of money you are willing to sell your record sheet for in
the blank space provided on the next line.
I will sell record sheet for $__________
At the end of this stage you will have a decision to make. For this decision, you
will need to circle either A or B for your choice. Do not make this choice yet. We will tell
you when to make your decision.
Deduct none of the Seller’s earnings from the first game:

A

Deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game:

B

20sided Roll

1st
10-sided Die
Roll

Did sale take place? Yes

No

If yes, amount paid $___________
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2nd
10-sided Die
Roll

F.3.3 Belief Elicitation Instructions
F.3.3.1 Elicitation of Punishment Beliefs
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions
privately.
In this task you will place a bet that the Punisher reduces your earnings from the
first game by 50%.
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and if the Punisher reduces your
earnings from the first game by 50%.
If you believe with 100% certainty the Punisher will reduce you earnings from the
first game then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if the Punisher reduces
you earnings from the first game and $0 if the Punisher does not reduce you earnings
from the first game
Similarly, if you are sure the Punisher will not reduce you earnings from the first
game then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there is a
0% chance that the Punisher will reduce you earnings from the first game. Row 0% pays
$0 if the Punisher reduces you earnings from the first game and $50 if the Punisher does
not reduce you earnings from the first game
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will
come by to assist you.
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.
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DECISION SHEET
Row
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
7%
8%
9%
11%
12%
14%
15%
16%
18%
19%
20%
22%
23%
24%
26%
27%
28%
30%
31%
32%
34%
35%
36%
38%
39%
41%
42%
43%
45%
46%
47%
49%
50%
54%
58%
62%
65%
69%
73%
77%
81%
85%
88%
92%
96%
100%

Payment if the Punisher
reduces your earning from
the first game by 50%
$0.00
$0.50
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
$5.50
$6.00
$7.00
$7.50
$8.00
$9.00
$9.50
$10.00
$11.00
$11.50
$12.00
$13.00
$13.50
$14.00
$15.00
$15.50
$16.00
$17.00
$17.50
$18.00
$19.00
$19.50
$20.50
$21.00
$21.50
$22.50
$23.00
$23.50
$24.50
$25.00
$27.00
$29.00
$31.00
$32.50
$34.50
$36.50
$38.50
$40.50
$42.50
$44.00
$46.00
$48.00
$50.00

Payment if the Punisher does
not reduces your earning
from the first game by 50%
$50.00
$49.50
$48.50
$48.00
$47.50
$46.50
$46.00
$45.50
$44.50
$44.00
$43.00
$42.50
$42.00
$41.00
$40.50
$40.00
$39.00
$38.50
$38.00
$37.00
$36.50
$36.00
$35.00
$34.50
$34.00
$33.00
$32.50
$32.00
$31.00
$30.50
$29.50
$29.00
$28.50
$27.50
$27.00
$26.50
$25.50
$25.00
$23.00
$21.00
$19.00
$17.50
$15.50
$13.50
$11.50
$9.50
$7.50
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00

Report: __________
To be completed by Staff:
Did punisher reduce by 50% (yes/no)?: ________
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Earnings: _________

F.3.3.2 Elicitation of Confidentiality Beliefs
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions
privately.
In this task you will place a bet that the Sender will pass your record sheet to the
Punisher.
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and if Sender passes your
information to the Punisher.
If you believe with 100% certainty that your information will be passed to the
Punisher then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if your information is
passed to the Punisher and $0 if your information is not passed to the Punisher.
Similarly, if you are sure that your information is not going to be passed to the
Punisher then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there
is a 0% chance that your information will be passed to the Punisher. Row 0% pays $0 if
your information is passed to the Punisher and $50 if your information is not passed to
the Punisher.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will
come by to assist you.
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.
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DECISION SHEET
Row
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
7%
8%
9%
11%
12%
14%
15%
16%
18%
19%
20%
22%
23%
24%
26%
27%
28%
30%
31%
32%
34%
35%
36%
38%
39%
41%
42%
43%
45%
46%
47%
49%
50%
54%
58%
62%
65%
69%
73%
77%
81%
85%
88%
92%
96%
100%

Payment if your record sheet Payment if your record sheet
is passed to the Punisher
is not passed to the Punisher
$0.00
$50.00
$0.50
$49.50
$1.50
$48.50
$2.00
$48.00
$2.50
$47.50
$3.50
$46.50
$4.00
$46.00
$4.50
$45.50
$5.50
$44.50
$6.00
$44.00
$7.00
$43.00
$7.50
$42.50
$8.00
$42.00
$9.00
$41.00
$9.50
$40.50
$10.00
$40.00
$11.00
$39.00
$11.50
$38.50
$12.00
$38.00
$13.00
$37.00
$13.50
$36.50
$14.00
$36.00
$15.00
$35.00
$15.50
$34.50
$16.00
$34.00
$17.00
$33.00
$17.50
$32.50
$18.00
$32.00
$19.00
$31.00
$19.50
$30.50
$20.50
$29.50
$21.00
$29.00
$21.50
$28.50
$22.50
$27.50
$23.00
$27.00
$23.50
$26.50
$24.50
$25.50
$25.00
$25.00
$27.00
$23.00
$29.00
$21.00
$31.00
$19.00
$32.50
$17.50
$34.50
$15.50
$36.50
$13.50
$38.50
$11.50
$40.50
$9.50
$42.50
$7.50
$44.00
$6.00
$46.00
$4.00
$48.00
$2.00
$50.00
$0.00

Report: __________
To be completed by Staff:
Was the record sheet passed (yes/no)?: ________
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Earnings: _________

F3.3.3 Elicitation of Beliefs from Senders and Punishers
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions
privately.
In this task you will place a bet you receive the seller’s record sheet from the first
game we played.
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and if you receive the seller’s
record sheet.
If you believe with 100% certainty that you will receive the seller’s record sheet
then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if you receive the seller’s record
sheet and $0 if you do not.
Similarly, if you are sure that you will not receive the seller’s record sheet then
you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there is a 0% chance
that you will receive the seller’s record sheet. Row 0% pays $0 if you receive the seller’s
record sheet and $50 if you do not receive the seller’s record sheet.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will
come by to assist you.
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.
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DECISION SHEET
Row
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
7%
8%
9%
11%
12%
14%
15%
16%
18%
19%
20%
22%
23%
24%
26%
27%
28%
30%
31%
32%
34%
35%
36%
38%
39%
41%
42%
43%
45%
46%
47%
49%
50%
54%
58%
62%
65%
69%
73%
77%
81%
85%
88%
92%
96%
100%

Payment if you receive the
seller's record sheet
$0.00
$0.50
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
$5.50
$6.00
$7.00
$7.50
$8.00
$9.00
$9.50
$10.00
$11.00
$11.50
$12.00
$13.00
$13.50
$14.00
$15.00
$15.50
$16.00
$17.00
$17.50
$18.00
$19.00
$19.50
$20.50
$21.00
$21.50
$22.50
$23.00
$23.50
$24.50
$25.00
$27.00
$29.00
$31.00
$32.50
$34.50
$36.50
$38.50
$40.50
$42.50
$44.00
$46.00
$48.00
$50.00

Payment if you do not receive
the seller's record sheet
$50.00
$49.50
$48.50
$48.00
$47.50
$46.50
$46.00
$45.50
$44.50
$44.00
$43.00
$42.50
$42.00
$41.00
$40.50
$40.00
$39.00
$38.50
$38.00
$37.00
$36.50
$36.00
$35.00
$34.50
$34.00
$33.00
$32.50
$32.00
$31.00
$30.50
$29.50
$29.00
$28.50
$27.50
$27.00
$26.50
$25.50
$25.00
$23.00
$21.00
$19.00
$17.50
$15.50
$13.50
$11.50
$9.50
$7.50
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00

Report: __________
To be completed by Staff:
Was the record sheet received (yes/no)?: ________
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Earnings: _________

F.4 Stage 3: Lottery Task Instructions
Lottery task instructions were identical to those used in Appendix D.4.
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